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Abstract 
Innovation is fundamental to the firm and ultimately to national economic growth and 
stability. Systemic support for identified sectors assumes that innovation depends not 
only on how individual firm and non-firm actors perform but also on the dynamics of 
their interaction as parts of a system. To date, research within the Sectoral System of 
Innovation framework perceived fit as a function of enablement between the firm and 
the system based on industry type. This is problematic as assuming firms are 
homogenous overlooks the impact of critical micro level contingencies such as age and 
strategic intent in achieving fit, and in turn enabling innovation. 
Consistent with theory that organisational performance is a function of the fit between 
two or more factors within a system, this thesis departs from previous macro and 
meso system-level approaches by undertaking a micro level analysis of how fit is 
mediated by age and strategy contingencies in two contrasting sectors. Using interview 
and survey data of Irish software and manufacturing engineering companies, this 
represents the first empirical analysis of contingency-based system fit. 
This study reveals a detachment between the universality implied in the design of 
Sectoral Systems of Innovation and the heterogeneity of firm context. Importantly, this 
finding provides strong evidence supporting previously intuitive calls for policy makers 
to place greater emphasis on firm dynamics. The findings in relation to firm age and 
strategic intent demonstrate that the nature of value creation hinges significantly on 
firm-level contingencies. This new departure extends current thinking on Systems of 
Innovation by clearly demonstrating the effects of firm-level characteristics, adding to 
the explanatory breadth of the existing framework. This contribution to theory has 
important implications for both firm managers and policy makers, enabling more 
effective interventions in their efforts to drive and support innovation outcomes. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Sectoral Innovation Systems – A Micro-Level Perspective 
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1.0 Innovation System Fit – a contingency perspective  
1.1 Introduction  
Productivity and associated per-capita income growth depend on a continuing process 
of innovation and technical change by means of new and improved products, novel 
business models and modes of production, distribution and marketing. The propensity 
to innovate presupposes internal entrepreneurial and strategic dependencies while 
reflecting environmental variables. Individual firms are known to play a central role in 
the development of innovations however the process that nurtures and delivers 
technological change involves a ‘complex web of interactions among firms, other 
organisations and institutions’(Fischer, 2001, p.200). This web comprises the System of 
Innovation [SI]. While entrepreneurial traits are known to be significant, they fail to 
explain firm achievement independent of context as entrepreneurs depend heavily on 
the people, resources and opportunities in their environment (Baum & Locke, 2004) 
including upstream suppliers, downstream customers, government, economic and 
educational institutions.  
Contemporary research emphasises the ways in which organisations are shaped by the 
complex character of the environment, yet SI theory largely ignores micro-level 
characteristics. Companies match internal and external resources with opportunities to 
create value by accessing and mobilising the means necessary for growth and as such, 
economies within and outside the firm are embedded in an institutional setting which 
shapes and is shaped by contemporary strategies and structures (Granovetter, 1985). 
At the core of this thesis are questions about the innovation resources companies have 
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access to, seen through the lens of firm age and strategic contingencies. Beyond 
analysis of the micro-foundations within which small businesses operate, is an interest 
in the macroeconomic implications of system-fit and how institutional and firm-level 
variables combine to enable or impede value creation. Lundvall claims that, absent 
innovation systems that encompass analysis of organisational and inter-organisational-
fit, ‘it is impossible to link innovation to economic growth’ (2010, pp.317-318). This 
thesis sets out to address this gap.  
1.2 System-fit  
The Systems of Innovation, firm age and organisational strategy literatures focus, 
largely independently, on how firms adapt to internal and external dynamics to best 
exploit opportunities and create value. Previous research has however, failed to 
address the respective effects of age and strategic intent on system fit. Observing the 
complexity brought about by change, Van de Ven and Poole (2005) urge researchers to 
move beyond the traditional static interpretation of organisations to a ‘spatialised, 
temporalised’ perspective (p.512). In a similar vein, Starbuck  (1965) proposes that 
policies and procedures appropriate at one stage of an organisation’s history can 
become dramatically unsuited to another. To properly explore fit from a theoretical 
and practical perspective, this research addresses the variables and interrelationships 
of age and strategic intent with a view to analysing their impact on the Sectoral System 
of Innovation [SSI] in two distinct technology sectors.  
This thesis employs the definition of fit proposed by Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) that 
all contingency models share an underlying premise that context and structure must fit 
together if the organisation is to perform well. Specifically, they propose that the 
4 | P a g e  
 
‘structure and process of an organisation must fit its context (i.e. characteristics of the 
organisation's environment), if it is to survive or be effective’ (Drazin and Van de Ven, 
1985, p.515). 
Underscoring the role of the firm, the SSI concept recognises micro-behaviour in the 
core (Lundvall, 2007) yet the literature explicitly acknowledges a focus on generic 
rather than firm-specific needs. The thesis explores micro-level variables in conjunction 
with key system dimensions with a view to identifying management and policy 
interventions through richer understanding of the concept. Analogous to the idea of 
information system fit, this revised conceptualisation considers ‘fit as enablement’ 
(Strong & Volkoff, 2010, p.733) to the extent that the SSI enables the organisation to 
operate efficiently and effectively according to its profile with a resulting impact on 
firm-level innovation capacity. Suggesting that theory is often satisfied with relatively 
trivial characterisations of the firm, Kauffman’s posits a ‘fitness landscape’ (1993, as 
cited in Levinthal, 2000, p.365) that could be tuned according to the degree of 
complementarity between the organisation and the environment. Despite the practical 
and theoretical need to understand this phenomenon, the question has received scant 
attention in the literature 
1.2.1 Systems of Innovation  
In the context of a systemic, situational phenomenon, SI offer an important theoretical 
framework for the analysis of innovation capacity. The systems through which 
enterprises source productive and market knowledge, financial and relationship capital 
and the instruments to safeguard intellectual property are contextually grounded. This 
complex array of resources renders SI a particularly appropriate conceptual framework 
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for analysis. Rather than focussing solely on the supply of resources, the system 
approach is designed to give precedence to the organisational and technical 
capabilities needed for the productive application of resources. In turn, policy makers 
strive to promote and manage the social and economic infrastructure, which supports 
firms in generating innovative output, in turn fostering employment, technological and 
economic development.  
Given the multiplicity of factors and feedback processes involved, the SI concept has 
been described as co-evolving and self-organising (Edquist, 2005) in that organisations 
at any given moment are not the ‘most-fit’ (Aldrich, 1999 , p.33) with their 
environment in an absolute sense, but rather reflect historically accumulated 
variations within the firm and the economy. 
Sectoral Systems Perspective  
The broad perspective of National Systems of Innovation (NSI) benefits from a more 
precise dissection of institutional structures and interactions through the Sectoral 
Systems of Innovation (SSI) lens.  In the industrial organisation tradition, industry 
structure is perceived as a central determinant of firm performance (Porter, 1980) 
while Mowery and Nelson employ the term ‘sectoral support systems’ (1999, p.368) 
reinforcing the idea that competitiveness resides in intermediate structures between 
nations and firms. Given that the institutions supporting technical progress in one field 
may not align with the conditions required to support innovation in another (Nelson, 
1993 ; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997), the SSI framework addresses, at least in part, the 
criticism that NSI classifications are too generic.The logical interconnection between 
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the fates of individual organisations and populations of organisations renders it 
inappropriate to analyse them in isolation of their sectors (Kimberly, 1980).  
Recognising that key sectors constitute the innovative engines of small economies in 
particular (Guerrieri & Tylecote, 1997; Read, 2008), SSI provide an appropriate focusing 
device for analysis. Environmental conditions vary from one industry to another and 
controls for these variations are created by focusing on two distinct sectors – 
manufacturing engineering and software.  
While patterns of innovation differ across sectors, it is suggested that they are largely 
invariant across countries. This is at the core of the SSI concept. Employing the United 
Nations International Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (ISIC) 
which groups industries into high-technology, medium-high-technology, medium-low-
technology and low-technology sectors, software falls into the high-tech class while 
traditional engineering is classified as being medium-low tech. 
Underscoring the significance of contingency, research highlights heterogeneity within 
sectors, suggesting that future work should explore firm-level patterns of innovation 
including influences such as the age, sector and location of the firm (Pavitt, 1984; 
Storey, 2004). Critical analysis of SSI design brings the question of alignment to a new 
level – that of firm specificity.  The present study analyses the moderating effect of 
firm contingencies on key dimensions within the selected SSIs.  
Dual Sector/Technology approach  
Given the aforementioned effect of industry characteristics on firm performance, 
comparative analyses of innovation and enterprise in different SSI can make an 
important contribution to system design. Sorenson and Stuart (2000) suggest that the 
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intersection between industry-type and firm-level processes constitutes a promising 
opportunity for research to fill empirical gaps in our understanding of how firm-
environment relationships affect fit. The dual-sector (Traditional Engineering and 
Software), dual-contingency (fit based on age and strategic intent) approach adopted 
by the thesis addresses both gaps.  
New Technology Based Firms (NTBFs) are defined as those firms that are less than ten 
years of age with operations based on exploiting technological resources (Mäki and 
Hytti, 2008). Concentration of SME productivity and job creation research in so-called 
NTBFs represents a strong policy pillar but this approach is interpreted as somewhat 
biased and to the detriment of fostering innovation and technology diffusion across 
the wider economy (Hirsch-Kreinsen & Jacobson, 2008; Hoffman et al., 1998; 
Robertson & Jacobson, 2011). Despite support for a broader policy response, lower-
tech sectors are commonly regarded as ‘unusual suspects’ (Mendonça, 2009, p.470) in 
economic development. While there is some evidence that rapidly growing enterprises 
are more widespread in technologically sophisticated sectors, empirical data 
increasingly point to a lack of growth concentration among high tech firms (Mason and 
Brown, 2010; Parker et al., 2010). 
Understanding mechanisms of influence within firms at different points in their life 
course and their strategic evolution, is a central focus of this study. Suggesting the 
benefit of determining how quickly obsolescence accrues and how it varies within and 
among populations, Ranger-Moore (1997) recommends that ‘researchers should 
replicate their work across populations experiencing nearly constant turbulence with 
those experiencing frequent but temporally separate periods of turbulence’ (p.918). By 
8 | P a g e  
 
establishing the extent to which firm contingency affects SSI fit across contrasting high 
–medium tech and medium-low tech sectors, this research examines emergent and 
traditional sectors making a contribution to both academic and public policy 
perspectives.  
Recognising that key sectors constitute the innovative engines of small economies such 
as the current research setting, SSI provide an appropriate focusing device, blending 
parsimony with depth. Analysis is particularly critical in the case of small firms 
operating in peripheral economies where niche strategies are innately dependent on 
export competitiveness for growth and scale. Reflecting on small country innovation 
systems such as Ireland, Edquist and Hommen (2008) refer to economic growth based 
on different patterns of sectoral specialisation, production structures and technology 
trajectories. Given the effect of industry characteristics on firm performance, 
comparative analysis within and between different SSI can make an important 
contribution to system design.  
1.2.2 Firm Contingency  
While technological innovation is generally recognised as the primary driver of 
economic growth, precise firm and system-level determinants are less well 
understood. This may be due to the neglect of micro perspectives in prior analyses, 
even though resources and institutions are known to fit differentially rather than 
within defined boundaries. Given the firms’ heterogeneity, calls for policy 
reorientation to foster specific business dynamics are gaining increased currency (Katz 
and Gartner, 1988, Mason and Brown, 2010; Shane , 2009; Storey and Greene , 2010).  
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Even within narrowly defined industries, the literature provides evidence of 
considerable disparity in firm behaviour (Bartelsman, Scarpetta, & Schivardi, 2005). 
Pointing to a theoretical gap, Lundvall (2007) concludes that the co-evolution of 
constituent variables within SSI has been afforded insufficient attention while Zahra 
and Bogner  (2000) suggest that empirical research is needed to determine the precise 
nature of relationships between the firm and the environment and how interactions 
and mismatches may influence performance. Just as the institutional infrastructure 
supporting start-ups is likely to prove unproductive for adolescent and mature 
organisations, the resources that support a venture’s survival may be completely 
different from those required to deliver technology leadership or longevity. The 
strategic management literature focuses on ecosystems as sources of competitive 
advantage for individual companies (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) however; emphasis on 
firm-level context in SSI design is limited.  
While evolutionary economists recognise the significance of organisational adaptation 
in the face of technological and competitive change, there is a gap in our 
understanding as to whether there are systematic relations between SSI-fit and 
observable firm-level variables. Just as changes in external conditions such as demand 
and competition require appropriate strategies and tactics, internal factors are 
significant in that they provide the context within which owners and employees create 
and deliver competitive advantage. Research reveals that the future of organisations 
may be less determined by outside forces than by firms’ historical development and as 
such, firm-system fit may be more influenced by prior history than by environmental 
dynamics (Aldrich and Ruef , 2010; Carroll and Hannan , 2000). This poses questions as 
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to whether conformity in the processes of aging and strategic intent might provide 
superior understanding of system-fit.  
This research employs two firm-level contingencies that suggest significant bearing on 
SSI-fit. In regard to firm age, policies may be derived to help newer, transitioning, 
restructuring and older firms to compensate for weaknesses and capitalise on 
strengths through more responsive SSIs. In the case of strategic aspiration, policies 
might be directed in tandem with the needs of lifestyle firms through to organisations 
intent on technology leadership, rapid growth or exit through acquisition. To follow is a 
summary rationale for the selection of the age and strategy contingencies.  
Age 
Age is known to be an important moderator of the effectiveness with which 
organisations deploy resources as they grow, evolve, decline or stage revivals 
throughout their life course. For example, innovation has been found to have a 
stronger impact on younger firms than more established SMEs which suggests that 
new firms possess distinct capabilities to create and appropriate value, off-setting 
liability of newness (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann and Bausch, 2011). 
Theory charts various stages from the pre-entry experience of the entrepreneur, to 
start-up, survival and growth but beyond basic chronology, age exerts seemingly 
contradictory consequences on innovation suggesting implications for system-fit. 
Reasoning that management problems and principles are rooted in time, Greiner 
(1972) posits that organisational lifespan constitutes the most obvious and important 
dimension to interpret and model firm development while Levie and Lichtenstein 
(2009) argue that such an approach provides little more than an illusion of 
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predictability in entrepreneurial firm development. This thesis identifies patterns in 
resourcing innovative activities in the context of lifecourse. 
A young firm spawning an innovation may not have access to the necessary means for 
its commercial exploitation as the resources for invention are often different from 
those for commercial exploitation while older firms’ inventive capacities may be 
burdened by the counter effects of age. Such focus would help to redress the tendency 
among scholars to apply a narrow understanding of the SI concept, which leaves 
significant elements of innovation-based economic performance unexplained. Jordan 
and O’Leary (2011) cite the age and sector variables as important in modelling controls 
for business characteristics that ultimately affect innovation output. 
Strategic Intent  
Rather than representing a standalone outcome, innovation results from 
organisational and strategic intent. On-going competitive advantage requires that 
firms pursue strategies that match the internal motivation driving the enterprise with 
conditions in the external environment. Based on analysis of a company's 
environment, marketplace, competitors and internal capabilities, managers craft 
strategic intent (Hambrick and Fredrickson, 2001), acquire, develop and allocate 
resources and identify how they can be leveraged. This has led to the call for research 
to link firms’ resource pools to their strategy choices in different environments with 
the aim of clarifying the interplay between strategy, resources and performance. 
According to Oinas (2005), the strategies of individual firms need to be considered in 
explaining the functioning of SI in accounting for economic performance.  
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Business strategy is recognised as being among the most difficult constructs to 
measure (Hambrick, 1980), insofar as the constituent dynamics are likely to defy 
categorisation. The range of options open to the firm includes organisational and 
functional management strategies, product-market strategies, technological prowess, 
profit maximisation, acquisition and diversification (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000; 
Bell, Crick, & Young, 2004; Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005; Storey, 1994). 
Emphasising the importance of internally motivated economic change, Teece and 
Pisano (1994, p.538) developed the Dynamic Capabilities paradigm, to accommodate 
the ‘dynamic’ associated with the shifting character of the environment including the 
pace of innovation and, ‘capabilities’, emphasising the role of strategic management in 
adapting, integrating and reconfiguring internal and external skills, resources and 
functional competencies in concert with the changing environment.  
While growth is an output of the firm’s entrepreneurial and managerial knowledge 
capacities (Penrose, 1959), it is clear that not all entrepreneurial firms seek it as a 
primary objective (Porter, 1996). Firms are not undifferentiated profit maximisers 
reacting to markets independent of strategic intent (Mason, 1939). Indeed growth 
intent is generally a precursor to firm strategy, directing critical decisions (Bird, 1992). 
This study represents an initial effort to distinguish empirically, the moderating effects 
of strategic intent on access to the systemic resources necessary for innovation using 
rich firm-level data. 
Strategies that accelerate growth at one stage of the life cycle may disrupt 
development at a different stage. Defining a strategy for development within the 
context of the firm’s sector and life-course presumes the capacity to secure the 
13 | P a g e  
 
organisational and institutional conditions and resources to realise it. Stressing 
adaptability, Miller (2003) suggests that strategy should not be market-driven but 
market-relevant, guided primarily by those market forces a firm can exploit better than 
its rivals rather than by what customers want and what competitors can do. This is in 
keeping with the notion of system fit in the context of enablement. The SSI may have a 
differential effect on future returns based on the availability of human, financial and 
other resources.  
1.2.3 Policy-Practice Implications 
Insofar as economic policy is directed at influencing firm output, Cyert and March 
(1992) suggest that the behavioural theory of the firm should inform policy 
alternatives though they concede that this is unlikely to provide precise answers given 
the paucity of detailed information about the demography of firms and sectors.  This 
research seeks to link firms’ resources to SSI dimensions and clarify the interplay 
between age, strategy and the SSI. Figure 1-0 provides an illustrative schema of the 
thesis encompassing system dimensions intersecting with firm-level contingencies with 
the potential to affect system-fit. The SSI lens supports the development of the 
framework used to address the research question while providing the basis for 
empirical analysis. 
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Figure 1-0: Illustrative Schema of the thesis – Conceptual Model of SSI-fit. 
 
The following paragraphs outline the make-up of the significant dimensions addressed 
in the research. 
1.2.4 Innovation System Dimensions  
Endogenous growth theory suggests that innovation is produced within the system 
subject to economic incentives. It is regarded as an output resulting from a range of 
inputs. Knowledge, risk funding, human and physical capital and research and 
development are pillars typically associated with firms’ innovative capacity. Education, 
funding and output are more clear-cut whereas the structures which embody them are 
abstract. Identifying the factors that shape indigenous firms’ ability to generate and 
commercialise innovations is a key policy concern.  
Skills and Management Development 
In keeping with SI thinking, the activities that generate the skills and know-how 
forming the basis of competitive advantage are less internationalised than all other 
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dimensions of company activity (Pavitt & Patel, 1999). The availability of firm-
appropriate skills and competencies depend heavily on sectoral factors; the degree to 
which knowledge is generic or application-specific, levels of tacitness and 
transferability, complexity in terms of specific disciplines, technologies and 
competencies needed and the degree of independence or embeddedness involved in 
innovative activities.   
Innovation output sources and intellectual property protection 
Commercial innovation typically takes the form of product, service, process, 
organisational and business model outputs. Such outputs include more nuanced 
aspects of innovation such as developing new routes to market, improving production 
capacity and reducing labour inputs. This is extended by way of inputs such as reverse 
engineering and patent disclosure; licensing and external R&D. Firms are increasingly 
engaged in mixed modes of innovation including the creation of services in support of 
more traditional product offerings and the use of hybrid business models to counter 
the liabilities of new and small firms.  
Cooperation and partnership 
In addition to investment in intermediary goods and services, collaboration comprises 
engagement with other firms or organisations in acquiring, developing and exchanging 
knowledge and resources (Edquist, 2000). As firms tap into wider pools of knowledge, 
innovation and operations have become more reliant on influencing assets outside of 
their ownership (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). The practice of closed innovation is yielding 
to the pace of technological change. Competition will spur inbound and outbound 
knowledge transfer as networks and partnerships facilitate acquisition of creative and 
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commercialisation resources to deliver more competitive outcomes. The transfer of 
tacit, un-codified knowledge is increasingly facilitated by shared experiences and trust, 
developed through interaction (Jordan and O’Leary, 2011). Despite the strategic logic 
of co-operation, effective partner selection and lifecycle management is known to 
present numerous challenges which are said to be amplified in the Irish context 
(Forfás, 2004b).  
Funding for development and innovation 
The need for a functioning capital system as a tool for funding innovation has been 
widely documented while the lack of investment finance has long been accepted as a 
serious constraint to SME growth. Funding availability and costs are known to have a 
significant impact on SME growth prospects with particular emphasis on access to 
external finance. As policy makers and private lenders behave similarly in respect of a 
reluctance to finance innovation without near term prospects of commercial return 
(Czarnitzki, Hottenrott, & Thorwarth, 2011), conservatism can be compounded amid 
risk aversion and a desire for autonomy among small firm owners. 
1.3 Context: SMEs in Small Economies  
There is growing recognition that the effective exploitation of new knowledge or 
technology is particularly important for small, newly industrialising countries for whom 
the capacity to contribute to economic growth by exploiting new and existing goods 
and services dwarfs the potential to make a contribution to global knowledge 
(Fagerberg, Mowery and Verspagen, 2008). Small, open, peripheral economies offer 
limited domestic market potential to SMEs who, in turn are challenged to develop and 
commercialise products and services in export markets if they are to realise sufficient 
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returns. Coincidentally, the role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), while creating 
significant value for such economies, can bring about instability. The vagaries of 
economic cycles driving increased possibility of retrenchment and withdrawal may 
lead to re-evaluation of dependencies for small country economies driving increased 
focus on indigenous output. This research is set in the context of Ireland, a small, 
peripheral economy with a significant reliance on FDI for economic sustainability. It 
recognises the need for research focused on small firms because of their importance 
to wealth creation through employment, innovation, diversification, trade and export 
twinned with their role as initiators, catalysts and conduits of technological change. 
1.4 Motivation 
Examining significant relationships between SSI dimensions and firm-level 
contingencies in contrasting sectors is intuitively appealing while providing an 
important opportunity to make a contribution to theory development. Through 
systematic assessment of the impact of firm age and strategic intent at the point 
where it interacts with the SSI, the aims of the research are first; to examine the 
relationship between micro-level contingencies and system dimensions to measure fit. 
Secondly, it seeks to contrast significant associations by researching the high-tech, 
knowledge-intensive software sector in conjunction with the low-to-medium tech 
traditional manufacturing engineering sector. Given differences in the underlying 
technologies, strategic dynamics and maturity of the firms that populate sectors, the 
results have wide-ranging implications for practice and policy. 
This thesis is based on several motivations. The first is to provide as complete a picture 
as possible of the regulating effect of firm-level contingencies on SSI fit, this implies 
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potential reinterpretation of fit with respect to enablement of innovation. The second 
is to add to knowledge in key areas related to the age and strategic aspiration 
associated with system fit. The third is to draw connections between various strands of 
the theoretical and empirical literature that have in the past focused on aspects of fit 
but failed to capture the complexity of firm dynamics.  
Despite a longstanding theoretical and practical focus on SME innovation by academics 
and policy makers, the degree and effects of interaction between firm and system-
level variables have not been investigated heretofore. The framework assessed how 
previously un-examined associations at the firm-system level regulate fit. The results 
indicate that the relationship between firm age and strategic aspiration is significant in 
respect of a number of measures.  
Given that the co-evolution of industry and supporting institutions occurs as a result of 
positive and negative feedback mechanisms, closer attention to company-level 
contingency mechanisms is merited. Policy bodies may be encouraged to assess fitness 
between age and strategic contingencies on the one hand and structural and 
institutional agents on the other, allowing for the creation of more enabling 
intervention strategies. Increased awareness of the micro conditions which promote 
positive interaction with the SI represents a valuable contribution.  
1.5 Conclusion  
This research offers theoretical and empirical contributions to the knowledge of 
innovation system design by developing new theoretical, practice and policy 
perspectives while testing previously unexamined theories. Centred on the 
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organisation-environment relationship, the research aligns with what has emerged as 
one of the richest streams in organisational theory - the extent to which context 
specificity embeds opportunity and constraint. The approach proposes that the key 
contingencies heterogeneously affect fit with selected dimensions.  
Integrating the innovation systems, age and strategy literatures, a framework was 
developed to capture the effect of firm-level contingencies on the degree of fit with SSI 
dimensions – in short, establishing how endogenous factors might result in differential 
advantage for firms in the same sector. Employing the SSI framework, this research 
examines the relationship between firms’ internal contingencies and system 
dimensions with the potential to impact innovative potential. The workings of SSIs are 
shown to be unsystematic in regard to micro-level characteristics. Intra-industry 
differences in system-fit have heretofore resisted explanation due to the absence of 
data that adequately represent the theoretically important concepts of firm age and 
strategic intent.  
Against the backdrop of growing calls for a more fine-grained approach to policy 
design and evaluation (Carlsson et al., 2002; Edquist, 2006; 2011) and more recent 
appeals for context-specific systems of entrepreneurship (Acs, Autio, & Szerb, 2014; 
Autio, Kenney, Mustar, Siegel and Wright, 2014), this research analyses SSI fit relative 
to firm-level contingencies. In the context of potential to stimulate growth and 
productivity, SME innovation is recognised as a competitive necessity however, if 
growth is context specific; it can be argued that harmonised innovation policies, even 
at sectoral level, fail SMEs by understating the effect of firm-level variables.   
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This research suggests the need for a more granular depiction of firm characteristics in 
the SSI domain. Despite the intuitive appeal of gaining an in-depth understanding of 
the effect of firm-level variables, these outcomes have not achieved wide currency in 
theoretical debates. The framework adopted begins to respond to criticisms that SI 
theory is in need of more dynamic models (Edquist, 2006; Lundvall et al., 2009) and by 
extension, that the fabric of innovation policy merits a more fine-grained approach to 
firm context. Analysis of the results indicates that empirical support for the framework 
is mixed, but the insights into system fit and particularly into the design, 
implementation and evaluation of policy, represents an exciting and valuable 
contribution to our knowledge of the increasingly important firm-policy nexus.  
1.6 Structure  
The thesis is presented in seven chapters (see Figure 1-1 Thesis Structure overleaf). In 
addition to outlining the aims and objectives of the research, this chapter discusses the 
theoretical context for the research question and outlines the importance of the 
domain. Chapter two articulates the theoretical motivation for the application of the SI 
concept in conjunction with the literature on firm age and strategic intent, elucidating 
the link between innovative capacity, firm access to resources and internal dynamics. 
The conceptual framework for the research encompasses a review of the extant 
literature on SI, firm age and strategic intent as they pertain to innovation in SMEs. The 
chapter concludes by drawing together the system-firm contingencies and how they 
may be expected to affect innovation capacity. Chapter three describes the empirical 
setting reflecting the structural specifics of the SSI of the Irish manufacturing 
engineering and software sectors in an economy where industrial output is dominated 
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by Foreign Direct Investment. The heterogeneity of the sectors illuminates SMEs’ 
perception of fit in distinct systems within a national context. Chapter four discusses 
the methodological approach adopted to operationalise the analysis along with the 
rationale for the research design including the development and administration of 
interviews, derivation of cohorts and dual sector surveys. The research population 
comprises SMEs employing ten or more people, thus excluding micro firms. The 
contingency model used to analyse the determinants of sector-system fit is presented 
using a phased approach in which the output of early empirical analysis was applied to 
later strands of research. Chapters five and six present the results of the empirical 
investigation and significant relationships between SSI dimensions, firm age and 
strategic aspiration are illustrated and analysed for both sectors respectively. Chapter 
seven interprets the findings from a theoretical, policy and practitioner perspective 
and outlines the contribution of this research. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the study’s limitations and opportunities for further research. 
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Figure 1-1: General Thesis Structure 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
Innovation Systems, Strategic Intent and Firm Age 
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2.0 Literature Review  
The impact of the environment on organisations is well documented. In the context of 
institutional theory and social construction, the firm is viewed as operating within the 
fabric of an economic context. A fundamental issue in economic theory is the extent to 
which organisational development is the product of external forces rooted in their 
social and economic systems, or whether it results from the structural or behavioural 
characteristics of the firm. 
This chapter firstly examines the origins of, and developments in SI as a theoretical 
framework and its utility as a tool for understanding and analysing environmental fit 
over time. As industries differ in their needs, SSI are afforded particular consideration 
given that firms-in-sector are regarded as homogenous. Thereafter, the literature on 
firm age is introduced with respect to implications for system fit and innovative 
capacity. The literature on strategic aspiration in small firms is then discussed. While 
there is a substantial and growing body of literature in relation to the systems, firm age 
and strategy domains, extant research is scant on the interrelationships between 
them. The conclusion draws each of the elements together, underlining the gaps in the 
literature and prompting the research question as to how micro processes may enable 
or constrain system fit, and in turn, innovative potential. 
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a body of literature aimed at the study of 
national policy and development issues. Since the inception of National Systems of 
Innovation (NSI) (Freeman, 1987, 1992, Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 1993; Nelson and 
Rosenberg, 1993), the concept has been adopted by policy makers and academics in 
their quest to understand enablers and impediments to economic growth and 
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competitiveness. At its broadest, the systems of innovation (SI) concept presents ‘a 
way of describing and analysing the set of institutions that generate and mould 
economic growth, to the extent that there is a theory of growth in which technological 
innovation is the key driving force’ (Nelson, 2000, p.11).  
While a common infrastructure sets the context for innovation in an economy, it is 
ultimately firms, influenced by their microeconomic environments, which develop and 
commercialise innovations (Furman et al., 2002). Lundvall (2010) describes the firm as 
the ‘central motor’ (p.340) in the SI. In recognition of this, the original NSI concept has 
been adapted to reflect regional, technological and sectoral specificities however, little 
is known about how the framework adapts to support individual firms as they mature 
and adjust their strategies.  
SI have emerged as an important academic and policymaking tool designed to help 
understand the structure and performance of systems and processes supporting macro 
innovation (Soete, Verspagen and ter Weel, 2010) and ultimately enabling firm-level 
innovation. As a collective construct, they present a multidimensional, integrated view 
of innovation by comparison with the traditional market failure based perspective.  
In the context that technology represents the theoretical and practical knowledge, 
skills and artefacts used to develop products and services as well as playing a role in 
their production and delivery (Burgelman, Christensen and Wheelright, 2008), the 
integrative capacity of the SI concept, encompassing the fundamental shift from 
natural to human resource endowment (Wicken, 2009) and the inclusion of market 
and non-market institutions, highlights the concept’s analytical potential compared to 
competing frameworks. Among adjacent models are Porter’s (1990) Diamond 
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Framework and the Triple-Helix model (Etzkowitz  and Leydesdorff, 2000). Porter 
presents national systems as host environments to single industries competing in an 
international context rather than a system in its own right (Lundvall, 2010) whereas 
Etzkowitz  and Leydesdorff (2000), consistent with the knowledge-based society – the 
basic premise of the triple helix model, give primacy to university-industry-government 
relations in keeping with the science-driven innovation paradigm. 
Drawing on the SI, firm age and strategy literature this research proposes a distinctive 
analytical approach to assessing system-fit. Analysing the effect that the environment 
has on organisations, and the counter effect that organisations have on their social 
environments, Stinchcombe  (1965) interprets ‘social structure’ as any variables that 
are stable characteristics of the society outside the organisation (p.142).  
Companies give simultaneous consideration to strategy, markets, products and 
technologies and how these interact over the firm lifecycle, yet despite the thorough 
exploration of SI over the last quarter century, the concept has proved difficult to 
operationalise at the micro level owing to the resources required (Robertson & Smith, 
2008). While numerous studies have addressed system-level support, none has 
adopted a micro perspective with a view to testing whether firm-specific contingencies 
are more or less conducive to performance through a more differentiated perspective 
on system-fit (Carlsson and Jacobsson , 1997; Donaldson, 1996).  
Emphasising the systemic, embedded character of the process, Van de Ven (1986) 
defines innovation as ‘the development and implementation of new ideas by people 
who over time engage in transactions with others within an institutional order’ (p.590). 
The notion of engagement over time reflects the assumptions of structuration theory 
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whereby structure is embedded in practice and both are recursively connected with 
actors exercising agency by making a difference to the systems in which they are 
embedded (Giddens, 1984). Structuration is an appropriate lens as it embraces the 
connection between structure and the practice of constituent firms characterised by 
reciprocity and feedback mechanisms. While the SI literature is not formally situated in 
the context of structure and agency, Giddens’ views on the reflexive role of individuals 
and social structures suggests parallels with the SI framework which recognises 
processes of change through the co-evolution of dimensions such as skills, funding, 
innovation types, co-operation and intellectual property protection. Critical to that is 
the recursive process of organisations building or acquiring the resources and 
competencies needed to deliver innovation in conjunction with supporting institutions. 
With respect to the effect of contingency on system fit, Lundvall (2007) suggests ‘an 
inherent risk that the system embeds a structuralist mode of explanation that neglects 
the critical role of agency’ (p.110)  - a core aspect of this research.    
Firm contingencies 
Taking the view that organisations and institutions are distinct, there is a need to look 
at organisation-specific factors. The proposition that organisational structure and 
process must fit its context to survive and prosper (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985) is 
apposite. In the management literature, contingency theory suggests that appropriate 
organisational structures and styles are dependent on a set of ‘contingency factors’, 
usually related to the environment (Tosi & Slocum, 1984, p.9) and further, no single 
organisational configuration is effective in all circumstances (Tidd & Hull, 2006). Indeed 
organisations are not best fitted to their environments in any absolute sense, but 
rather their strategies and operations reflect the historical path created by a 
28 | P a g e  
 
combination of accumulated and selectively retained variations (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; 
Donaldson, 1996). Donaldson (1996) argues in favour of organisational optimality vis-a-
vis contingencies such as size, age, strategy and technology. This recognises the 
importance of micro-level factors and their potential implications but despite its 
relevance for managers and policy-makers, this area remains relatively unexplored by 
management researchers. This study addresses the gap by exploring how firm specific 
factors influence system-fit in the software and manufacturing engineering sectors, 
employing SSI as a lens. Three key factors are explored:  
 Firm-system fit based on associations with organisational age 
 Firm-system fit based on associations with strategic aspiration  
 Firm-system fit based on associations with sectoral classification 
Similar to the bivariate interaction construct put forward by Drazin and Van de Ven 
(1985, p.515), this study measures fit as ‘the interaction of pairs of organisational 
context-structure (system) factors which affect performance’, otherwise viewed as 
system enablement.  
Structural and Behavioural Contingency 
Organisation-environment models and strategy-policy frameworks differ markedly in 
how contingencies are modelled, and in the role that organisations play in the process 
(Rumelt , 1979). Carroll and Hannan (2000) posit two classes of environmental change:  
‘Exogenous processes (environmental conditions) which shape and change 
organisations, but are not directly systematically affected by firms; and 
endogenous processes (population dynamics), in which the environment 
changes in line with organisation and population-based variations’ (P.193).  
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The former is consistent with the SI literature as currently constituted whereas the 
latter is in keeping with the thrust of the current research.  
Effect of firm maturity 
The SI framework has evolved to meet the needs of distinct countries, regions, sectors 
and technologies through sub and supranational systems. With specific regard to 
technological systems, these are often matched by policies that support ‘embryo, 
infant and adolescent technologies’ (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997, p.285) however 
this diversity is not reflected at the firm level. Firms transition from novice to expert 
decisions through time and experience (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011) learning 
through failure and success. Just as the methods and assets required to manage 
engineering enterprises are distinct from those for software companies, the resources 
needed to create a founding team, develop a first product or cultivate a business 
model are different from those required to servitise an existing product, license 
technology or diversify a portfolio. The literature to date, while recognising the need 
for differentiated systems, has failed to capture the relationship between SSI 
dimensions, life-course (Aldrich, 1999; Boswell, 1973) and strategic aspiration (Roper, 
1998; Storey, 2004). This study addresses this gap by testing bivariate interactions 
between firm age, strategy and SSI components.  
2.1 Dynamics of Firm-System Fit 
Empirical studies following the Resource Based View (RBV) suggest that firm specific 
factors dominate industry effects in driving performance. This is further supported by 
evidence indicating greater variations within than between industries (Hawawini, 
Subramanian, & Verdin, 2003; Rumelt, 1991) demonstrating in many cases, that 
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industry-wide factors matter less than firm-specific dynamics. However, system-
specific assets have a significant bearing on the availability of resources (Saxenian, 
1994), creating the potential for unearned advantage. This supports the logic of a 
micro-level approach.  
Environmental determinism and purposive perspectives  
There are two main perspectives on the drivers of innovation - internal and 
environmental. If the private sector is the most important driver of innovation 
(Lundvall, 2011; Wessner, 2005), this suggests that policy should be crafted in light of 
firm dynamics and how they evolve. On the other hand, if environmental determinism 
and selection have a greater bearing on capacity (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Alchian, 
1950), the question arises as to how firm dynamics can best be managed in accordance 
with environmental enablers and constraints. Cognitive aspects of entrepreneurship 
are beyond the scope of this study – rather the focus is on the potential of 
organisations and institutions to understand and potentially leverage SSI fit based on 
age and strategy dynamics, an area that has received much less explicit attention.  
2.2 Analytical framework 
The forces at work within NSI are a source of significant academic and policy interest, 
particularly in cases where framing conditions are insufficient to support innovation-
led growth. Given that failure is an intrinsic consequence of the innovation process, SI 
should be evaluated and improved based on informed analysis and promotion of 
adaptive responses. While the state plays a pivotal role in the functioning of SIs, the 
firm ultimately determines their overall efficiency (Furman et al., 2002; Peters, 2005). 
Underscoring that interplay, Lundvall (1992) characterises the core facets of the 
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system as ‘social’ - reflecting learning as a process - and ‘dynamic’, incorporating 
positive feedback loops and reproduction.   
Integrative framework 
The interaction between SI dimensions and firm contingencies is illustrated in Figure 2-
0 (overleaf) using an integrative research model (after Papadakis, Lioukas and 
Chambers, 1998) of the SI, age and strategy perspectives contained in the review. SI 
dimensions are shown on the left, with SSI representing the central plank of analysis; 
age-specific and broader life course characteristics are depicted in the middle; and 
strategic orientation on the right.   
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Orientation/Aspiration 
Profitability, Sales 
growth, Technical 
superiority, Value of 
the firm for eventual 
acquisition, Stability 
and Longevity of the 
firm (Autio, Sapienza 
and Almeida, 2000)  
- Profitability, 
Survival, Career 
satisfaction, 
Innovation (Baum 
and Locke, 2004). 
- High Growth 
Strategies, Lifestyle 
Ventures (Berger and 
Udell, 1998) 
Innovation Systems Age - Life course 
Life course (Aldrich, 1999) 
Liability of Newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) 
Liability of Age: ossification, obsolescence 
and senescence (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994, 
Sorensen and Stuart, 2000)  
Liability of Adolescence (Bruderl and Schussler, 
1990) 
Liability of scarcity (Carroll and Hannan, 1989, 
2000) 
Niche crowding (Aldrich, 1999) 
Learning advantage of Newness (Autio et al., 
2000) 
Discovery advantage – Exploitation 
advantage (Steffens, Davidson and Fitzsimmons, 
2009) 
Viability of newness (Levie and Lichtenstein, 
2009)  
Episodic Growth – trigger points in High Growth 
Firms (Mason & Brown, 2010).  
Organisational rhythms and cycles (Kimberly, 
1980) 
Configurations of performance outcomes 
(Steffens et al., 2009) 
Reconfiguration (Galbraith, 1982) 
Transition points (Phelps, Adams and Bessant, 
2007) Motion, dynamics, emergence and 
transformation (Malerba, 2002) 
Structural inertia theory (Baum, 1996) 
Age, Stage, Lifecycle 
Infancy 0-5 (Bartelsman, 
Scarpetta and Schivardi, 
2005; Boswell, 1973) 
Youth - Maturity (Greiner, 
1972; Churchill and Lewis, 
1983; Nelson, 1995) 
Adolescence (Adizes 1979; 
Ranger-Moore, 1997) 
Entry, post entry, 
intermediate and advanced 
(Huergo and Jaumandreu, 
2004) 
Lifecycle models (Greiner, 
1972; Levitt, 1965; Vernon, 
1966; Cox, 1967; Utterback, 
1996). 
Developmental and stage 
models (e.g. Churchill and 
Lewis, 1983; Greiner, 1972; 
Kazanjian and Drazin 1989) 
Age-Period-Cohort effect 
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) 
National Innovation Systems (Freeman, 1982, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 1993; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993) 
Technological Innovation Systems (Carlsson, 1994; 
Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991), 
Regional Innovation Systems (Cooke, 1996; Maskell and 
Malmberg, 1997) 
Sectoral Systems of Innovation (Asheim, 1999, Braczyk, 1998; 
Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2004) 
Age and Strategy 
variables  
System/Firm 
Environment  
Strategic Intent 
Figure 2-0: Integrative Research Framework – SSI-Firm Fit 
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2.3 Innovation  
Much of the contemporary understanding of innovation originates in the work of 
Schumpeter (1950) who asserted that innovations typically represent 
improvements in product or process utility which drive economic activity through 
market preference. The literature widely acknowledges that innovation is not an 
exogenous factor leading to predictable results, but rather an endogenous 
phenomenon, reliant on and shaped by, interactions between firms and their 
environments (Fagerberg, Mowery and Verspagen, 2008).  
Within small firms, much product innovation is incremental (Roper, 1997). Firm-
level research indicates that close interaction with users, suppliers and competitors 
has a greater impact on innovation than public or university-based research 
(Lundvall, 2011; Granstrand, 2004). Thus Kline and Rosenberg (1986) recommend 
that innovation and diffusion be approached holistically, given that originating new 
ideas is generally less important for business performance than how those ideas are 
exploited and diffused (Lundvall, 2011) however prioritisation and selection remain 
key to market advantage and profitability. The relative weighting on diffusion 
emphasises growth, competitiveness and employment, each of which is central to 
SI governance and output. 
2.3.1 Technological innovation 
There is broad acceptance that innovation and technological change are important 
sources of productivity and material welfare. Specifically, technological innovation 
is said to be the most powerful engine of change (Aldrich, 1999). The central thesis 
of Freeman’s (1987) seminal work on technology policy and economic performance 
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is that technical and related social innovations are the main sources of economic 
dynamism, and that technological capacity constitutes the competitive engine of 
both firms and nations. This echoes the assertions of many theorists (e.g. 
Burgelman, Christensen and Wheelright, 2009; Teece, 1986; Zahra and Bogner, 
2000), that technological change is the most powerful driver of success in 
contemporary markets. The intrinsic economic power of technology places 
innovation policy at the heart of debates on achieving sustained and sustainable 
economic growth. However, reflecting the belief that creativity and the creation of 
new technologies are necessary but not sufficient to ensure development and 
growth (Mowery and Nelson, 1999), SIs recognise that innovation outcomes result 
from interactive learning and engagement between organisations in the context of 
national, sectoral, regional, technological, and institutional systems.  
Having introduced the mutual impact of the firm and the environment on the 
potential for innovation, the following section examines the influence of 
technological change in the SI context.  
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2.4 Systems of Innovation 
Contrary to the endogenous thrust of the Resource Based View, exogenous theory 
suggests that the outcomes firms generate are due more to the properties of their 
systems than to the intentions or actions of individual actors (Cyert and March, 
1992, Lundvall, 2007; Sharif, 2006). Mapping national Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation Policies, Lundstrom, Almerud and Stevenson (2008) propose the study 
of causal relationships between policy and outcomes in terms of competitiveness, 
economic progress and growth. Their model (Figure 2-1) articulates the links 
between entrepreneurship and SME policies in the context of overarching 
innovation policy along a temporal axis, emphasising integration and the relevance 
of life course in design and implementation.  
 
Figure 2-1: Innovation Policy (Lundstrom et al., 2008, p.12) 
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There are different perspectives on how institutions can be defined and there are 
several units of analysis to be considered on the firm-context nexus. Linking the 
entrepreneurship and innovation perspectives of SI, Aldrich and Ruef (2006) 
observe that entrepreneurship finds limited reference in institutional theory. The 
next section deals with the institutional aspect of SI.  
The institutional and organisational perspectives 
The statist perspective perceives environments as institutions (Zucker, 1977) which 
include ‘formal rules (constitutions, statutes, common laws and regulations), 
informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, and self-imposed codes of 
conduct) and their enforcement characteristics’ (North, 1990, p.2). These elements 
combine to form a set of institutions involved in making and implementing 
economic decisions. Viewing the organisation as a nexus of relationships, including 
those between individuals within the organisation, between individuals and the 
organisation, and across organisational boundaries, Fichman and Levinthal (1991) 
assert that the nature and durability of such relations exerts influence on 
organisational fit and firm mortality.  
Internal capabilities and environmental perspectives 
Traditional management thinking on innovation has tended to focus almost 
exclusively on firms’ internal capabilities and the processes that create and 
commercialise technology (Mowery and Nelson, 1999), yet many authors (e.g. 
Porter and Stern, 2001; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Storey, 1994; Ucbasaran, 
Westhead and Wright, 2011) argue that the external environment for innovation 
and entrepreneurship is at least as important, given that organisational 
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transformation occurs within geographical and historical contexts (Aldrich, 1999, 
Kimberly, 1980, Stuart and Sorenson, 2000). Firms’ propensity to innovate 
presupposes entrepreneurial and strategic dependencies, but also reflects their 
market positions and operating environments (Roper, 1998).  
Contrary to the popular mythology of the lone inventor and the atomistic small firm 
working independently of the system, the process of innovation is largely systemic, 
as enterprises innovate in collaboration with other organisations (Von Hippel , 
1988) and institutions (Edquist , 2005; Lundvall, 2011). The entrepreneur is not in a 
‘fixed state’ of existence and personal traits, independent of context, fail to explain 
entrepreneurial achievement (Gartner, 1988) – rather, entrepreneurs are 
characterised as interactive individuals who depend heavily on the people, 
resources and opportunities in their particular contexts (Audretsch, Dohse, and 
Niebuhr , 2010) including upstream suppliers and downstream customers (Jordan 
and O’Leary, 2011; Malerba and Nelson, 2011). In the context of industries and 
nations, individual firms play a central role in the development of specific 
innovations supporting a systems perspective.  
Understanding mechanisms of influence across and within firms in contrasting 
technology domains at different points in their life course is a central focus of this 
study. Having assessed the impact of the firm and the environment on the potential 
for innovation through time, the following section examines the influence of 
technological change in the SI context.  
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Firms and institutions  
‘Both the environment and what firms make of that environment matter’ (Mowery 
and Nelson, 1999, p.368) thus, organisations and institutions are seen to 
orchestrate the system jointly to create the conditions necessary for growth and 
competitiveness. By prioritising interactive learning and innovation in the analysis 
of economic growth and development, the NSI concept employs an alternative 
analytical framework to static standard neo-classical economics (Edquist, 2001; 
Lundvall, 2007). The framework expands beyond R&D to other types of innovative 
efforts, encompassing impact on employment and growth. Rather than institutions 
determining innovation, they constitute the framework within which companies act 
(Oinas, 2005) by accessing locational strengths and proactively developing the 
environment for innovation and commercialisation (Porter and Stern, 2001). 
Organisations are conceptualised as the main actors in innovation processes, 
although institutions define the rules of the game and both are reciprocally related, 
firms are seen to act as agents of institutional change (Edquist, 2001). This research 
sets out to explore how firm age and strategic contingencies impact innovative 
potential based on SSI fit.  
Several factors are associated with firm growth including age, sector, geographic 
location and strategic selection (Storey, 1994). Cyert and March (1992) posit that 
firms change by virtue of internal developments and by interacting with their 
environs, while the environment itself changes through interactions with the firm in 
conjunction with other firms. This collective effect is important to our 
understanding of the functioning of SSIs. 
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2.4.1 Systems Thinking 
Understanding innovation as an evolutionary process, the SI approach presents a 
platform for thinking through and analysing the nature and implications of the 
collective character of innovation (Edquist et al., 1998). Given that organisations 
can be constrained by history, culture and their environment in the quest for 
solutions to new problems (Kimberly, 1980; Sofer, 1972), it is recognised that SIs 
are so complex that their efficiency cannot be determined in any strict sense (Sloth 
Andersen, 1997). Indeed Soete et al. suggest that ‘innovation policy, just like 
innovation, is always on the run’ (2010, p.1169). Citing the dual importance of 
internal and external variables in contributing to firm-system fit, Cyert and March 
(1992) portray the firm as an adaptive system operating with an array of properties 
while Alchian (1950, p.211) proposes the idea of ‘adaptive, imitative, and trial-and-
error based behaviour in the pursuit of positive profits rather than maximised 
profits.’  
The purpose of innovation and technology policy is to create the conditions through 
which ideas, products and processes deliver economic and social benefit. This in 
turn requires fostering strong knowledge bases, innovative capacities and 
behaviours within firms, as well as conditions for diffusion and adoption, including 
production and market knowledge, skills, a functioning distribution system and 
financial resources (Fagerberg, 2005).  
Core to the NSI concept is recognition of innovation as a non-linear process of 
learning as opposed to a mechanistic, Science-Technology-Innovation (STI)-led 
process (Mytelka & Smith, 2002). By focusing on diffusion and use beyond market 
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introduction, policy could be actively crafted around the problems and 
opportunities faced by entrepreneurs, rather than aggregate input measures such 
as patents and R&D spend (Wessner, 2005). Despite the assertion that salespeople 
and customers are as important to the innovation process as scientists and 
researchers (Bhidé, 2008), Guerrieri and Tylecote (1997) allude to the lesser 
prestige of sales and marketing compared to scientific and technical roles in some 
countries. They suggest that sales, marketing and production should work towards 
mutual respect, and seek to develop cooperation across organisational boundaries 
and a common language for technology. Citing Wilson’s (1968, p.70) history of 
Unilever, they illustrate the positive mutual regard for scientific and commercial 
roles in the United States where the social prestige of industry and widespread 
regard for scientific knowledge are not competitive but complementary. This 
appears inconsistent with the prevailing view in Europe and represents an 
important aspect of firm-environmental fit taking into account the significant role 
of commercialisation.  
2.4.2. National Systems of Innovation 
Porter asserts that ‘the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lies 
increasingly in local things – knowledge, relationships, motivations – that distant 
rivals cannot match’ (1998, p.78). On the basis that the national dimension 
constitutes an abiding feature of SIs, the nation state plays a central role in 
mobilising resources and establishing competency bases through education 
(Lundvall et al., 2009). Innovation activity in SMEs responds to different 
technological and economic drivers than large scale firms and geography has a 
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defining influence. Although US firms have dominated the market for traded 
software since its origin, turnover among leading software companies 
demonstrates competitive strength at the level of the nation rather than the firm. 
This is in keeping with Mowery’s (1999) assertion that ‘comparative’ advantage is 
more enduring than ‘competitive advantage’(p.133), a noteworthy aspect of system 
design.  
The policies and programs of governments, their laws, common language and 
shared cultures, define boundaries that largely affect how technical advances occur 
(Nelson, 1993). Indeed, the international exploitation of innovation developed on a 
national basis has been identified as the most diffuse form of globalisation 
(Archibugi, Howells and Michie, 1999). Delineating national-cultural and statist-
political dimensions, SIs are described as:  
…. constituted by elements and relationships which interact in the 
production, diffusion and use of new and economically useful knowledge 
and that a national system encompasses elements and relationships, either 
located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state (Lundvall, 
1992, p.2). 
 
The OECD (1999) proposes a model that describes the market and non-market 
institutions influencing the direction and speed of innovation and technology 
diffusion, including the connections between components designed to facilitate 
performance. It articulates the roles of the main actors and the forms and intensity 
of their interrelations, including the key processes of knowledge generation, 
diffusion and exploitation shaped by organisational capabilities, and the strength of 
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their relationships. Supporting these activities are other aspects of the commercial, 
technological and regulatory environment within which firms operate (Roper & 
Love, 2006). As depicted in Figure 2-2, the SI focuses on countries' innovative 
abilities but more specifically, on the relations between company actions and the 
broader national context, including input providers, customers, government 
agencies and universities who help define ‘maps’ for firms’ search activities (Sloth 
Andersen, 1997, p.177). In summary, the model provides a tool for analysing 
country specificities in the innovation process as well as a guide for policy 
formulation (OECD, 1999, p.22).  
 
Figure 2-2: Actors and linkages in the Innovation System (OECD, 1999, p.23) 
 
The NSI concept presumes the existence of a nation under the control of a state 
authority, albeit ‘drawing the precise boundaries of an ecosystem is an impossible, 
and in any case, academic exercise’ (Iansiti and Levine , 2004, p.2). Throughout 
industrial history, entrepreneurial firms located in particular countries have 
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developed superior product and process technologies, production mechanisms and 
marketing strategies which have conferred significant advantage on their host 
nations (Mowery and Nelson, 1999). These factors support the logic of NSI (and its 
derivations) as a conceptual framework recognising that much innovation relies on 
resources and interactions outside organisational boundaries (Lundvall, 2007).  
At the national level, ‘countries and companies vary in respect of their structural 
adjustment to different starting points in economic evolution, technological and 
industrial specialisations, institutions, policies and attitudes to change’ (OECD, 
1998, p.3). Early studies emphasise nation-specific innovation patterns in their 
historical, political and cultural context (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004), along with a 
tendency to cluster spatially and temporally (Breschi & Malerba, 1996; Howells, 
2005), aspects which have particular resonance for analysis of firm-fit. In order to 
understand why some countries, and indeed some companies in some countries, 
are more successful at innovation than others, McKelvey (1993) describes the 
search for a normative perspective on the SI approach. 
Anchored in socio economics, the concept is credited with delivering a holistic 
perspective on the roles of policy governance and institutions for the analysis and 
application of technical and social innovation. NSI provide a much broader 
foundation for policy than the market failure-based approach whereby measures 
are driven by the identification of failure and parallel justification as to how policy 
change can bring the system closer to its optimal state. Given the link between 
innovative know-how and economic performance, the proactive role of the state in 
developing technological capabilities for economic advantage (Nelson, 1993) is one 
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of fundamental importance. While the stereotypical image of innovation is one of 
path breaking endeavour, most firms engage in incremental rather than pure play 
innovation (Danneels, 2002), possibly in the knowledge that innovations with a 
closer fit to firm competencies tend to be more successful (Autio et al., 2000; 
Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1987, 1993; Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991). Although most 
innovations are incremental, many are built on technologies with links to science 
and engineering principles. Freeman (1992) reflects both scenarios:  
When there is a radical discontinuity in technology systems the role of the 
Science and Technology network becomes exceptionally important. But 
when the main direction of technical change is the improvement and 
diffusion of a familiar technology, the interaction with users becomes more 
important (p.187). 
System hierarchy and intervention 
While the SI is commonly applied at macro and meso levels, the firm itself 
constitutes a system. As firms grow, develop new technologies and become 
increasingly interdependent, they foster both vertical and lateral relationships 
(Child and Kieser, 1981). Schilling (2000) describes organisations as systems within 
the context of an industry, and industries as systems within the context of an 
economy.  
While seen as a framework built from the bottom-up rather than one imposed from 
above, there are differing views on levels of interventionism within SIs. Rather than 
creating jobs per se, the role of government is to create and maintain an enabling 
environment. For example, the drivers of Silicon Valley’s ecosystem appear 
distinctly more entrepreneurial and potentially more democratic than parallel 
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architectures in Europe (Cooke, 2001). Reflecting on the role of government, 
Breznitz (2007) contrasts variants of market liberalism in Israel and Taiwan with 
‘neoliberal interventionism’ in Ireland. Cooke (2001) interprets public intervention 
as a symptom of market failure, suggesting that the innovation gap between 
Europe and the US is due in part to European entrepreneurs failing to recognise 
innovation opportunities in marked contrast to their North American counterparts. 
Whether traits, culture, institutions or resources are at the root of their contrasting 
fortunes is unclear. This research addresses institutional aspects of fit.  
Metcalfe (1995) contrasts two policy perspectives; the first, the enabling stance 
aimed at building an economic environment which is conducive to technological 
advance. The second is intervention directed at particular firms, products or 
technologies leading to policies which support the development of particular 
sectors. Depending on the technologies or sectors selected, policy is not 
automatically welfare-improving (Metcalfe, 1999) and it is important to understand 
the consequences that follow. Policy makers strive to nominate technologies with 
the potential to offer enhanced returns, but influencing expectations as to winning 
technologies or ‘picking winners’ may have far reaching and unintended 
implications. More broadly, governments need to make careful assessments of the 
balance between support for high technology sectors and that aimed at innovation 
and technology diffusion throughout the wider economy (OECD, 1999). The impact 
of contrasting technologies on system-fit is an underlying theme of this research.  
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Scientific Research and Education  
Incremental and science-based innovations are not opposites - science-based 
technologies require systemic innovations in both products and processes to be 
adopted and used by industry (McKelvey, 1993). Supporting the transition from S&T 
policy towards Innovation policy, the systems approach has helped to shift the 
perspective from linear to interactive processes with greater emphasis on people, 
organisations and competence building (Lundvall, 2007). In an assessment of what 
makes basic research economically viable, Pavitt (1991) notes the indirect 
contributions made by scientists, who due to their training, can perform a variety of 
activities within industry. This, he suggests is as important as more typical output 
measures, such as patents and publications.  
Referring to education and training as the ‘Achilles’ heel’ of British Industry for over 
a century, Freeman (1987) argues that policy responses have been hindered for a 
range of institutional and political reasons. Organisations and other social systems 
resist change even when the environment provides strong pressure for it, so change 
can be frustrated by conflicts and compromises. O’Malley, Hewitt-Dundas and 
Roper (2008) suggest that education in Ireland acts as a general ‘signal’ to help 
secure employment, however the system is seen to lack correlation between 
educational attainment and required competencies. While recognised disciplines 
are supported, there is often a failure to integrate commercially-relevant 
components, such as the ability to understand product-market fit, or to combine 
business acumen with foreign language fluency in support of export growth, or 
engineering competence with design capability.  
47 | P a g e  
 
Domain expertise 
While incremental innovations in established sectors mainly consist of private 
initiatives using private funds, more radical technology shifts tend to require 
government intervention through public R&D funding or through procurement 
policy. Such interventions demonstrate that policy is not neutral, but rather 
‘countries should accept the idea of picking winners while avoiding subsidising 
losers’ (Edquist and Hommen, 2008, p.463). Maintaining competitive advantage in 
high-cost countries relies significantly on innovation driven by policy instruments, 
facilitated by universities and research institutes (Audretsch and Beckmann, 2007). 
While the US has the appearance of the most marketised SI in the world, federal 
funding is seen to sustain its scientific leading edge (Cooke, 2002).  
The US hardware and software industries illustrate important differences in 
national patterns of supply and demand. As well as the VC sector providing smart 
money, Mowery and Nelson (1993) describe the importance of Defence 
Department funded R&D and procurement programs backed by university research 
and training, in developing a skills pool substantially deeper than Japanese and 
European equivalents. In Japan, funding was instead focused on a small number of 
established firms. The development of domain expertise in the US was bolstered by 
a substantial domestic market for mainframe computers, a sophisticated user base 
and strong antitrust policy that nurtured the emergence of independent software 
firms. This position contrasts with the erosion of the US position in the chemical 
industry, emphasising the differing impacts of national and sectoral policy 
influences. Prompted by the expected relevance of expanded international 
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frameworks, Balzat and Hanusch (2004) call into question the appropriateness of 
the NSI approach suggesting the superiority of regional, technological or sectoral 
criteria. Sectoral Systems are analysed below including qualification their selection 
as the conceptual framework on which the research is based. 
2.4.3 Sectoral Systems of Innovation 
A sector represents ‘a set of activities that are unified by some related product 
group for a given or emerging demand and that share some basic knowledge’ 
(Malerba, 2004, p.10) demonstrating that while firms in sectors demonstrate 
commonality, they are heterogeneous. Sectoral systems emphasise industry type 
and the resources, assets and co-operation they rely on for development and 
diffusion whereas technological systems relate to the specific cluster of firms 
engaged in generating and diffusing new knowledge within a technology sphere 
(Malerba & Orsenigo, 1997). For this reason, SSI have been selected as the 
conceptual framework for this research. The factors that matter for innovation and 
consequently, the available policy options, vary from one sector to another and 
among other aspects of SI, the education system, government policy and 
institutions differ in respect of how they provide structural supports and incentives 
for different sectors. Research on innovation intensity and success reveals that 
input-output efficiency has a strong sectoral dependency (Love & Roper, 2001), for 
example, some sectors rely heavily on interaction with universities whereas others 
are largely divorced from higher education and while the NSI may set out to 
support wide-ranging technologies, particular sectors are favoured in many 
countries.  
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While national infrastructures set the basic conditions for innovation, companies 
introduce and commercialise innovations within, and potentially across, sector 
boundaries. Originally proposed by Breschi and Malerba (1997), SSIs support better 
understanding of the influence of contextual factors on firm-in-sector performance 
which they define as:  
‘…that system (group) of firms active in developing and making a sector’s 
products and in generating and utilising a sector’s technologies; such a 
system of firms is related in two different ways; through processes of 
interaction and cooperation in artefact-technology development and 
though processes of competition and selection in innovative and market 
activities’ (p.131).    
Technological capabilities consist of the skills and knowledge necessary to develop, 
produce and sell products, as distinct from innovativeness, which involves the 
capacity to generate and commercialise novel or improved products and production 
processes (Dosi, Pavitt, & Soete, 1990). Innovations are produced by activities in 
which technology is both an input and an output. 
SSI and performance 
Entrepreneurship research has established that industry characteristics have a 
significant impact on venture performance (Baum & Locke, 2004; Bhide, 2000). The 
sectoral composition of an economy co-determines the institutional setting of the 
SI, as well as the structure and direction of innovative activities (Balzat & Pyka, 
2006). Non-firm organisations generally don’t have a direct effect on innovation 
processes but rather they influence, reinforce or improve the context within which 
innovating firms operate (Edquist, 2011). Many important elements of government-
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provided infrastructures and policy are sector-specific (Nelson and Mowery, 1999) 
creating a potent shaping role, while the national context has a substantial 
influence on sectoral performance (Archibugi, Howells, & Michie, 1999). 
Highlighting the importance of SSI, Malerba (2010) argues that entrepreneurial 
initiatives are shaped by different institutions through specific knowledge and 
technological domains, heterogeneous agents and interaction with distinct 
networks.  
Consistent with population ecology, the simultaneous action of search and 
selection sees firms evolve over time, with the condition of the industry in each 
period bearing seeds in the subsequent period. This holds particular significance for 
SSI analysis in terms of how respective generations of firms impact those that 
follow, including effects of positive and negative interactions with institutions. This 
characterises path dependence, whereby current innovative capacity is somewhat 
conditional on the previous course of events (Carroll and Hannan, 2000), further 
emphasising the potential inherent in the temporal and lifecycle analysis.  
Challenges to sectoral segmentation  
In the context of pervasive technologies that span sector boundaries, the notion of 
SSI and production is broadly encompassing (Malerba, 2002; 2004). Any assessment 
of sectoral economic development reveals idiosyncrasies at the country level based 
on indigenous learning, at the product level in terms of portfolio mix, and at the 
micro level in respect of how firms operate and the markets they serve (Malerba 
and Nelson , 2011). SSI are principally characterised by the technologies and 
learning processes they employ – but, just as they represent a disaggregation of 
51 | P a g e  
 
NSI, different systems can coexist within sectors. By way of illustration, the NACE 
European Industrial Activity Classification system encompasses six broadly based 
codes for engineering (24 Basic metals, 25 fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment, 28 Machinery and equipment, 29 Motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers, 30 other transport equipment, 33 Repair and installation 
of machinery and equipment). This presents researchers and policy makers with 
self-evident challenges in establishing boundaries and to measuring innovative 
activity. Pertinent to this study, the traditional manufacturing engineering and 
software sectors both employ pervasive technologies, and are susceptible to broad 
internal segmentation. Recognition that knowledge bases, actors, networks, inputs, 
institutions and demand differ from sector to sector, supports discrete system 
perspectives.  
Technologies and applications 
Reflecting an evolutionary view of technology, industry structure and supporting 
institutions, Adams, Brusoni and Malerba (2011) offer a comprehensive 
interpretation: 
A sectoral system is characterised by a knowledge base and technologies 
that may cut across conventional industry boundaries. Such systems are 
composed of heterogeneous organisations or individuals (such as 
consumers, entrepreneurs, scientists) that may all be sources of 
knowledge, ideas, and feedback for producers and innovators, but that may 
not be part of conventionally defined industries in terms of firms (users and 
suppliers) and other organisations (universities, financial institutions, 
government agencies, trade unions, or technical associations). These 
organisations are characterised by specific knowledge bases and learning 
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processes… Often their outcome is not adequately captured by existing 
systems for measuring economic output (pp.169-170). 
Agents in sectoral systems are individuals and organisations characterised by 
specific learning processes, competencies, beliefs, objectives, organisational 
structures and behaviours, and which interact through communication, exchange, 
co-operation and competition shaped by institutions. Somewhat contradictory of 
the idiosyncratic nature of sectors suggested by Malerba and Nelson (2011), 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that highly structured organisational fields can 
lead to sectoral homogeneity in terms of structure, culture and output. This 
research addresses the question of whether firm age and strategy confers greater 
homogeneity in terms of system fit than sectoral affiliation per se.   
Sectors and industries differ in how learning and innovation occur within their 
boundaries (Malerba 2004), and organisational fields are generally characterised by 
somewhat distinctive governance systems composed of a combination of public 
and private actors (e.g. trade associations, the education system, intellectual 
property protection and state agencies) based on regulatory and normative 
controls (Scott, 2008). The relationship between SSI and NSI is a co-evolutionary 
one through which sectoral and firm attributes influence the development of 
knowledge infrastructures, institutions and policies at the national level, while 
industry characteristics influence the evolution of the national economy (Malerba, 
2002). Thus, capacity depends on the strength of linkages between common 
structures and specific sectors, implying that a given infrastructure results in more 
innovative output when there are mechanisms or institutions - such as an effective 
university system or established funding sources - supporting the commercialisation 
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of technologies in particular sectors (Furman et al., 2002). Given that firms compete 
for resources within selected environments, organisations in a population exist in a 
state of competitive interdependence (Aldrich, 1999), which in turn affects the 
prosperity of the sector, resulting in firms adapting, or perhaps mal-adapting to 
certain environmental configurations. 
By encompassing sectoral characteristics, the SI perspective used in this study not 
only goes beyond the set of commonly considered variables that seek to capture 
activities, but also takes account of interdependencies between industry structures 
and institutional frameworks as evinced by seminal authors in the domain:  
- In the early evolution of the NSI framework Freeman, Lundvall and Nelson, 
became increasingly cognisant of significant differences among innovation 
systems associated with different sectors (Nelson, 2000) 
- Economic growth is often driven by specific sectors - understanding the key 
sectors of an economy, with their related specificities, advances the 
understanding of national growth and national patterns of innovation 
(Malerba, 2005) 
- Due to internationalisation, Nelson and Rosenberg and Lundvall argue for a 
sectoral approach questioning the usefulness of a national perspective 
(Edquist, 2011). 
It is arguable that the SSI framework addresses the criticism that national 
classifications are too wide-ranging, and that institutions supporting technical 
advances in one field may not align with the framing conditions required to support 
innovation in another (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Malerba and 
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Orsenigo, 1997). This echoes the finding that the most fertile locations for 
innovation vary across fields (Porter and Stern, 2001).  
Sectoral Convergence 
Given the increasing ambiguity of industry definitions outlined earlier, partly 
evidenced by the proliferation of NACE codes within sectors, convergence appears 
inevitable (Evans, 1987). In the software context, convergence with other 
technologies has led to the blurring of boundaries within, for example, healthcare 
and financial services. In the Irish manufacturing sector, Newman (2011) 
distinguishes between modern and traditional manufacturing, the former covering 
all high-technology multinational enterprises (e.g. chemicals; computers and 
instrument engineering; electrical machinery and equipment), and the latter 
including all other sectors. Manufacturing engineering is also subject to increasingly 
blurred boundaries, with ‘clean tech’ emerging as a key sub sector reflecting the 
revision of the NACE system which has reclassified many manufacturing activities as 
services. There are parallel illustrations in the software sector, where programming 
covers enterprise and consumer grade applications, from complex financial 
platforms to music and gaming. 
Adoption of the sectoral lens 
Early economic analyses saw comparative advantage residing in differences in the 
availability of the inputs needed to support different types of economic activity 
(Mowery and Nelson, 1999). With reference to the dual sector approach adopted 
by this research, Lundvall et al. (2009) suggest, the SSI approach may facilitate 
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understanding of interaction not alone within but between different sectors leading 
to improved understanding of the mechanisms at work.  
As systems thinking continues to evolve, historical focus on R&D and the supply 
side has given way to thinking that such strategies can only be effective if they are 
accompanied by policies that stimulate output in sectors of comparative 
competitive advantage (Freeman, 1988). In the context of differential development, 
Rosenberg  (1974) articulates the need for careful understanding of the manner in 
which differences in the state of development of individual industries have a 
bearing on the composition of inventive activity. This study builds on research that 
emphasises the role of firms as central actors of SSI (e.g. Breschi and Malerba, 
1997; Lundvall, 1992; Wessner, 2000) and, further, that in-sector profiles will be 
diverse in respect of fitness to context.  
The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of firm-level contingencies on SSI 
fit. Prior to assessing the specifics of age and strategic intent, the literature 
reviewed in the foregoing section encompassed; the dynamics of firm-system fit, 
the overarching analytical framework adopted in this thesis, innovation, systems of 
innovation and most particularly, sectoral systems of innovation. The following 
section outlines the age/life course context proposed for the research. It examines 
the influence of age related factors on firms’ ability to secure and apply the 
resources for innovation. Shedding light on the potential impact of SSI via an 
analysis of age-related liability and viability, the review assesses the influence of 
variables such as firm newness, and the impact of moral hazard on funding, through 
to the viability of age and the capacity of mature SMEs to attract and retain talent 
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based on inferred reputation and stability. Analysing innovation with respect to firm 
age can make an important contribution to the understanding of firm dynamics.  
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2.5 Firm age, evolution and development.  
The mainstream innovation literature recognises the need for continuous renewal 
of organisations in dynamic environments, yet limited explicit attention has been 
given to the question of how firm dynamics affect system fit. It is clear that 
organisations develop over time and that even standing still does not imply 
stagnation in terms of policy, structure or behaviour. Given that globalisation, 
market turbulence and change are not merely routine but gathering pace, 
questions arise as to how newer, smaller and non-dominant firms confront and 
negotiate change (Louçã and Mendonça, 2002). 
At any particular time in history, firms founded in one era typically rely on different 
social structures than those formed at another time, creating mixed potential for fit 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). In the context that any given sector is likely to include some 
young, some middle aged and some elderly organisations, including them in the 
same research sample will have the effect of denying potentially important 
variances (Kimberly, 1980). This poses a parallel question in relation to SSI-fit in line 
with differing stages of maturity. Linked to that, there have been very few 
systematic, studies of the relationship between organisational age and the 
propensity of firms to produce technological innovations (Sorenson and Stuart, 
2000).  The dynamic quality of firm age is curiously absent from SI research. 
Age variables exhibit consistent and significant relationships with performance 
(Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968), although very early stage ventures 
present weaker evidence of such effects (Baum and Locke, 2004; Low and 
MacMillan, 1988). While old, small organisations incur a relatively high risk of 
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failure, successful organisations can outgrow age-based penalties (Ranger-Moore, 
1997), an assertion supported by Starbuck’s (1965) contention that as organisations 
get older, they learn more about coping with their environment and with internal 
problems of communication and coordination. Notwithstanding this, firms are 
unlikely to be successful if they draw lessons from observing growth in one period 
and apply these routinely at a later stage (Parker, Storey, & Van Witteloostuijn, 
2010). Aldrich and Auster (1986) further argue that formalisation and codification 
preserve the successes of the past at the potential cost of mortgaging the future. 
Empirical research on organisational age refers to tenure within a particular 
industry cohort or population. Organisations entering a population from an 
established position in another geographical location or even from another sector, 
generally display lower failure rates (Carroll and Hannan, 2000) indicating the 
potential benefits of structure, experience and resources. 
Paradoxically, as firms age, their core capabilities have been shown to both enable 
and impede innovation. While age is frequently associated with increased rates of 
innovation, the challenge of keeping in step with external developments can cause 
firm outputs to obsolesce or at least decline in value relative to current demand 
(Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). As start-ups grow, mature, and develop, their 
innovation processes frequently lose pace with market developments, with the 
result that they may become vulnerable to the same problems that gave rise to 
their initial advantage (Freeman & Engel, 2007). An alternative interpretation 
suggests that the impact of aging depends on the degree to which gains in 
competence through experience may be negated by declining performance due to 
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poor environmental fit (Sorenson and Stuart, 2000). Leonard-Barton labels the 
growth of core rigidities as the ‘dysfunctional flip-side’ (1992, p.111) of age, which 
otherwise demonstrates that activities related to developing and marketing new 
products expands competencies, in turn enabling further innovations (Danneels, 
2002), compared to major new innovations and technologies which are often 
associated with competence destruction (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). The 
generation of new technological knowledge generally builds on the previously 
existing base however the cognitive nature of learning processes and past 
knowledge can become a constraint (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997).  
These conflicting variables complicate the analysis of enterprise populations, so 
much so that, observing the near absence of their study from academic and 
institutional policy-making, Carroll and Hannan (2000) call for the creation of 
corporate demography as a discipline. Similarly, Kimberly (1980) argues that much 
organisational theory and research is static and in need of more dynamic theories 
and models.  
Theorists emphasise the need to examine the nature of the relationship between 
aging and organisational behaviour and, in particular, to study the joint effects of 
age on innovation outcomes in models of organisational mortality and growth 
(Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Given that the relationship between innovation, firm 
profitability and growth are expected to change over time, the effects of age on 
critical performance dimensions are insufficiently understood (Davidsson, Steffens, 
& Fitzsimmons, 2009). Detailed consideration of lifecycle impact on SSI appears 
merited. 
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Of particular importance to this study is the distinction between firms, technologies 
and age. Reinforcing the importance of population dynamics in small firms, Boswell 
(1973) discounts differentials based on industry classification, instead prioritising 
firm age, changing industry patterns, and the sociological evolution of the business 
itself. This leads to the concept of differential development, suggesting the need for 
careful understanding of how variations in the improvement of individual sectors 
can influence the composition of firms’ inventive activities (Rosenberg, 1974).  
Evolutionary theory 
Evolutionary theory – which aims to explain how particular forms of organisations 
exist in specific environments (Aldrich, 1999) suggests that organisational 
environments are rarely if ever static, so firms and the sectors they belong to, 
transform and change to avoid de-selection (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Danneels, 
2002). While neoclassical theory perceives an economy at rest or, at most, 
undergoing anticipated changes, evolutionary theory sees actors as having the 
capacity to innovate when they encounter opportunities or when their current 
behaviour is out of step with a changing context (Nelson, 2011). Growing emphasis 
on the temporal aspects of firm existence represents a significant trend, as social 
science seeks to examine the effects and management implications of evolutionary 
processes within organisations (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Carroll and Hannan, 1995, 
2000; Hamilton, 2011; Phelps, Adams, and Bessant, 2007; Westerman, McFarlan, 
and Iansiti, 2006) and within sectors (Boswell, 1973; Hanks, Watson, Jansen, and 
Dean 1993; Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004; Klepper, 1997; Kotha, Zheng, and 
George, 2011).  
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Organisational change has an inevitable impact on learning, behaviour and 
innovation (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Hannan, 1998; Sorenson and Stuart, 2000). 
Formation, growth, stabilisation, decline, exit and revitalisation mark potential 
milestones in the firm’s life course: virtually all theories about organisations 
presuppose some process of adjustment over time (Carroll and Hannan, 2000) and 
consistent with the SI framework, many address adaptation to change in geographic 
and historical contexts (Aldrich, 1999, 2008). In the context of the specific, 
differentiated and cumulative nature of technological development, Pavitt (1990) 
posits that the range of product and process technologies that firms can access 
depends on their historically accumulated competencies. Change and time resonate 
closely with innovation in respect of keeping pace with technology trajectories, the 
science base, industry and economic cycles. As such the impact of time on the firm 
should be a central feature of the SSI.  
Kimberly (1980) asserts that much organisation theory is static and ‘ahistorical’, 
suggesting that the revision of research paradigms to accommodate thinking about 
firms in lifecycle terms is long overdue. There is a significant body of literature on 
the nature of the technological and organisational capabilities embodied in firms 
and how these evolve over time (e.g. Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Bruderl and 
Schussler, 1990; Churchill  and Lewis, 1983; Galbraith, 1982; Greiner , 1972, 1998; 
Kimberly and Miles, 1980; Miller and Friesen, 1984; Ranger-Moore, 1997; Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2000; Westerman et al., 2006). Market conditions, innovation and 
diffusion are central to that evolution, as are age, size, productivity, capital 
intensity, export performance and ownership structure.  
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2.5.1 Adaptation and Selection  
Diverse industrial environments have particular economic and technical 
characteristics which demand unique competitive strategies (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1986) however; the degree to which strategic adaptation or environmental 
determinants dominate firm change remains unclear. There has been some 
criticism of the focus on adaptation to the neglect of selection in analysing 
organisation-environment relationships (Hannan and Freeman, 1978). Evolutionary 
approaches to the study of innovation, originated by Schumpeter and pioneered by 
Nelson and Winter (1982) highlight variety, creation, adaptation, selection and 
retention, all of which are time and path-dependent. Their suggested approach 
embodies the principles of biological evolution and natural selection by interpreting 
the economic system as an adoptive mechanism which chooses among actions 
generated by firms’ adaptive pursuit of success or profits (Alchian, 1950).  
At any point in time innovations emerge, but only those that are well adapted to 
the current selection environment are likely to succeed and form the basis for 
continuing adaptation and improvement (Alchian, 1950; Fagerberg et al., 2008). 
While survivors may appear to be those that have adapted best, Alchian (1950) 
posits that the environment may have actively ‘adopted’ them, reducing liability for 
motivated adaptation (p.214). The SI is the selection environment for new 
entrepreneurial ventures, while path-dependence exerts a significant influence. 
New ventures that have little in common with strongly embedded sectors may find 
the system is poorly adapted to their needs. In relation to emerging sectors, Peters 
(2005) suggests that the SSI and NSI models should be coupled to analyse why some 
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industries are better supported than others.  Equally, government attempts to pick 
winners may result in selection against established or traditional sectors (Hirsch-
Kreinsen, 2008; von Tunzelmann & Acha, 2004) . For this reason, the target 
research population addresses the low-medium and medium-high technology 
sectors in parallel.  
Developmental and evolutionary theory  
Based on the premise that change occurs through a cycle of emergence, growth, 
maturity and decline, many theories of organisational founding and growth are 
developmental rather than evolutionary. Contrasting the developmental-stages 
approach with a focus on configurations of performance outcomes for companies in 
specific age groups, Steffens et al. (2009) suggest a probabilistic relationship 
between age and performance. The focus of ecological and institutional researchers 
is one of analysing common changes within organisational populations over time 
(Aldrich, 1999; 2008). Penrose (1959) refers to the reinforcement of the firm 
through the evolutionary lens of an ‘unfolding process’ based on internal 
developments leading to new directions and advantageous positions (p.1). 
Population Ecology  
Population ecology focuses on how groups of organisations are transformed by 
environmental change. The process of selection and retention, combined with the 
creation of new organisations, transforms sectors and ultimately renders them 
better suited to their environments. In biology, the differential survival of mutant 
organisms best able to exploit the food supply (Aldrich, 2008) is a familiar concept. 
In SI terms, this might equate to superior ability to access sources of finance, talent 
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and new markets. Echoing Darwin, Aldrich (2008) credits survival with superior 
resource-based selection, backed by learning which supports differential 
reinforcement of valuable processes.  
In contrast to Darwin’s population adaption, Lamarck promotes the notion of 
individual adaption, which is typically interpreted as the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, yet Darwinism and Lamarckism are not mutually exclusive. While 
Darwin endorsed Lamarckian inheritance, it is perceived inadequate as a theory, as 
it fails to explain why dysfunctional characteristics are inherited without invoking 
selection mechanisms (Aldrich et al., 2008). One expression of Lamarckian thinking 
is Saxenian’s (1994) reference to Silicon Valley as a ‘Protean Place’ (p.161), based 
on Proteus’ ability to change shape while avoiding commitment to a single form. 
Cyert and March (1992) interpret Nelson and Winter’s (1982, p.19) search based 
change theory as Lamarckian.  
This suggests that a generalisable assessment of SSI fit may be of practical use to 
firms in search of markers to navigate their environments. 
2.5.2 Lifecycle, life course and Stages Models 
Economics frequently draws on the natural sciences to illustrate phenomena, the 
most common application of which is the life cycle metaphor, where firm 
emergence, growth, decline and exit is perceived as analogous to birth, growth and 
death in biological organisms (Child & Kieser, 1981; Penrose, 1952; Whetten, 1987). 
The lifecycle paradigm is well established (Greiner, 1972; Levitt, 1965; Utterback & 
O'Neill, 1994; Vernon, 1966), with variants spanning organisational age (Boswell, 
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1973), products (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) and technology (Klepper, 1996) 
which renders this particular lens apt for consideration by policymakers.  
Theorists point to the importance of size, age, technology and legal form in shaping 
innovation and growth outcomes for individual firms (Barron, West and Hannan, 
1994; Bruderl and Schussler, 1990; 1994; Carroll and Hannan, 1995; Churchill and 
Lewis, 1983; Fichman and Levinthal, 1991; Greiner, 1972). Distinguishing between 
age and technological progress (production and output technologies) as sources of 
growth is challenging. Differentiating between organisational and biological age, 
Kimberly (1980) adopts a developmental view suggesting that chronology is just 
one of many dimensions to consider in assessing firm maturity or propensity to 
grow: 
Chronological age may have very little to do with where an organisation is 
going or where it has been. Calendar time and organisational time are not 
necessarily identical. Organisations often have rhythms and cycles that are 
quite independent of their chronological age (p.6).  
Employing similar logic, industrial organisation economists characterise age as 
young or mature, suggesting that various business and technology iterations occur 
naturally as industries grow older (Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Greiner, 1972; Nelson, 
1995). Other authors use similar nomenclature at the firm level: early-stage new 
ventures 0–4 years old (Low & MacMillan, 1988); entry, post entry or intermediate 
and advanced age (Huergo & Jaumandreu, 2004a); infants (0±2 years), adolescents 
(3±4 years), middle-aged (5±24 years), or old (25 years or more) as a rough 
approximation for seed, start-up, and later stages  (Berger & Udell, 1988). Each of 
these is suggestive of differential behaviour or economic interaction which requires 
consideration in regard to temporal adaptation of SI. 
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The growth literature commonly applies developmental and stage models (e.g. 
Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Greiner, 1972; Kazanjian and Drazin 1989). The 
characteristics and challenges of growth stages appear to constitute a more useful 
mechanism for calibrating the entrepreneurial process than specific timeframes 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001b). Promoting a more subtle approach, Phelps, Adams, and 
Bessant (2007) conclude that lifecycle models are ‘linear, unidirectional, sequenced 
and deterministic’ (p.17), calling into question their applicability to the analysis of 
firm growth over time. In an extensive analysis of growth models, Levie and 
Lichtenstein (2009) found no consensus on basic constructs and no empirical 
evidence supporting stages theory. As outlined below, this discord has been 
addressed by a number of authors, extending the menu of evolutionary diagnostics 
which might be applied to assess system fit within chosen sectors.  
Start-ups and Lifecycles 
Liabilities of newness and smallness combined appear to dilute the usefulness of 
the lifecycle description of organisational change in that most organisations don’t 
grow and, high mortality rates among start-ups mean that most new firms face 
short term dissolution (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). The US Small Business 
Administration as cited in Berger and Udell (1998, p.627) estimates that about 
23.7% of small businesses disappear within 2 years and 52.7% disappear within 4 
years due to failure, bankruptcy, owner retirement, ill health, or a desire to embark 
on a more profitable endeavour. Given the instability of the start-up population, 
entrepreneurship policy, rather than the system of innovation, may offer a better 
route to resolving market-failure.  
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Firm Age and Growth  
Gibrat’s Law predicts discontinuous growth patterns driven by independent random 
variables (Hamilton, 2011) however Parker et al. (2010) contend that this is 
incompatible with evidence that consistently explains firm growth. Employing 
growth as a proxy for innovation, the literature presents supporting and conflicting 
evidence of the age-growth relationship. Citing high-technology start-ups as an 
exception to generally accepted business growth stages, Churchill and Lewis (1983) 
suggest that the entrepreneurs and investors who start them, do so with the 
intention of growing them quite rapidly, often with a view to a successful exit (e.g. 
IPO or trade sale). While there is some evidence that rapidly growing enterprises 
are more concentrated in technologically sophisticated sectors, empirical data 
increasingly points to a lack of concentration in the high tech sector (Mason & 
Brown, 2013; Parker et al., 2010). Exit patterns and growth potential in high tech 
sectors should be a key consideration in SSI design; both from the perspective of 
qualifying expectations for job-related growth and the consequences of firm 
exit/acquisition for a small open economy.  
Once established, organisations benefit from patterns of relationships that 
ultimately coalesce into a social structure that enhances their survival prospects. 
Beyond the minimum efficient level, however, this study focuses on firm age in 
combination with the distinction between technologies and industry lifecycles. 
Several aspects of the SI are thought to be prominent in influencing the ultimate 
success of innovation as businesses mature from start-up through intermediate and 
advanced ages. In the developmental tradition, Churchill and Lewis (1983) argue 
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that small businesses experience common challenges at similar stages of 
development - so while each firm is unique, they all face similar problems and are 
subject to the vagaries of changing conditions - and that categorising problems and 
growth patterns could help entrepreneurs to navigate them. They highlight pivotal 
components as:  
Financial resources, including cash and borrowing power; Personnel 
resources, depth and quality of people at management and staff levels; 
Systems resources, in terms of the degree of sophistication of information 
and planning and control systems; Business resources, including customer 
relations, market share, supplier relations, manufacturing and distribution 
processes, technology and reputation, all of which give the company a 
position in its industry and its market (P.40).  
By way of illustration, emergent markets are challenging for many young firms as 
the timing of market adoption is difficult to predict, and difficulties are often 
compounded by straitened capital and human resources, so that the firm is too 
drained to bridge the chasm (Moore, 1991). Clearly, an active presence in growing 
markets where customer needs and awareness are established can offer young 
firms significant advantage (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990).  
Lifecycles and system contingency 
Adopting a growth perspective, Adizes (1979) portrays lifecycles themselves as 
contingency models, suggesting that they provide frameworks for prescribing the 
actions and decisions likely to be most effective at particular organisational stages. 
Employing stages theory, it appears reasonable to assume that development takes 
place in identifiable stages during the life course of most firms (Foss, 1997). The 
growth and maturity phases merit focus in terms of potential to scale and diversify. 
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Models further suggest the potential for firms to foresee problems associated with 
growth over time, and to gain insights for effective action (Adizes, 1979).  
Articulating parallel factors that condition sector-specific patterns, Klepper (1997) 
describes how firms could exploit regularities in evolution, including insights 
offered by industry lifecycles. This is supported by La Rocca, La Rocca, and Cariola 
(2011)  who propose a financial lifecycle model that is homogenous for different 
industries and consistent over time.  
Child and Kieser (1981) are critical of efforts to support managerial decision-making 
by attempting to typify development paths. They suggest that lifecycle models offer 
only limited help to those seeking to navigate development, compounded by the 
absence of information about potential time lags. Route 128’s minicomputer firms 
and Silicon Valley’s semiconductor firms, followed lifecycle organisational and 
location logics closely during the 1980s, but competition based on continuous - and 
especially radical - innovations undermined the industrial maturity logic implicit in 
those models, creating shortened lifecycles. However, Silicon Valley with its 
capacity for experimentation, learning and pursuit of multiple technology 
trajectories (Saxenian, 1994) privileged the companies involved in that system.  
Life course 
Child and Kieser (1981) outline the challenge of drawing a sharp distinction, 
conceptually or empirically, between development brought about by strategic 
choice and that caused by unplanned forces.  They suggest that ‘the distinction 
between development as a function of strategy and development as a function of 
ageing is a highly academic one’ (p.46) and propose that ex post rationalisation by 
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managers and researchers risks producing spurious analyses of organisational 
development. This notwithstanding, Aldrich and Auster (1986) suggest that 
research on strategy and context would benefit from investigations which 
simultaneously consider both levels of analysis and how they are connected.  
Aldrich (1999) suggests substituting the life cycle concept with ‘life course’ (p.196) 
as a means of avoiding implied determinism. Borrowing from population 
demography, Aldrich and Ruef (2006) employ history rather than time as the 
central attribute of firm evolution, suggesting a framework (Table 2-1) 
incorporating age, period and cohort effects. 
Age 
effect 
Changes produced by processes inherently associated with duration of existence 
– e.g., decay of a founder’s initial enthusiasm 
Period 
effect 
Changes produced by historical events and forces that have similar effects on all 
organisations, regardless of age (e.g., deregulation of financial markets). 
Organisations founded in the same year make up a group that moves together 
through time, experiencing historical periods and events while they are all the 
same age. 
Cohort 
effect 
Changes produced by historical events and forces that have different effects on 
organisations of different ages - for example, shortages of essential resources 
may weaken younger organisations but have little effect on older ones. 
Table 2-1: Attributes of firm evolution (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006, p.164). 
Many young organisations display drive, flexibility and dynamism derived largely 
from the characteristics of their founders and the relative newness of their ideas, 
assets and markets, while other young firms may make investments in people, 
technology, and assets that they are unable to change subsequently because they 
are blinkered or resource-poor (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). In a meta-
analysis of literature on SME age and growth in the US and the UK, Storey (1994) 
finds that younger firms grow more rapidly than their more mature counterparts, 
and consistent with this, Robson and Bennett (2000) in a 1997 study of 2474 British 
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SMEs find that as firms age, they are less likely to drive growth in employment and 
turnover. In accord with Storey’s findings on the negative age-employment 
relationship, they contend that this is due to owner-managers having achieved the 
objectives they formulated at founding, and also that older firms are more likely to 
have surpassed the minimum efficient scale of production giving them reasonably 
secure position in their markets. One aspect of the aging process is goal-change, 
including adjustment to meet broader and/or more achievable targets, and 
maintaining the organisation once established (Child and Kieser, 1981). Growth has 
been found to decrease with age when firm size is held constant (Evans, 1987).  This 
suggests that improved understanding of firm dynamics is critical to SSI governance.  
Although a large body of literature charts the evolution of market structures, 
industries and firms, including theories attempting to predict patterns of growth 
over time (Evans, 1987; Klepper, 1997; Phelps et al., 2007), the implications of age, 
stage, life course and lifecycle for SSI fit have received limited attention. Sorenson 
and Stuart (2000) contend that there have been very few systematic studies of the 
relationship between organisational age and firms’ propensity to innovate. 
Similarly, Metcalfe (1997) observes wide differences in firms’ abilities to sense 
relevant innovation opportunities and to manage technology creation processes. 
Echoing that, Phelps et al. (2007) propose a typology of maturity stages of 
absorptive capacity, assessing organisations’ abilities to engage with and use new 
knowledge. The methodology employed in the current research offers an 
opportunity to gain insight into firms’ absorptive capacity. 
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2.5.3 Stages of development  
Transitioning from the theories and frameworks that support our understanding of 
ages and stages of development, there is scope for overlap and confusion. Klepper 
(1997) delineates three stages of evolution; exploratory or embryonic, intermediate 
or growth and maturity. The stages-of-development tradition promoted by 
Churchill and Lewis (1983), Greiner (1972) and Kazanjian and Drazin (1989) presents 
a stage-based map of founder and firm characteristics evolving over a timeline. In a 
bid to provide management with a roadmap for the future, Greiner (1972) 
articulates the developmental phases of organisational growth as five 
interconnecting dimensions; age, size, stages of evolution, stages of revolution and 
the industry growth rate, defining evolution as ‘prolonged periods of growth where 
no major upheaval occurs’ and revolution as ‘periods of substantial turmoil in 
organisational life’ (p.398).  
Arguing against the idea of predetermined stages of firm development as a function 
of age, Penrose reasons that: 
to abandon firm development to the laws of nature diverts attention from 
the importance of human decisions and motives, and from problems of 
ethics and public policy, and surrounds the whole question of the growth of 
the firm with an aura of naturalness and even inevitability (1952, p.809).  
Penrose (1952) further derides the concept of stages as a bare, undeveloped 
hypothesis lacking consistent theory and with insufficient substance to make it 
useful. In a comparable analysis of the S-curve as a management tool, Schilling 
(2010) cautions that while it is useful for gaining a deeper understanding of rates of 
improvement or limitations when mapping technology trajectories, its use as a 
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predictive tool is limited. Aldrich and Ruef (2006) similarly advise that ‘cross-field 
borrowing’ (p.160) can generate helpful insights but that facile equations of 
organisational development could be misleading. In a comprehensive review of 
stages models and life-cycle theories of business and entrepreneurial growth, Levie 
and Lichtenstein (2009) argue that they do not offer an accurate representation of 
entrepreneurial firm growth and development, describing stages models as being 
‘similar to clear but misleading roadmaps that create an illusion of certainty about 
the path ahead’ (p.336). 
Contending that lifecycle models are overly deterministic, Churchill and Lewis’ 
(1983) own findings suggest that while some companies may be at a given stage of 
development, many are at one stage with regard to one growth dimension and at 
another on an alternative dimension. This aligns with the argument that many 
organisations survive at an arrested stage of organic development, while most 
attain maturity and avoid transitioning to decline and death (Child & Kieser, 1981). 
In conclusion, Levie and Lichtenstein (2009) resolve that scholars should no longer 
use stages models, claiming that they act as a barrier to the advancement of 
research on the growth of entrepreneurial organisations.  
Taking account of the conflicting observations expressed by scholars of stage and 
age-related models, empirical research on age-related system fit appears 
warranted. This mixed method study explores SSI fit in respect of the research 
population. While the findings may not be significant in terms of innovation output, 
firms’ demands for innovation related resources such as external funding and 
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access to R&D should be indicative of the opportunities and constraints associated 
with age.  
2.5.4 Age-related Liabilities 
Two factors present at the foundation of an organisation are said to influence its 
subsequent development: the personality of the founder and societal conditions at 
the point of the firm’s foundation (Storey, 1994). It is reasonable to assume that the 
characteristics and aspirations of founders initially drive their firms, but the 
necessity for survival dictates the need for growth in newly established businesses 
(Gartner, 1988). Entrepreneurs’ beliefs and preferences have been shown to frame 
organisations, both at the outset and thereafter (Child and Kieser, 1981), but 
growth in small firms (where it occurs) is rarely a continuous and sustained process, 
so firm age is rarely a predictor of growth prospects (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; 
Smallbone and Wyer, 2012). In the context of founding conditions, additions to a 
firm’s knowledge base depends on what it already knows and how it processes or 
assimilates new knowledge (Autio et al., 2000), which brings into question the 
learning and unlearning of routines, ‘competency traps’ and firms being ‘locked-
out’ of types of knowledge if they don’t acquire or cannot access them at an early 
stage (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p.136-137). 
Extending the earlier reference to cohort effects (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006), the 
economic era in which a particular type of organisation is founded may have a 
residual effect on its structure (Stinchcombe, 1965) and growth prospects. Boswell 
(1973) describes infancy – i.e., the first five years of existence - as a distinctive 
period in a firm’s history, associated with boot strapping, high risk, modest capital 
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expenditure and personal sacrifice by the owner. He finds that the link between 
founder-ship and management was strongest in young firms, albeit founder 
entrepreneurs normally have long periods of involvement with firms in the 
manufacturing sector – over 25 years in some cases. Such firms are characterised by 
founders’ drive and ambition for growth which can be matched by a reluctance to 
adopt formal planning and control, opting instead to deal with issues on an intuitive 
basis diminishing potential for scale - impetus can decline, and the changes that 
success brings such as the need to delegate, may be at variance with the style of 
the founder (Child and Kieser, 1981). 
Liability of newness 
In the context of conditions that affect comparative mortality rates among new and 
old organisations, Stinchcombe (1965) coined the term ‘liability of newness’ based 
on evidence of the higher risk of failure among new firms compared with older 
counterparts.  In a study of growth oriented founders, Baum and Locke (2004, 
p.588) similarly identify characteristics of the entrepreneur’s situation as: (a) 
extreme uncertainty (newness of products, markets, and organisations; lack of 
information), (b) resource shortages (financing, knowledge, operating assets, and 
legitimacy), (c) surprises, and (d) rapid change. The inexperience of start-ups 
contrasts with the established routines of more mature firms including succession 
structures, skills transfer, decision criteria, mechanisms for dealing with conflict, 
known liabilities in routine procedures and general loyalty to the firm (Bruderl and 
Schussler, 1990, p.530; Stinchcombe, 1965, p.148). While conditions associated 
with newness are partially addressed through provision for start-ups, the other 
dynamics enumerated are given limited consideration in the SI literature. 
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Two of the main problems in starting new organisations are the concentration of 
sufficient resources in the hands of the ‘innovating elite’ and the capacity to recruit, 
train, motivate and organise personnel effectively’ (Stinchcombe, 1965, p.160). The 
liability of newness theory has become part of the conventional wisdom of 
organisational sociology, in which reliability and accountability are seen to increase 
with age (Barron, West and Hannan , 1994). However more recent findings indicate 
that mortality rates do not decline monotonically from firm foundation, as implied 
or empirically observed (e.g. Freeman , Carroll and Hannan, 1983), but rather they 
sometimes rise during the early part of a firm’s life when initial resource stocks are 
exhausted before declining over a typical lifespan. It is posited that these patterns 
have been overlooked due to reliance on parametric representations that assume 
monotonic changes in hazard rates over time (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991).  
Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004a) show that entrant firms are more likely to be 
innovative than older firms however, Malerba and Orsenigo (1997) find that a large 
proportion of new innovators can be classed as ‘occasional’ with many ceasing to 
innovate soon after entry. They also show that the oldest and youngest cohorts 
held a far larger share of patents than the intermediate or adolescent cohorts, and 
that entry and exit processes mean the age distribution of innovators appears 
strongly skewed towards youth.  
Extending the analysis, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) argue that liability of 
newness fails to deal with two common observations; firstly that leaders can and do 
influence the performance of firms, particularly young and small ones, and 
secondly, that there can be enormous differences in the quality of life of surviving 
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ventures. Exploring contrasting perspectives on age-related liabilities, Autio et al. 
(2000) advance the notion that the generation of new organisational knowledge is 
greater in proximity to domains of existing knowledge. This suggests that emerging 
firms have few organisational routines to unlearn, meaning that learning, 
assimilation and retrieval occurs in a persistent fashion  conferring advantages on 
young firms, which are generally more flexible and enjoy ‘discovery advantage’, 
whereas established firms enjoy ‘exploitation advantage’ based on their ability to 
leverage resources and experience (Steffens, Davidson and Fitzsimmons, 2009, 
p.125). Similarly, Autio et al. (2000) introduce the concept of the ‘learning 
advantages of newness’ (p.919) in conjunction with knowledge based competition 
in SMEs. Entrepreneurial firms lacking traditional ‘hard’ sources of power - such as 
scale, deep pockets and a strong customer base – can nevertheless use ‘soft’ 
sources of power that reduce ambiguity and create influence (Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009, p.667), echoing the potential viability of newness (Levie and Lichtenstein, 
2009). The strengths of larger, older organisations show up the weaknesses of 
smaller, newer organisations and vice versa (Aldrich and Auster, 1986), these 
paradoxes warrant further study in respect of implications for SSI configuration.  
Liability of adolescence  
A number of authors (Adizes, 1979; Bruderl and Schussler, 1990; and Ranger-
Moore, 1997) define adolescence as the mid-point of firms’ age range, with 
distribution subject to sectoral and industry lifecycles. Between 20-40 per cent of 
new entrants in a given cohort fail within their first two years, and although failure 
rates decline with age, only 40-50 per cent survive beyond the seventh year 
(Bartelsman et al., 2005). Research indicates a higher probability of fast growth for 
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surviving firms as the accumulation of experience and assets fortifies their position 
and reduces the likelihood of failure as they adjust to environmental change (Ahn, 
2002; Mason and Brown, 2010). More time is spent on planning and co-ordination, 
and on establishing policies, so a somewhat contradictory style emerges where the 
administrative orientation seeks stability while the entrepreneurial orientation 
seeks variation (Adizes, 1979). This supports the proposition that failure rates peak 
during adolescence, as found by Bruderl and Schussler (1990) in their work on the 
mortality hazard of Bavarian businesses. They refute Stinchcombe’s hypothesis of 
higher risk for young firms, introducing the concept of ‘liability of adolescence’ 
(p.530), proposing an inverted U-shaped risk pattern indicating that mortality, 
depending on firms’ initial resource endowments, peaks between one and fifteen 
years after founding. In adolescence, death risks are seen to be low because 
monitoring is high and judgment about success or failure is postponed: later, 
however, monitoring reduces and organisations are more vulnerable to the usual 
risks of failure (Bruderl and Schussler, 1990). Because organisations tend to be most 
vulnerable to survival hazards early on in life, any factors that result in a buffer 
period making them less susceptible would have a significant effect on persistence: 
Fichman and Levinthal (1991) refer to this as the firm equivalent of a honeymoon 
period, in which age effects and initial endowments shield relationships to varying 
degrees, ‘even if they are, in some sense, less fit than other possible relationships 
or organisations’ (p.447). Even so, proponents of the idea of adolescent liability 
continue to assume that mortality hazard declines with age over the majority of 
organisational lifespans (Carroll and Hannan, 2000) although Fichman and Levinthal 
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(1991) suggest that initial endowments can mask difficulties up to a point in the 
lifecycle, resulting in greater challenges for adolescent firms. 
In keeping with emergent thinking on business model innovation (Osterwalder  and 
Pigneur, 2009), it might be suggested that adolescent organisations are liable to 
iterate or change direction based on shifts in their environment or in technology. 
Hannan and Freeman (1984, p.160) propose that such change renews their liability 
of newness by diluting the value of the organisation’s history of survival, making 
established routines and competencies obsolete, and disrupting relations with the 
market. This is consistent with the theory on competence-enhancing and 
competence-destroying innovations and also with structural inertia theory, which 
suggests that organisations might fail as a direct result of their attempts to survive 
(Baum, 1996). Considering governmental interest in job-rich growth, the challenges 
and opportunities inherent in adolescent companies merits closer consideration in 
the SSI context.  
Liability of age 
Older technology firms are generally presumed to have perfected the routines and 
structures needed to develop new technologies and bring them to market, but they 
may also be prone to obsolescence or senescence (Stuart & Sorenson, 2000) if 
employee behaviour becomes ossified (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). Unlearning 
established practices becomes more difficult as firms develop ‘self-reinforcing 
patterns’ (Autio et al., 2000, p.911) where existing knowledge is most likely to be 
exploited and new knowledge may injudiciously be assimilated based on dominant 
logic (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). Although knowledge-intensive firms suffer greater 
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downside risks of technological obsolescence, they are more likely to be able to 
contend with knowledge obsolescence than firms with less developed knowledge 
regenerating capacities. Given the inevitability of environmental change, firms and 
policy makers must be alert to the risk that organisational policies can become 
locked into strategic frames of reference formulated for an outdated context (Child 
and Kieser, 1981), a phenomenon that may offer some explanation for the difficulty 
businesses experience in sustaining growth over time. 
A popular theme in the literature is that larger organisations are likely to generate 
incremental innovations whereas smaller ones are the more likely springs of radical 
innovation, albeit a small minority of them (Roper, 1997). On the other hand, 
Winter (1984)  suggests that small firms face an obvious disadvantage in developing 
incremental innovations due to the absence of necessary complementary assets in 
their portfolios, whereas established firms may suffer opposing constraints, 
imposed by incumbency (products, assets and customer/supplier commitments). As 
organisations age, they gain a history and routines that limit their flexibility by 
restricting their range of potential action, compounded by external commitments 
that create pressure to continue business as usual (Ranger-Moore, 1997; Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2000). Together with the necessity to continue serving existing 
customers, this may hamper the perception and pursuit of emerging market 
opportunities (Rosenbloom & Christensen, 1994). 
In research on the combined attributes of age and size, Barron, West and Hannan 
(1994) suggest that larger and older organisations gain increasing dominance over 
their environment, enjoying lower failure rates and higher growth through 
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competence-enhancing change which Ranger-Moore (1997, p.903) and Anderson 
and Tushman (1986, p.445) liken to the ‘the rich getting richer while the poor get 
poorer’ as liabilities of newness plague recent entrants. By extension, Starbuck 
(1983) claims that older, larger firms may hold sufficient resources to buffer 
themselves from adverse changes in the environment while Aldrich and Auster 
(1986) argue that organisational inertia may be a product of external selection, 
rather than assuming it is a primary cause. External mediators such as funding 
agencies, suppliers and customers may select more established organisations on 
the basis of seeking accountability and reliability in their dealings (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). 
A number of studies point to increasing bureaucratisation as a function of time, 
sometimes independent of organisational size. Among the characteristics and 
strengths of innovative culture, Pavitt (1991) cites flexibility, short lines of 
communication, close customer relations, management and labour force 
motivation, reduced bureaucracy and strong interest in product development and 
technological change. Starbuck (1965) suggests that process formalisation is 
fundamentally adaptive, and Child and Kieser (1981) add that only when 
organisations treat a discontinuous environment as continuous, do repeatability 
and formalisation become sources of inflexibility or weakness, countering the 
assumption that maturity inevitably leads to sclerosis. 
Obsolescence and senescence  
The fate of older, larger firms is presented as one of diminished capacity to respond 
to new challenges which is framed alternately as the ‘liability of obsolescence’ and 
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the ‘liability of senescence’ (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994, p.387; Stuart and 
Sorenson, 2000). In the case of obsolescence, causal significance cannot be 
attributed to aging per se, as mortality rates are independent of age in stable 
environments. Senescence connotes disadvantage among older firms in dynamic 
environments where accumulated routines and structures impede the firm’s ability 
to react in a timely fashion, or simply impose excessive overhead costs that 
undermine efficiency, even in a stable environment. Models of the drivers of 
innovation, productivity and firm growth for manufacturing plants in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland show that plant age has a uniformly negative effect on product 
and process innovation (Roper, Du, & Love, 2008). However, an earlier study by 
Roper and Hewitt‐Dundas (2001) revealed positive effects on productivity for older 
plants with consistently negative growth effects.   
The liability of obsolescence corresponds with Schumpeter’s thesis on ‘creative 
destruction’ whereby aging organisations become vulnerable to competition from 
new, unencumbered entrants. Among the constraints mature organisations face 
which limit their potential to make changes are ‘retention of control by founders 
long after such control is effective, a tendency towards internal consistency and 
homogeneity, and the hardening of vested interests opposing changes’ (Aldrich and 
Auster, 1986, p.172). 
One impact of firm maturity has been interpreted as a lack of innovative decision-
making, combined with avoidance of risk, leaving established firms vulnerable to 
emerging competitors more sensitive to environmental change. Within the SI 
framework, this may constitute an inability on the firm’s part to access the physical 
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and social assets needed to modify production processes, recognise the need for 
diversification or to implement strategic or functional change. In most instances, 
managerial rather than material interventions may be needed.  
Liability of Smallness/Size 
Most organisations are small and suffer from attendant liabilities. Freeman, Carroll 
and Hannan (1983) lament what they perceive as unquestioning acceptance of 
Stinchcombe’s ‘liability of newness’ argument. They reason that firms may instead 
suffer ‘liability of smallness’ in so far as the smallest organisations suffer the highest 
death rates, and that overall cohort death rates decline with age as small firms exit 
the population. Significant to this is that the Small Business Administration in the US 
was created with a specific mandate to protect and preserve firms burdened with 
size-related inefficiencies (Audretsch & Beckmann, 2007). Studies reporting size 
distributions usually do not control simultaneously for size and age, thus inferences 
drawn about the effects of organisational age in such models may be spurious 
(Aldrich and Auster 1986; Barron, West and Hannan, 1994). 
Liability of smallness indicates the tendency among larger organisations to have 
lower and later mortality peaks than their smaller counterparts (Bruderl and 
Schussler, 1990; Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983). Birch (1987) showed that 
non-survival rates for small firms were very high regardless of age, despite some 
evidence that smallness does not necessarily make survival problematic (Aldrich 
and Auster, 1986). Firm size measured by employee numbers is frequently used as 
a proxy for the amount of resources available, allied to the importance attributed 
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to the economic and innovative contributions of large firms (e.g. Schumpeter, 1947; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982 and Penrose, 1969).  
Viability and liability of size 
There is little question that in general, larger, older firms have certain advantages 
over smaller, newer firms, given the reduced managerial effort required for routine 
operations. Larger organisations enjoy advantages over their smaller counterparts 
in respect of raising capital, managing taxes and government regulations, as well as 
being better positioned to compete for labour (Bruderl and Schussler, 1990). Size 
can legitimate organisations to the extent that their scope may be interpreted as an 
outcome of prior success and an indicator of future dependability. Pertinent to SIs, 
Pavitt (1990) points to the strategic decisions of large firms having a bearing on 
sectoral patterns, technical activity and economic competitiveness within an 
industry. Thus larger organisations may be better positioned to influence their 
environments by monopolising resources or by exerting control over institutions, 
while conferring greater fitness in a broader range of environments (Ranger-Moore, 
1997). This offers a parallel with the benefits of advanced age including the ability 
to compound favourable conditions.  
The size-age relationship is the subject of much debate, with a number of studies 
implying that firm growth is independent of size (e.g. Evans, 1987; Jovanovic, 1982). 
Assessing the impact of efficiency on growth and survival, Jovanovic (1982) posits 
that firms differ in size, not because of the supply of capital but because some are 
more efficient than others at bringing about a range of outcomes from growth and 
steady-state through to exit. However, efficient organisations take time to build, 
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requiring the creation of roles and routines, gaining an understanding of the 
environment and developing relationships with relevant organisations and 
institutions (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994; Stinchcombe, 1965). In contrast, large 
firms may have a tendency to avoid risky innovation by substituting minor product 
improvements which are sufficient to defend and extend market positions (Child 
and Kieser, 1981), potentially undermining long term viability. Senescence may 
result in dated market vision, with the result that the size-age related advantage of 
established firms reduces in growth markets (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990).  
The literature review on age/life course and the preceding review of systems of 
innovation touch on a number of factors which research suggests may have an 
impact on firm-system fit - collectively or independently.  
The next section addresses strategic aspiration and how strategic contingencies 
might affect potential fit. Strategic aspiration emerged from the semi-structured 
interview phase of the research as a potentially important determinant of SSI-fit. 
2.6 Strategic Context 
Porter (1991) defines strategy as the act of aligning a company and its environment 
while noting that the environment and the company’s capabilities are likely to 
change over time. Firm strategies in any period are thus related to the market 
position of the business, the characteristics of the entrepreneur, the aspirations of 
the company and the operating environment. For the most part, organisational 
outcomes are a product of the intentions and consequent actions of the individuals 
who run them, influenced by environmental and institutional conditions (Roper, 
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1998). While venture growth is assumed to be the essence of entrepreneurship, 
divergence in growth paths is common as small firms mature (Tan, Fischer, Mitchell, 
& Phan, 2009), highlighting the need to understand the relative importance of 
firms’ strategic motives in order to craft SSI which align entrepreneurial and policy 
aspirations. 
Ventures that match their technological choices with their external environment 
are better positioned to achieve superior performance (Zahra and Bogner, 2000). In 
the SME context, this is broadly in line with the perception that external factors 
dominate internal influences, consistent with industrial organisation theory that 
strategy and performance are primarily determined by the firm’s sector, while 
economic competence or the ability to identify and exploit business opportunities is 
unevenly distributed (Carlsson, 1994). Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) argue that 
rationality around these assumptions is not alone limited but quite different among 
firms. These opposing perspectives are led by institutional and strategic choice 
theorists; clearly both schools of thought have a significant bearing on SSI analysis 
and fit. While institutional theorists stress organisational inertia and dependence, 
strategic choice theorists give primacy to managerial autonomy and adaptability 
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Aldrich, 2008). Lundvall (1992) cites strategy as 
fundamental to firm learning, second only to consideration of economic structure. 
Expressing a contrarian view, Child and Kieser (1981) observe the tendency to 
interpret organisational development in terms of strategy but raise the possibility 
that development takes place independently of strategic moves, merely ‘as a 
function of time’ (p.44). 
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One defining characteristic is that no two firms innovate identically. Lundvall (1992) 
asserts that taking advantage of the environment for innovation is not routine given 
that companies based in the same location demonstrate significant variations in 
output, as they are shown to navigate the same environment with very different 
strategies (Miles & Snow, 1978; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Miller & Toulouse, 1986) 
This view is particularly pertinent to the comparative study of SSIs and the influence 
and impact of aspiration. 
2.6.1 Economic Motivation  
In the mainstream economic literature, the supremacy of economic motive is often 
taken for granted with the assumption that firms act in ways to maximise profits. 
However, in the context of privately owned SMEs, a more diverse view may be 
relevant. Setting aside the close association between growth and development, 
growth does not represent the only organisational development strategy, indicating 
that researchers might dispense with profit maximisation as a first approximation 
(Alchian, 1950). People start and operate firms for a variety of reasons other than 
maximising economic returns (Davidsson, 1989a; Delmar, 1996; Gundry & Welsch, 
2001; Nelson, 1984; Storey, 1994). In terms of strategic orientation, not all owner-
managers can be described as Schumpeterian or Kirznerian entrepreneurs. Most 
entrepreneurs articulate modest growth ambitions (Levie and Lichtenstein, 2009) 
however, little is known about why some identify and pursue more opportunities 
than others (Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2008) . This runs somewhat counter 
to the idea that similar organisations experience comparable social expectations 
and are inclined to conform to the same strategies and structures.  
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New technology based firms are frequently founded by engineers with limited 
knowledge of markets, or experience in managing and growing businesses. Those 
founded with the objective of exploiting a technology proposition, rather than a 
recognised strategy or market opportunity, frequently regard the functions needed 
to drive commercialisation as secondary (Ganotakis & Love, 2011). Explicit 
enthusiasm for commercialisation in policy discussions is uncommon, a deficit 
which the SSI has the potential to address in an integrated, developmental fashion. 
This leads to the key question of how the system might support firm level strategy, 
embodying commercialisation and diffusion. It also presumes knowledge of and 
access to the human, capital, market and other resources needed to create deliver 
and capture value.  
2.6.2 Strategic Planning and Small Firms 
The aggregate economic and social impact of SMEs indicates that societal interest 
would be served by research that delivers an improved understanding of their 
strategies (Robinson & Pearce, 1984) and how that might inform system design. Bell 
et al. (2004), drawing on theories of strategy-making in SMEs, observe that strategic 
planning undertaken by CEOs  is a key factor in firm expansion. As small firms 
mature, planning routines reflect a combination of the dynamics associated with 
start-ups and the need for bureaucracy and discipline (Storey, 1994). In accord with 
the view that strategic planning becomes more advanced over the business life 
cycle, Bell et al. (2004) note that, strategy formulation is a top-down process and 
that the absence of an explicit strategy should not necessarily be interpreted as a 
lack of strategic vision. By comparison with larger organisations characterised by 
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broader managerial participation in strategy making (Miller & Toulouse, 1986) , 
small organisations tend to have inexplicit, intuitively derived strategies that reside 
mainly in the mind of the CEO (Mintzberg, 1993; Oakey, 2012). 
Reflecting the paucity of strategic planning among small firms, Robinson and Pearce 
(1984) document the gap on the basis of four themes; lack of time, lack of 
knowledge of the process, absence of specialist expertise and sensitivity about 
sharing business decisions with employees and outsiders. This underscores the 
difficulty in measuring the strategy construct whereby strategy-making is often 
reactive, ad-hoc or simply opportunistic, leading to calls for alternative approaches 
in the context of widely documented financial and human resource constraints 
which often arise due to formal planning deficits (Carson, Cromie, McGowan, & Hill, 
1995; Welsh & White, 1981). For the purpose of this thesis, the strategic orientation 
construct developed by Autio et al. (2000) is employed as an indicator of strategic 
intent on the part of the firm.  
2.6.3 Strategic Orientation 
In the context of developing strategy constructs, Hambrick (1980) counsels 
researchers to view strategy as a predictor, mediator, or criterion variable arguing 
that strategy is too situational to be usefully measured and that attempts at 
measurement often lose sight of context and internal logic. Making a similar 
argument against researchers’ attempts to build contingency models sophisticated 
enough to account for all possible variants of strategy, Bailey, Johnson, and Daniels 
(2000) propose following archetypes or configurations of strategy development.  
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Baum and Locke (2004) suggest that the aspirations of CEOs, regardless of whether 
they are entrepreneurs, span profitability, survival, career satisfaction and 
innovation. In a similar vein, Autio et al. (2000) articulate five strategic orientations 
with the underlying intent of maximising growth, profit, technology leadership, exit 
conditions or firm longevity. In regard to how this might translate to SME 
behaviour, Roper (1997) finds that UK and Irish firms adopt a balanced approach to 
innovation with increases in both productivity and employment while German 
strategies produce sharp increases in productivity with a concomitant reduction in 
employment. Thus, while differing aspirations do not preclude value creation, they 
may fall short of the economic and social outcomes sought by governments and 
policy makers, job-rich growth in particular. 
2.6.4 Growth orientation 
Originating in the work of Storey (1994) there is a growing body of empirical 
evidence to support the proposition that only a small proportion of firms create the 
majority of jobs in any cohort (Anyadike-Danes, Bonner, Hart, & Mason, 2009; 
Birch, 1987; Henrekson & Johansson, 2010; Stangler, 2010).  Some small firms are 
‘mom and pop’ type enterprises that are not designed to pursue a high growth 
strategy; others are `life-style ventures’ with the primary objective of protecting 
autonomy (Berger and Udell, 1998, p. 627). In a UK survey of over 18,000 
respondents’ two-year growth objectives, Vos, Yeh, Carter, and Tagg (2007) found 
that less than one-tenth of SMEs opt for rapid growth. The majority reported an 
objective of moderate expansion (49.1%) or to remain the same size (24.7%) while 
fewer than 10% wanted to either sell (6.9%) or transfer (1.9%) their businesses. 
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Rapid growth was cited as the main objective by just 8.3% of the total sample 
(p.2655). Vos et al. (2007) also found that rapid growth aspirations decrease with 
time, while ambitions for closure, exit, succession or maintaining the status quo 
increase incrementally with age.  
Pertinent to SSI design, Child and Kieser (1981) question whether social structures 
should be adjusted to fit strategy (strategic choice/adaptation) or whether they 
should be employed to constrain strategic activity (evolutionary/determinist view). 
This reflects the adaptive-adoptive character of the environment and warrants 
research into the potential for firms to achieve better fit through adaption while 
policy makers might analyse potential to harness growth potential among aspirant 
firms. 
2.7 Summary 
This review set out to achieve three broad objectives. The first was to document 
and organise the body of literature on innovation systems, including a specific focus 
on SSI. The second was to examine the related phenomena of firm age and industry 
life course and their potential impact on SSI-fit. The third was to identify the ways in 
which system-fit may be diluted or enhanced by firms’ strategic intent.  
It is argued that the role of endogenous change and managerial discretion has been 
overshadowed by equilibrium and static methods of analysis (Foss, 1997) and while 
much of the research on innovation and productivity has integrated industry and 
firm level perspectives (Pianta and Vaona, 2006), age- and strategy-contingent 
effects on SSI fit have not been examined heretofore. Among key drivers of 
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innovation in small firms are culture, leadership, process innovation and notably, 
strategic orientation (Laforet & Tann, 2006). While contexts present a variety of 
constraints and opportunities, the literature suggests that firm age and strategic 
aspiration are likely to exert influence on system-fit, as firm-specific factors are 
known to have greater impact than industry-related features (Hawawini, 
Subramanian, & Verdin, 2005). 
Sectoral Systems of Innovation 
SSIs address the need to explore innovation dynamics in leading economic sectors 
to analyse the interaction between firms and the institutional infrastructure and 
also to understand whether some industries are supported (Peters, 2005) while 
others may be subject to de-selection (von Tunzelmann and Acha 2004). The 
literature reveals a gap in regard to firm-level contingencies with significant impact 
on innovation output, insofar as the SSI may expose firms to unknown positive or 
detrimental effects. 
Given that most countries concentrate activities in selected industries, a sectoral 
perspective facilitates more nuanced understanding of the interactive processes at 
work. It also offers potential for greater impact in respect of learning about the 
potential for adaptation and adoption. This responds to criticisms that SME 
research is not sufficiently sector or industry-specific, and that findings are too 
general to be instructive for managers and policy makers (Fagerberg, Mowery, & 
Verspagen, 2009; Laforet & Tann, 2006). 
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Age 
The literature conceives of stages in organisational development spanning 
progression from the emergent firm to mature organisations marked by greater 
financial security, complex operations and potential to scale.  The start-up usually 
has less capital, fewer scientists and engineers, less legitimacy, limited brand 
presence, fewer strategic alliances, evolving organisational structures, and 
incomplete or even non-existent processes. At a more abstract level, young firms 
suffer liabilities of newness and smallness, failing at higher rates than their larger 
and older competitors.  
Analysis of the temporal aspects of firm existence represents a significant trend in 
social science as researchers seek to examine the effects and management 
implications of evolutionary processes within organisations and sectors. The 
literature reveals organisational age as an appropriate contingent variable given 
that its impact on innovation and firm behaviour is multifaceted and unresolved 
(Stuart and Sorenson, 2000). If youth signals vulnerability, twinned with dynamism, 
and aging suggests exploitation advantage coupled with underlying rigidity (Aldrich 
& Ruef, 2006; Barron et al., 1994; Leonard‐Barton, 1992; McGahan & Silverman, 
2001), questions arise as to how systems and firms can best respond to age in 
terms of preserving productivity in an institutional context. The assessment of 
corresponding system-fit is necessarily complex, given the micro-level, meso-level 
and institutional factors involved (Aldrich, 1999; Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 
2001) as well as the interactions between them, each of which plays a decisive role 
in shaping technological innovation. 
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Strategic Intent 
Strategic intent was selected as a secondary contingency based on exploratory 
research in relation to SSI fit. In the context of exploitation advantage, among the 
most robust outcomes of strategy research is that firm-level drivers have the 
greatest impact on explaining variations in performance including the finding that 
firms in the mid performance range demonstrate a lesser facility in navigating their 
environments than their more successful counterparts (Hawawini et al., 2005). 
Firms may not respond to environmental change either because they are unwilling 
or unable, or because they fail before delivering an adequate response (Baum, 
1996). Given that innovation is shown to be a firm- rather than a country-level 
phenomenon (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Wessner, 2005), an in-depth understanding 
of how company strategy guides the initiation, resourcing and management of 
innovation is critical to the design and implementation of SSI policies. 
The theoretical framework derived from the foregoing review forms the basis of the 
research questions outlined below. 
Research Questions 
For software and traditional engineering firms: 
o Question 1: What are the positive and negative associations between 
firm age and sectoral system (SSI) dimensions? 
o Question 2: What are the positive and negative associations between 
firms’ strategic intent and sectoral system (SSI) dimensions? 
o Question 3: What are the contrasting associations between age, 
strategic intent and dimension fit in the respective sectoral systems? 
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The propositions align with the overarching objectives of the research outlined in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the software and engineering sector systems in the context of 
the economy of the Republic of Ireland.  
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Chapter Three 
Research Context 
Irish Economy - Software Sector - Manufacturing Engineering Sector. 
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3 Research Context 
This thesis analyses the dynamics of sectoral system of innovation (SSI) fit using 
Ireland (the Republic of Ireland), as the research setting. This chapter reviews the 
Irish economy as the context within which the research takes place. Initially, it 
examines the framework conditions for innovation in the broader economy 
including economic history and policy evolution. To support the objective of 
assessing SSI-fit, the chapter later focuses on the software and manufacturing 
engineering sectors encompassing sectoral characteristics, industry profiles and 
system dimensions.  
Underpinning the SSI focus of this research, analysis of economic performance in 
small economies demonstrates that growth is positively related to the sectoral 
structure of the economy allied to the influence of location (Read, 2008). In the 
context of Ireland’s dependence on international trade, firms are known to be more 
likely to export in sectors in which host countries offer comparative advantage 
(Bleaney and Wakelin, 2008).  
The origins of Ireland’s NIS were laid in the late 1950s with employment policy 
based on attracting multinational corporations through financial incentives and a 
parallel emphasis on achieving growth through export-oriented indigenous 
enterprise (Cunningham & Golden, 2014). This combination has brought about 
Ireland’s so-called dual economy  (Collins & Pontikakis, 2006; O'Riain, 2008) 
characterised by the uneven development of the country’s productive system 
between indigenous enterprise and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Ramirez, Love, 
& Vahter, 2013). FDI generates approximately 49 per cent of private sector output 
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(CSO, 2013b) and 72 percent of exports (Industrial Development Authority, 2013). 
OECD, EU and US government initiatives to reform the global tax regime render the 
FDI proposition fluid, reinforcing the need to examine the indigenous sector. 
Population and Employment 
The 4.59 million population of the Republic of Ireland is set to exceed 5 million by 
2016 (CSO, 2013). Of the 1.85m people in employment at the end of 2012, 75.7 per 
cent were in full‐time employment, 83.5 per cent were employees, 36 per cent 
were under the age of 35, 46.6 per cent were third level graduates and 85 per cent 
were Irish nationals (Forfás, 2013a). Emigration, a perennial economic safety valve, 
rose to almost ninety thousand in 2011 and 2012; however immigration was also 
significant, at over 50,000 in each of the two years (CSO, 2013).  
A National Economic and Social Council (NESC) report (Mjøset, 1992) which set out 
to analyse Ireland’s historically poor economic performance by comparison with 
other European economies, concluded that the country had a very weak system of 
innovation. Beyond assessing technical system dimensions and firms’ capacity to 
initiate and manage change, the NESC study determined that the country’s 
demography and emigration constituted twin engines of underdevelopment. 
Mjoset argued that reduced emigration would create sufficient pressure to 
challenge the country’s economic inheritance rather than accepting its constraints. 
This argument has not been developed in the literature however emigration 
patterns have persisted in the intervening years. 
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3.1 Republic of Ireland - Economy 
This section analyses the evolution of the Irish economy over the last century. It 
concludes with a chronology of policy documents that have been important in 
shaping thinking on Ireland’s exports, the innovation system and labour market 
development. Ministries with core responsibility for driving innovation policy are 
the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (DJEI) and the Department of 
Education and Skills. Oversight of research and innovation investment is led by the 
cabinet sub-committee on Economic Recovery and Jobs.  
Exports as the sole driver of economic growth 
Ireland’s budgetary and debt crises rooted in the 2008 recession established 
exports as the only significant medium term driver of growth (Barry & Bergin, 2012; 
Forfás, 2014). The domestic economy was supressed though a combination of 
austerity measures and a high debt burden. While there was little evidence of 
permanent damage to Ireland’s tradable sector as a result of the global recession 
(McHale, 2012), credit rationing coupled with the increased cost of capital had a 
dampening effect during the reference period.  
Output drivers include growth within target export economies, especially the US 
and the EU, coupled with the competitiveness of the Irish economy vis-à-vis its 
peers (FitzGerald, 2012). 2011 brought a turnaround in productivity and exports, 
including rising levels of FDI however the need to diversify the export base was 
underlined as Ireland’s global market share remained at pre-recession levels 
(Forfás, 2014).   
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Historical perspective 
While firms depend heavily on current resources and investments, economic 
history exerts an inevitable influence (Pavitt, 1990; Rowen, 2007) as current output 
is rooted in the fabric of industry legacy (Carlsson, 1995). Development and 
structural change in western economies is generally characterised by a transition 
from agriculture accounting for the bulk of GDP and employment, to 
industrialisation through the growth of the manufacturing sector to the more 
recent dominance of the service sector. Ireland is seen to have vaulted to a post-
modern high-tech economy without experiencing the intervening phase of 
industrialisation (Donovan & Murphy, 2013), possibly raising questions about the 
robustness of its structural foundations.  
Ireland is not renowned for its ‘entrepreneurial expertise and risk-taking ethos’ with 
business failure readily criticised and success often regarded with antipathy 
(Heavin, Fitzgerald, & Trauth, 2003, p.245). One policy report found that the 
organisational and management capability of Irish firms was insufficient to deliver 
success in the absence of hands-on industrial policy (Telesis, 1992). The near 
absence of a managerial class prior to the 1970s may have some bearing on this 
(Begley et al., 2005). By contrast, Cunningham and Golden (2010) perceive strong 
cultural drivers supporting the evolution of the NIS including increasing levels of 
entrepreneurship and positive interaction between policy-makers, private industry 
and the third level sector . This view points to contention in the assessment of the 
country’s structural supports for economic growth. Economic output data will 
qualify this perspective in the medium to long term. 
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Globalisation 
Ireland is recognised as one of the most globalised economies in the world with 
more than half of its manufacturing and financial sectors in foreign ownership and 
export values in excess of Gross National Product (Honohan & Walsh, 2002). As a 
small open, trade-dependent economy growth is, as already referenced, highly 
dependent on external markets. Output of internationally traded goods and 
services in 2012 was equivalent to 191 per cent of GDP, totalling €164 billion (Duffy 
& Timoney, 2013).  
As one of the world’s largest beneficiaries of FDI, the profile of subsidiary 
employment has transitioned from low-skilled, low-cost manufacturing and 
assembly in the 1970s, to higher skilled localisation, advanced manufacturing and 
services in the twenty first century. By way of illustration, 2013 saw the celebrated 
launch of Intel’s first Irish-designed chip in the twenty four year history of the 
subsidiary. Heretofore, the FDI base has largely been focussed on process-related 
innovation. The sustainability of FDI is generally attributed (e.g. Buckley & Ruane, 
2006; Devereux, Lockwood & Redoano, 2008) to a combination of factors: 
corporation tax (12.5% since 2003) with effective rates reportedly as low as 2.5 per 
cent, financial inducements (e.g. capital grants – though these have been subject to 
constraint by the EU), the European market gateway, stable macro-economic 
policies and the flexible, educated, English-speaking workforce.  
Despite FDI having sustained Ireland’s economic wellbeing since the 1990s, 
persistent questions about the viability of an economic model that is so heavily 
dependent on the foreign-owned sector (Andreosso-O'Callaghan & Lenihan, 2011; 
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Lenihan, Hynes, & Hart, 2010) have led to a stated shift in policy emphasis to 
internal entrepreneurship, with indigenous export cited as the engine of future 
economic growth (DJEI, 2011). In this context, the indigenous software and 
manufacturing sectors are perceived as central to building scale in value-added 
exports (Forfás, 2012b). 
Boom and Recession 
Unlike Ireland’s FDI export-led economic surge in the 1990s (Celtic Tiger era) with 
average growth rates of 9.2 per cent (Begley et al., 2005), growth from 2002 to 
2007 was driven by construction and domestic consumption fuelled by a supply of 
credit based largely on foreign capital. Characterised as a period of speculation 
rather than enterprise, the traded sector was crowded out by construction and 
growth in the public service sector (Barry and Bergin, 2012). The 2007 slowdown 
that foreshadowed the global financial crisis of 2008 exposed vulnerabilities in the 
economy and its institutions, notably the failure of banking regulation and 
inappropriate fiscal policies (Kennelly, Thornton, Aronson, & Munley, 2012). 
Irish GDP and GNP grew by 5.7 per cent and 5.0 per cent respectively between 2000 
and 2007 however the combined collapse of the construction and banking sectors 
and the onset of the financial crisis saw GDP and GNP declining by 5.4 and 10.1 per 
cent through 2011 (ESRI, 2013). Unemployment climbed from 4.8 to 14.8 per cent 
between 2008 and 2010 and personal consumption contracted by 21.4 per cent 
between 2007 and 2011 (Lawless, McCann, & McIndoe-Calder, 2012). 
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Indigenous firm landscape 
In 2011, micro, small and medium enterprises accounted for 99.8 per cent of all 
companies in Ireland, 68.6 per cent of private sector employment, 51 per cent of 
turnover and 46 percent of Gross Value Added (GVA) representing almost seven in 
ten jobs with just over nine in ten firms employing less than ten people (CSO, 2013). 
In the European Union, SMEs account for over 98 per cent of all enterprises, 67 per 
cent of employment and 58 per cent of GVA (Ecorys, 2012). 
Indigenous exports contribute approximately 15 per cent of the nation’s total 
output year-on-year with SMEs delivering approximately 7 per cent of that volume 
(Lawless et al., 2012). Coupled with significant differences in productivity (some tax-
driven), foreign-owned firms are more export intensive. The statistics point to 
productivity challenges suggesting the need for improved understanding of how SSI 
can better support indigenous SME potential.  
Large scale enterprises account for 0.2 per cent of active businesses, employing 
31.4 per cent of the workforce (CSO, 2013) and are mainly in foreign-ownership. 
Irish-owned multinationals employed approximately 246,000 people in overseas 
affiliates in 2011 generating €73bn turnover however according to the report of the 
Forum on Small Business (Forfás, 2006b), indigenous companies tend to start small 
and stay small for an array of reasons : 
Difficulty in accessing finance, weak management capability, lack of 
innovation, both technological and non-technological, under exploitation of 
Information and Communications Technology, burdensome and costly 
administrative regulations, rising local charges, poor access to information 
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and advice, inadequate infrastructure and the lack of a systematic approach 
to entrepreneurship for start-ups (p.x). 
Expectations of international scaling, through born globals or adapted versions of 
locally developed offerings have not borne fruit. The employment intensity of Irish 
SMEs coupled with their reliance on internal demand (64 per cent of all employees 
work in indigenous, non-exporting firms ) and domestically provided credit renders 
them extremely vulnerable to the fate of the domestic economy (Lawless et al., 
2012). Further, policy tends to prioritise job-rich growth – driving labour intensity. 
FDI Landscape 
Ireland hosts a significant number of companies such as Apple, DePuy, Ericsson, 
Glaxo Smith Kline, Google, IBM, PayPal and Pfizer. IDA Ireland lists a total of 1,033 
overseas companies, employing 152,785 people, generating €122 billion in exports. 
The sector created over 12,722 new jobs in 2012 while inward investor job losses 
were the lowest for a decade (Industrial Development Authority, 2013). Other 
attributes aside, retention of the 12.5 per cent corporation tax rate is central to 
maintaining attractiveness as an FDI hub (Godart, Görg, & Hanley, 2012). 
FDI Spill-over and Embeddedness   
In parallel with export volume, FDI is seen as a potentially important contributor to 
technology transfer and absorption while enhancing human capital (Read, 2008). 
Despite some evidence of industry spill over e.g. in the medical device and 
engineering sectors (Giblin & Ryan, 2012; IEEF, 2014) there is scant indication of 
significant spill over in the software sector. This is consistent with multinationals 
generally sourcing fewer inputs in the host country than domestic firms; the 
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foreign-owned sector is not strongly embedded in the innovation system (Godart et 
al., 2012, Love, Roper & Du, 2009; Wrynn, 1997). US-owned subsidiaries appear to 
depend heavily on innovative capacity developed at home and collaborative 
relations with Irish firms tend to be formed on the basis of outsourcing rather than 
local collaborative networks (Kirby, 2008). In a study of innovation, ownership and 
profitability among Irish and foreign-owned plants in Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
Love, Roper & Du (2009) concluded that while ‘innovation is a competitive weapon 
for indigenous plants, it is simply a fact of life for externally-owned plants’(p.16). 
They further observed that externally owned plants in the Republic of Ireland do 
not draw strongly on the Irish Innovation System. 
Having provided an overview of the current landscape for innovation and 
entrepreneurship among indigenous and foreign-owned firms, to follow is an 
outline of how industrial policy and development has evolved since the 1950s.  
3.2 Industrial Policy  
Programme for Economic Expansion 
Ireland’s Economic Development Plan (1958), the country’s first programme for 
economic expansion and industrialisation, spurred a policy based on export 
oriented industrial growth (Smith, 2005). The Industrial Development act signalled 
the intent to engage foreign participation in the economy including rejection of 
previous protectionist mechanisms embodied in the Control of Manufactures Acts, 
1932 to 1934 (Donnelly, 2012). It was anticipated that domestic firms, protected by 
high tariff barriers, would prosper in export markets however the policy had a much 
greater impact in attracting the establishment of foreign enterprise export bases 
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(Kirby, 2008). The transition from inward looking protectionism to external 
openness is commonly described as industrialisation by invitation. By 1973, FDI 
accounted for almost one-third of all manufacturing jobs and by 1983 some 1,000 
overseas firms were established in the state (Kirby, 2009). Consistent policies in the 
interim have resulted in Ireland becoming the most FDI-intensive economy in the 
EU (OECD, 2013).  
Telesis Report 
With the near collapse of the Irish economy in the early 1980s, the Telesis 
Consultancy Group was contracted to conduct a study of industrial development 
policy. Published in 1982, the study was critical of over-reliance on foreign-owned 
firms, suggesting that economic growth should have a double engine in the form of 
strategic FDI industries and Irish owned companies (O'Riain, 2004). The report 
proposed the selection of national industry champions; however Telesis failed to 
offer any specific guidance on selection (Breznitz, 2007). 
Culliton Report 
Telesis was succeeded by the Industrial Policy Review Group’s Culliton Report 
(1992) ‘A Time for Change’ which suggested that the state should work to mitigate 
financial market failure by supporting companies in sectors deemed too risky by 
conservative financial institutions (Breznitz, 2007). Culliton also called for a 
transition from attracting FDI to the promotion of export oriented indigenous 
enterprise through the systematic improvement of social structures and public 
utilities coupled with tax reforms to promote employment. The report highlighted 
software as a potentially fertile sector. 
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Enterprise Strategy Group Report  
Culliton was succeeded by the Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) report ‘Ahead of the 
Curve’ (Forfás, 2004), commissioned to chart economic development for the 
ensuing decade. The report  recorded Culliton’s ‘influence on policy in a range of 
areas including increased investment in infrastructure and human capital under the 
national development plans 1994-1999 and 2000-2006’ (p.5). It further outlined 
sources of competitive advantage along with supporting conditions as articulated in 
Figure 3-1. It underlined the need to balance calls for greater R&D commitment 
with emphasis on market understanding and expertise in customer engagement. 
 
Figure 3-1: Conditions for competitive advantage (ESG, 2004, p.59) 
 
ESG (2004) reflected critically on the Celtic Tiger economy (mid 1990s to mid-2000s) 
suggesting that it was built on shallow, externally driven foundations. 
Ireland’s principal enterprise strengths have been in the operational aspects 
of manufacturing and services, rather than in markets and product 
development. This is particularly true of the foreign-owned sector, which 
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accounts for most of our exports and which, for the most part, produces 
goods that were designed elsewhere, to satisfy market requirements that 
were specified elsewhere, and sold by other people to customers with whom 
the Irish operation has little contact and over whom it has little influence 
(p.XII). 
Originally designed to serve as a strategy blueprint for enterprise growth and 
employment, the report, despite its apparent accessibility to enterprise, 
government and the education sector, has seen limited implementation.  
Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation  
The Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation (SSTI, 2006) 2006-2013, had 
the objective of enhancing Ireland’s position as a knowledge-based-economy and 
bringing R&D performance into line with leading economies through continuation 
of the Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions and Science Foundation 
Ireland. SSTI (2006) set forth the vision that:  
Ireland by 2013 will be institutionally renowned for the excellence of its 
research, and will be to the forefront in generating and using new 
knowledge for economic and social progress, within an innovation-driven 
culture (SSTI, 2006, p.8). 
While evidence of achievement is mixed, the strategy is seen as the first wide-
ranging attempt to develop science, technology and innovation through a whole-of-
government approach encompassing; The Interdepartmental Committee on 
Science, Technology and Innovation, The advisory council for Science, Technology 
and Innovation, Forfás (the policy advisory board for Enterprise, Trade, Science and 
Innovation), Science Foundation Ireland and the Office of the Chief Science Advisor 
(subsequently abolished). 
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The ensuing National Skills Strategy (2007), produced by the Expert Group on 
Future Skills Needs, set out a number of objectives aimed at building a competitive, 
innovation-driven, knowledge-based economy, including: Up-skilling 500,000 
people in employment, increasing the participation rate in upper secondary 
education to 90 percent; and increasing the progression rate to third level from 55 
to 70 percent. In recognition of systemic gaps in applied skills development, the 
government has since announced efforts to review apprenticeship policy.  
The Innovation Taskforce  
SSTI (2006) was succeeded by the Innovation Taskforce Report (ITF) (2010) titled Building 
Ireland’s Smart Economy with an overarching and ambitious aim that: 
By 2020 Ireland will have a significant number of large, world leading, 
innovation-intensive companies, each having a global footprint, many of 
which are Irish headquartered and owned (p.3). 
The Taskforce proposed a framework spanning an ecosystem with five pillars aimed 
at enhancing productivity and promoting sustainable economic growth for 
entrepreneurs and enterprises (indigenous and foreign-owned) by leveraging 
innovation in its broadest sense as outlined in figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-2: Main elements of the National Innovation System (ITF, 2010, p.21) 
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Critics suggest that the report placed too much emphasis on university-led 
innovation through a focus on STI and spin-outs. With a new government taking 
office in the year subsequent to its publication, there is limited likelihood that the 
Taskforce report will be adopted. 
Development and Policy landscape   
Reflecting on the overall role of government, Breznitz (2007) contrasts ‘neoliberal 
interventionism’ in Ireland with variants of market liberalism in countries such as 
Israel and Taiwan, suggesting that Irish economic and industrial policy has been 
based on two conflicting principles since 1958 - on the one hand, a strong free 
market ideology and on the other a major role for government in enhancing 
competitiveness and managing growth. 
Many of the development reports and policy documents outlined have strong merit 
and the nation’s capacity and infrastructure to deliver innovation-led growth have 
been advanced as a result. Pointedly, the imbalance between indigenous and 
foreign-owned export output highlighted in a number of policy documents has not 
been redressed. In 2012, 90 per cent of total industrial export sales were 
attributable to foreign-owned firms, the figure in 2003 was 91 per cent (Forfás, 
ABSEI, 2014) so the balance has not changed in the last decade. This reinforces the 
need to gain greater insight into the enablers and constraints affecting indigenous 
firms’ ability to contribute to the export-led economy.   
3.3 Institutional Structure  
The Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (DJEI) directs government 
efforts in relation to enterprise, employment protection, science, technology and 
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innovation policy through IDA Ireland, Enterprise Ireland, Forfás (absorbed by DJEI 
in 2013) and Science Foundation Ireland. Cunningham and Golden (2010, p.433) 
perceive the ‘responsiveness of policy initiatives through Forfás and its ability to 
organise specialised taskforces combining social and economic institutions’ as a 
strong driver supporting the evolution of the NIS. The Department of Education and 
Skills oversees the Higher Education Authority and the research council. Figure 3-3 
summarises the institutions involved in the public, enterprise and higher education 
sectors and the linkages between them.  
 
Figure 3-3: Irish Innovation and Research Sector Structure (Erawatch, 2013) 
The remit, function, budget and key outputs of core entities in the system are 
outlined in table 3-2 overleaf.  
112 | P a g e  
 
Public Institutions 
In addition to the central roles played by the IDA and EI in the system, support is 
provided by Local Enterprise development Offices, SFI, Forfás and Solas with a 
national training and development remit. Under the direction of the Higher 
Education Authority (HEA) the third level sector comprises 7 universities and 13 
institutes of technology along with a number of teacher training colleges.  
Agency Remit Core Objectives 
Enterprise 
Ireland [EI] 
EI provides direct supports to Irish 
and overseas SMEs at all stages of 
development to foster job creation 
and export growth.  
- Exploring new opportunities -
including feasibility studies and 
trade missions 
- Capability Building - including 
management development, R&D 
grants and lean programmes 
- High Potential Start Ups 
- Seed and Venture Capital 
Programmes, and  
- Research collaboration and 
commercialisation 
Funding/ 
Impact 
In 2010, client companies created 8,193 new jobs, bringing the total 
number employed to 137,241. The DJEI budget allocation was €307m, 
supplemented by €37m from the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food and the National Training Fund. In 2012, client companies generated 
€16.2bn exports up from 15.2bn in 2011(Enterprise Ireland, 2013).  
Industrial 
Development 
Authority-
IDA Ireland  
The IDA aims to attract high quality 
FDI projects while embedding 
existing companies in the 
economy, generating as many new 
jobs as possible while maintaining 
the existing stock. The agency 
provides grants to client companies 
to support capital investment, 
R&D, training and employment.   
- Improve company-wide 
competitiveness 
- Enhance the use of new 
technologies 
- Grow the skills of the business 
- Engage in R&D and innovation 
- Develop new business processes 
- Make company operations more 
energy efficient. 
Funding/ 
Impact 
The IDA supports 1,033 client companies with approximately 153,000 
employees who created 6,570 jobs and generated €122bn exports equating 
to 72 per cent of the total output for 2012 (IDA Ireland, 2013). The 2011 
budget was €93M. 
Shannon 
Development 
Supports foreign and indigenous 
firms in the Shannon Free Zone.  
- Similar to IDA and EI offering. 
Funding/ 
impact 
Companies supported by Shannon Development created 362 new jobs in 
2010. The agency’s budget for 2011 was €3.6 million.  
County and 
City 
Enterprise 
Boards 
35 boards deliver supports to 
micro-enterprises. Replaced by 
Local Enterprise Development 
Offices (LEO) in 2014  
- Assist existing micro-enterprises 
in survival and growth initiatives 
- Assist new start-ups  
- Focus on the stimulation of 
entrepreneurship locally.  
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Funding/ 
impact 
Provision of grants for start-up, business expansion and feasibility testing. 
Provision of Mentoring and Start-Up Programmes, General Business 
Training and Management Development. The DJEI budget allocation in 2011 
was €27.24m. 4,433 new jobs were created in supported companies in 
2010. There were 32,910 people employed full time in supported 
companies in 2010, with 11,462 in a part time capacity. 
Science 
Foundation 
Ireland(SFI) 
Founded in 2000 to encourage 
research in science and 
engineering. Invests in academic 
researchers and research teams 
most likely to generate new 
knowledge, leading edge 
technologies and competitive 
enterprises. Its remit expanded in 
2013 to include applied research as 
well as oriented basic research. 
Underpins the activities of Enterprise 
Ireland and the IDA in three areas:  
- Biotechnology 
- Information & Communications 
Technology (ICT)  
- Sustainable Energy & Energy 
Efficient Technologies (Energy).  
Funding/ 
impact 
The 2011 budget allocation was €161m. In 2013, more than 45% of IDA job 
announcements were in companies with links to SFI research teams.  
Five new Research centres of major scale, involve Government investment 
of over €150 million with an industry contribution of over 30%. 
IRC Irish 
Research 
Council 
The IRC mission is to enable and 
sustain a vibrant and creative 
research community in Ireland. 
Launched in 2012, the council 
represents a merger between the 
Irish Research Council for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences 
(IRCHSS) and the Research Council 
for Science, Engineering and 
Technology (IRCSET). 
- Focus on human capital 
development from 
postgraduate, early postdoctoral 
and senior researcher project 
based awards  
- Encourages exploratory research 
in the sciences, engineering, 
technology, humanities, social 
sciences, business and law.   
 The research budget for 2011 was €33M. 
Forfás Policy and Advisory Board for 
enterprise, trade, science, 
technology and innovation – 
established 1994. Provides 
research, advice and support in the 
areas of enterprise and science 
policy. Supports DJEI and wider 
Government. Works with IDA 
Ireland, Enterprise Ireland and 
Science Foundation Ireland to 
ensure the coherence of policies 
across the development agencies. 
Absorbed into DJEI as of 2013. 
Manages the work of: 
- Advisory Council for Science, 
Technology and Innovation  
- Expert Group on Future Skills 
Needs  
- National Competitiveness Council 
- National awareness programme, 
Discover Science and Engineering  
- Accreditation services of the Irish 
National Accreditation Board and  
- Hosts the Office of the Chief 
Scientific Adviser to Government. 
An Foras 
Áiseanna 
Saothair 
(FÁS) 
Labour market agency responsible 
for promoting job opportunities, 
training and labour market 
programmes for school leavers, 
post graduates and professionals 
As of October 2013 SOLAS is the Irish 
Further Education and Training 
Authority with responsibility for 
funding, planning and co-ordinating 
training and further education 
programmes.  
Higher The HEA, reporting to the Minister - Funding body for the Universities, 
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Education 
Authority 
(HEA) 
for Education and Skills, is 
accountable for the planning and 
policy development of higher 
education and research.  
Institutes of Technology and 
other institutions designated 
under the HEA Act. 
- Administers Program for 
Research at Third Level 
Institutions (PRTLI) (€866M 99-
2010), 7th Framework Programme 
(FP7) and Horizon 2020  
Table 3-1: Overview of Enterprise Support Agencies 
Having described the policy and public institutional landscape for innovation, to 
follow is an overview of Ireland’s innovation performance followed by an analysis of 
the Software and Manufacturing Engineering industries reflecting both industry 
characteristics and the Irish SSI context.  
3.4 Innovation Performance in Ireland  
By international standards, Ireland boasts high levels of innovation despite a history 
of relatively low levels of R&D expenditure (O’Malley, Hewitt-Dundas & Roper, 
2008) however there are reservations about the degree to which this reflects both 
parties to the dual economy. FDI is seen to skew the rankings as Irish output 
represents just one step in an international value chain including tax related 
intercompany accounting (Begley, Delany, & O’Gorman, 2005) while Irish 
indigenous enterprise is generally characterised by low productivity (OECD, 2013).  
Describing R&D in Irish SMEs as flexible, responsive and informal - consistent with 
the tendency to root innovation in more predictable near-market opportunities, 
Roper (1997) contrasts this with the more formal R&D-driven planned technology 
innovation in Germany. Similarly, Irish firms are described as having a creative 
attitude to software development in contrast to other nationalities that tend to 
adopt a more mathematical approach (Heavin et al., 2003). Even though the FDI 
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sector engages in fewer innovations than indigenously owned firms, these are 
typically more successful; due potentially to higher quality output and superior 
commercialisation practices (Love and Roper, 2001). Edquist and Hommen (2008) 
assert a link between countries specialising in high-tech, R&D intensive sectors and 
the achievement of high economic growth rates, including Ireland in that class by 
dint of its foreign-owned firm stock. Results from the 2010 - 2012 Community 
Innovation Survey (CSO, 2014) indicate that Irish owned enterprises (79% of all 
enterprises in the survey), spent €1.36bn on innovation related activities in 2012, 
while foreign owned enterprises (21% of those surveyed), spent €2.3bn, just over 
two-thirds of all innovation-related expenditure. The €3.6bn investment level in 
2012 represents an increase of almost 7% on R&D spend registered in 2010. 
The Innovation Union Scoreboard (EU, 2014) (Figure 3-0), ranks Ireland as a 
follower with performance close to the EU27 average but lagging behind leaders 
such as Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the UK. Ireland is highly ranked in 
international scientific co-publications, license and patent revenues from abroad, 
engagement in tertiary education and knowledge-intensive services employment 
and exports. In regard to the human resources dimension of the SI, Ireland closely 
follows top performing Finland and Sweden while the ‘economic effects’ dimension 
ranks the country as the top performer (EU, 2014), this ranking is likely to reflect 
the ‘dual economy’ effect discussed earlier. 
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Figure 3-0: Innovation Union Scoreboard (EU, 2014, p.49) 
In terms of scope for improvement, the scoreboard (EU, 2014) notes relative 
weaknesses in Community designs and Non-R&D innovation expenditure. 
Performance is also below average in SME product/process innovations, 
marketing/organisational innovations and innovative SMEs collaborating with 
others category. The OECD Economic Survey of Ireland (2013) observes that the 
innovation capacity of SMEs could be boosted by improved linkages between firms 
and higher education. In respect of the workforce, the report advocates reducing 
mismatches between supply and demand for skills and better alignment of 
education and training schemes to meet the needs of expanding sectors. The 
Economic Survey (OECD, 2013) further indicates that the innovation supports 
offered by state agencies are potentially too complicated for firms to access.   
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Figure 3-1 below indicates that Ireland’s innovation performance relative to the EU 
has been in decline since 2006, although levels have trended upward since 2010. 
The contrasting performance of aspects of Ireland’s SI dimensions noted here, in 
combination with the mixed outcomes of Ireland’s innovation policy to date, have 
played a significant role in motivating this thesis.  
 
Figure 3-1: Innovation Union Scoreboard (EU, 2015, p.49) 
 
Expenditure on R&D 
Appreciation for the role of R&D in economic development is relatively recent in 
the case of Ireland (Kirby, 2009; Ramirez et al., 2013). National Development Plan 
(NDP) funding has devoted increasing levels of support to STI – NDP (1994-1999) 
€0.5 billion, NDP (2000-2006) (Department of Finance, 2000) €2.5 billion and NDP 
(2007-2013) (Department of Finance, 2007) €8.2 billion. A 1998 survey of industry, 
academic and government leaders pinpointed biotechnology and Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) as global engines of industry concluding that 
‘world class research capability in selected niches of these two enabling 
technologies is an essential foundation for future growth’ (ICSTI, 1999, p.7). In 
response, the Government initiated the Technology Foresight Fund with a budget 
of €646 million and established Science Foundation Ireland to administer it (SFI, 
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2013). Sustainable and energy efficient technologies, including nanotechnology 
have since been added as priority areas. 
R&D spending as a percentage of GNP, increased from 0.93 per cent in 2003 to 1.46 
per cent in 2011 and 1.47 per cent in 2012 (Forfás, 2013). Table 3-1 presents a 
summary of aggregate BERD in 2011/12.  
BERD 2011 
2012 est.  
 
Firms across all business sectors spent €1.86 billion on in-house R&D 
activities in 2011, a 1.3 per cent increase over 2010. Enterprises active in 
R&D in 2011 estimated R&D spend of 1.96 billion in 2012 (+ 5.5%). 
Business R&D 
intensity 
BERD as a percentage of GDP reached 1.17% in 2011 (1.46% of GNP) 
against an average EU of 1.26% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This 
compares to Finland with the highest BERD intensity at 2.67% of GDP. 
FDI leads FDI accounted for 71% of total business R&D spend in 2011. 
Current and 
Capital 
expenditure 
The majority of BERD (86 per cent) in 2011 was current expenditure 
(wages of R&D staff etc.) with the remainder on capital (buildings, 
equipment, licence payments etc.) 
Service sector  In 2011, 61 per cent of BERD was generated in the service sector. 
Medium/large 
firms lead 
Medium and large enterprises (> 50 employees) accounted for almost 
three quarters of BERD in 2011. 
Self-funding 
predominates 
89% of BERD funding was from company funds in 2011, down from 92 per 
cent in 2009. 
Table 3-2: Aggregate R&D data adapted from BERD 2011/12 (Forfas, 2013, p.3) 
Highlighting the importance of understanding the fabric of the NIS, foreign owned 
enterprises account for €1.3bn of the total R&D spend or 71% of BERD which 
appears out of proportion in light of FDI turnover at 55 per cent of industrial output 
and business sector employment at 22 per cent (CSO, 2011).  
Government Expenditure on R&D 
Government expenditure on R&D (GERD) across all sectors of the economy reached 
a historical high of €3.8 billion in 2013, equating to 2.4 percent of GNP2, about half 
of which is targeted at 14 priority areas identified as offering high potential returns 
                                                     
2
 Irish GDP is inflated by the inclusion of profits of inter-firm activities of multinational firms; GNP 
excludes these profits giving a truer measure of economic activity. 
119 | P a g e  
 
(Research Prioritisation Steering Group, 2012). Among the priority areas relevant to 
the current research are: Future networks and communications; data analytics 
management and security; digital platforms, content and applications and 
manufacturing competitiveness.   
Higher Education Expenditure on R&D 
Higher Education sector Expenditure on R&D (HERD) was estimated at €829 million 
in 2009, the intensity ratio, as a proportion of GNP, was 0.63 per cent which 
exceeded the OECD average (0.4 per cent) and the EU 27 average (0.46 per cent). 
Business expenditure on R&D (BERD) is low by international standards.  
The foregoing analysis addressed the framing conditions for Ireland’s NIS. The 
section to follow focuses on the sectoral systems of innovation supporting the 
software and engineering and engineering industries.  
3.5 Sectoral Context 
The sectors selected for this research are identified as growth industries in national 
policy documents (E.g. Enterprise Strategy Group, 2004; Forfás-ICSTI, 1999; Forfás, 
2006a, 2008, 2013a, 2013b). A report on the Changing Nature of Manufacturing 
and Services in Ireland (Forfás, 2006a) observes significant structural change in the 
selected sectors. The software sector has been cited as a pillar of growth since the 
nomination of ICT in the government’s 1998 technology foresight exercise (Forfás-
ICSTI, 1999). Growth in software technology and services is mirrored across 
developed and catch-up economies. The Innovation Taskforce (Forfás, 2010) 
envisaged Ireland as a European Innovation Hub encompassing SMEs in services 
and manufacturing across the domestic and internationally traded sectors. 
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Cross-sectoral approach 
While analysis of single sectors allows for control of industry effects, such a 
perspective risks lacking balance - as knowledge-intensive and traditional firms are 
known to respond differently to opportunity (Bell, Crick & Young, 2004). 
Additionally, Robertson, Smith, and von Tunzelmann (2009) argue that the roles of 
the high tech and low-to-medium tech (LMT) sectors should not be analysed in 
isolation arguing it is their very interaction that drives growth and development. 
Liagouras (2010) cites a high-technology preoccupation at EU level, suggesting this 
undervalues the importance of business organisation and broader level economic 
structures. In the context of widespread expectations for the potential of the high 
technology sector, it is estimated that approximately 6.2% of workers in Ireland are 
engaged in high-tech employment (European Commission, 2009). While 
manufacturing firms are automating processes through adoption of advanced 
technologies, some software offerings may be considered low-tech based on low-
level functionality or minimal engagement in R&D. Perhaps more importantly, 
increasing focus on high technology sectors risks isolating the bulk of fast growth 
firms (Acs & Mueller, 2008) which populate almost every sector, irrespective of 
industry performance (Parker et al., 2010). High-growth firms are neither unique to 
nor concentrated in the high tech sector, one UK study showed that all major 
sectors contained between 4 and 10 percent of high growth firms (Anyadike-Danes 
et al., 2009). Further, the suggestion that only 7 per cent of high-growth firms in the 
UK are classified as high-tech (Bishop, Mason, & Robinson, 2009) supports the 
selection of manufacturing engineering and software in parallel. The dual approach 
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allows assessment of age and strategic contingency against similar and contrasting 
dimensions of the respective SSIs. 
Given that the interaction between NSI and SSI constitutes an independent source 
of variability, this analysis encompassed national development strategy, human 
capital, R&D expenditure, production and human capital development. To follow is 
an analysis of the engineering and software SSIs. Since sectoral systems transcend 
and sit within national borders at the same time, the sectoral perspective briefly 
addresses global and macro perspectives.  
3.6 Sector Overview 
3.6.1 Manufacturing Engineering Sector 
The complexity that characterises business globally is reflected in the 
manufacturing engineering3 sector spanning intensified competition, technology 
adoption, product diversification, productivity improvement and related skills. The 
LMT sector, measured by capital investment and employment, dominates the 
economies of developed nations providing more than 90 per cent of output in the 
EU (Robertson et al., 2009). In the early twentieth century, mechanical engineering 
SMEs were at the forefront of small scale industrialisation. 
Relevant NACE codes for the engineering sector comprise: [25] Fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and equipment, [28] Machinery and equipment, [29] 
                                                     
3
 The terms engineering industries and metalworking industries are used interchangeably (Carlsson, 
1989) 
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Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, [30] other transport equipment, [33] 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment). 
Only 3 per cent of Irish SMEs are active in manufacturing compared to an EU 
average of 10% (European Commission, 2012) however Carlsson (1989) advises 
caution in interpreting the decline of manufacturing and the related growth in 
services suggesting that outsourced manufacturers often show up as services 
establishments rather than manufacturing entities. While average firm size has 
been in decline since the 1970s, firm numbers have grown due to ‘flexible 
specialisation’ as manufacturing is divested or outsourced to smaller suppliers 
(Carlsson, 1989, p.27).  
It is estimated that SMEs contribute between 25 and 35 per cent of world 
manufactured direct exports concentrated around relatively few larger SMEs, 
however the bulk of export growth is generated by smaller firms (OECD, 1997).  
Innovativeness 
The manufacturing engineering sector spanning mechanical technologies with R&D 
expenditure at less than five per cent of revenue are generally classed as being 
engaged in evolutionary rather than revolutionary technology (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990). Research-driven innovation in the mechanical engineering 
sector is secondary to customer-supplier relationships in generating innovation – 
which is predominantly incremental (Wengel and Shapira, 2004). However many 
firms that are traditionally considered ‘low tech’ are in fact highly innovative 
(Leiponen & Drejer, 2007). This is echoed by an Irish Government report citing a 
negative perception of contemporary manufacturing which is increasingly complex 
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and cutting-edge (Forfás, 2013a). In their seminal work on technical innovation and 
national systems, Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) note that the effectiveness of a 
nation’s schooling and training systems not only determine the supply of skills but 
also influence attitudes towards technical advance. The increasing use of science 
and informatics and the formalisation of R&D pose a challenge to traditional 
learning processes in the sector which are predominantly in-house and tacit in 
nature (Wengel and Shapira, 2004). Furthermore, manufacturing engineering firms 
make a significant contribution to their own process technology in contrast with 
low tech firms who rely largely on upstream suppliers (Pavitt, 1984; Terziovski, 
2010).  
Firm Age-Ownership 
The indigenous engineering sector is characterised by family firms where links 
between ownership and management are strong and intergenerational 
involvement appear significant. Family ownership facilitates lengthy tenure (field 
data indicates periods of up to fifty years) creating ‘parsimonious stewards’ 
(Breton‐Miller & Miller, 2011, p.1173) who seek to avoid short term actions that 
jeopardise viability. Among the research population, succession, progression and 
strategic challenges are met by an array of responses, some driven internally, 
others supported by state agencies.  
Output, export and employment profile  
The Irish engineering sector has an aggregate turnover of over €14.2 billion, 
equating to 9.5 per cent of manufacturing output, it employs approximately 53,000 
people and represents 22.4 per cent of manufacturing employment (IEEF, 2011). 
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The sector has suffered shortfalls in qualified labour leading to concerns of 
inhibited growth (Wengel & Shapira, 2004), this is proving problematic in a number 
of markets including Germany and the United Kingdom.    
The indigenous sector comprises approximately 600 companies employing 16,000 
people operating across domestic and export markets. Indigenous firms generate 
sales of €2.7 billion with exports of €802 million (Enterprise Ireland, 2010). Export 
levels, potentially masked by domestic sub-supply, have been slated for policy 
support. As noted earlier, the engineering sector is significantly embedded in the 
Irish economy as foreign owned and indigenous firms source a large proportion of 
their inputs and services domestically (IEEF, 2014). 
The manufacturing engineering cohort accounts for 17 per cent of total sector 
exports and approximately one quarter of the payroll and value-added generated 
by indigenous manufacturing (IEEF, 2011). Although increasingly populated by 
graduate engineers, the sector is characterised by apprentice-based recruitment 
with local employees who are not mobile (Wengel and Shapira, 2004).  
Trading Profile 
Trade is concentrated within the EU, primarily in the UK, Germany and France (IEEF, 
2011) with growing reach into Eastern Europe and Asia among the research 
population. The sector is diverse with identifiable sub-sectors spanning original 
equipment manufacturers, Tier 1 and 2 sub component or assembly suppliers also 
called ‘producer’s goods’ (Pavitt, 1990, p.43). Product design and development is 
gaining traction among original-equipment companies and also among sub-
suppliers seeking to optimise output for their clients (intellectual property owners) 
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or those seeking to diversify their portfolios in order to reduce reliance on sub-
supply contracts.  
While the sector is diverse, dominant sub-sectors include: agricultural machinery, 
materials handling, precision and process engineering, automotive and aerospace, 
metal fabrication and processing. Table 3-3 presents an overview included selected 
company listings in each of the sub-sectors.  
Agricultural 
Machinery 
A strong sub-sector generating exports of over €100 million. Irish agricultural 
machinery tends to be more rugged and built to a higher specification than 
machinery from some other countries due to the mixed quality of Irish land. 
 E.g. Dairymaster, Dromone, Keenan Systems and Mc Hale Engineering. 
Materials 
Handling 
Sub-sector dominated by a small number of companies delivering exports of 
over €150 million. Companies service a wide range of sectors including 
manufacturing, transportation, retail, construction and quarries. 
 E.g. Combilift, Dennison Trailers and Instant Upright. 
Precision 
Engineering 
Sub-sector largely comprised of companies manufacturing a range of 
precision sub-components for large multinational manufacturers. A number 
of niche manufacturers have been highly successful. A significant number of 
these companies have developed their own product ranges. 
 E.g. Bellurgan Precision Engineering, Mincon International and Pressco Ltd.  
Process 
Engineering 
Sub-sector comprises companies manufacturing process equipment 
including high value-added modular skid units used by the world’s leading 
pharmaceutical, chemical and bio-pharmaceutical companies, and large bulk 
storage tanks for a range of applications including mining and food. 
 E.g. BCD Group, Grant Engineering and Suretank Ltd.  
Automotive 
and 
Aerospace 
Sub-sector has a small number of successful niche sub-component 
manufacturers supplying the automotive and aviation industries. Companies 
in precision engineering, tool making, plastics and metal fabrication are 
active in these sectors. 
 E.g. C & F Automotive Ltd (Iralco), M J Quinn Ltd and Romaquip Ltd. 
Fabrication 
and 
processing 
There are a large number of companies fabricating a range of metal products 
for the construction, agriculture, industrial, marine and transit industries. 
Also a source of highly innovative own-products. 
 E.g. Crowley Engineering, LMH Engineering Ltd and McAree Engineering 
Works Ltd.  
Table 3-3: Engineering Sector Profile & Sample Companies (EI, 2010, p.1) 
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The foregoing section provides a brief analysis of key dimensions of the 
manufacturing engineering sector in a global and Irish context. The next section 
addresses these dimensions in the Software sector. 
3.6.2 Software Sector  
The computer software and services sector originated in the US in the 1950s and 
has since expanded to serve multiple product and service niches. The sector is 
dominated by global brands such as Microsoft, SAP and IBM at one level and 
Independent Software Vendors (ISVs) at the other. The former provide generic 
solutions with minimal customisation, the latter more commonly deliver niche 
oriented and custom built solutions. Two million workers or at least 1.35 per cent of 
the EU labour force are directly engaged in software production (Steinmueller, 
2004).  
As a sector within the ICT industry, software has grown at about 10 per cent per 
annum over the last 25 years representing about 4 per cent of total world output 
(Rowen, 2007). As technology has evolved, the separation of applications from 
infrastructure reduced barriers to entry for small firms and led to the emergence of 
niche opportunities in formerly peripheral markets (Messerschmitt & Szyperski, 
2005; Saxenian, 2006) of which Ireland is a prime example. Pertinent to the focus of 
this research, Mowery (1999) suggests that ‘low physical capital intensity and high 
human capital intensity has enabled national influences rather than the industry-
specific effects commonly associated with mass-production technologies, to affect 
the software industry’s development (p.156)’. The industry is characterised by 
127 | P a g e  
 
clustering, geographic concentration and a high volume of innovators (Breschi & 
Malerba, 1996).  
Software firms vary significantly because of the wide array of markets in which they 
compete and their differentiated knowledge and resource bases (Zahra & Bogner, 
2000). The sector delivers a variety of application and infrastructure solutions 
throughout business and consumer markets. Application developers target the 
needs of specific segments in a way that maximises market share by servicing 
multiple end-users, often allied to the delivery of technical and project 
management skills.  
Innovativeness 
The seeds of Ireland’s high tech cluster emerged in the 1990s underpinned by 
growing competencies in software design and production (O’Riain, 2004). Firms 
pursued niche export markets employing a low-end disruptive approach, rather 
than competing directly with established players. Contrasting Israel with Ireland, 
Niosi, Athreye, and Tschang (2012)suggest that Israel has gained advantage through 
comparatively higher absorptive capabilities whereas software innovation in Ireland 
is largely path-dependent on the FDI sector however the impact of technology 
transfer is much less evident than the emergence of born globals on the sector’s 
expansion.  
Output, export and employment profile  
The ICT sector employed 43,280 people in Ireland in 2012; an additional 25,000 
were employed across other sectors in the economy. The sector is dominated by 
FDI, Irish firms are typically small; employ less than 25 people and turnover less 
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than €2M per annum (Enterprise Ireland, 2008). In 2013, 40 companies or 8 per 
cent of firms in the sector achieved turnover in excess of €10M. Indigenous 
software firms are highly export intensive with export volumes at 73 per cent 
compared to an average of forty five per cent across the EI client base.   
Referring to the sector’s 30 year history, EI’s strategy for 2009-2013 (Enterprise 
Ireland, 2008, p.3) states that ‘the New Software Economy is an environment in 
which Irish companies are uniquely well-placed to prosper’. The report noted that 
the sector comprises 500 companies, employing over 10,000 people, with 
combined sales of €1.4 billion. A profile of the broader ICT sector (Table 3-4) depicts 
its significant role in the economy. 
 Information Communications Technology Sector 
Output - Constitutes approximately 25% of Ireland’s total turnover 
- Second largest exporter of computer and IT services worldwide 
Export value 
2009 
- One third of the country’s exports by value 
- Five of the top 10 exporters in Ireland are technology companies 
- Computer services exports €24,223 million (€3,951M UK exports) 
Employment  - 75,000 
Enterprises  - 5,400 
Ownership - 233 foreign owned including the top 10 global ICT companies 
- 1,277 indigenous firms generating output of over €1 billion annually 
Growth   net employment growth rate of 6% in 2009 and 4% in 2010 
Table 3-4: ICT Sector Profile (ICT Action Plan 2012, ICT Ireland, 2013) 
Trading Profile 
Computer software embedded in hardware or carried via other physical media are 
classified as merchandise while the sale and purchase of software transmitted 
electronically as well as exports of software licences are classified as computer 
services (CSO, 2013a). Services account for an increasing proportion of total value 
added and commercial software services represent a growing proportion of that. 
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Domain expertise developed in a number of specialist areas including telecoms, 
finance, public sector, digital media entertainment and e-learning (Enterprise 
Ireland, 2009) while next generation internet, location based services, mobile ICT 
and social networking have been a more recent source of innovation and new 
revenue (ICT Action Plan, 2012). Table 3-5 presents an overview including selected 
companies within the sub-sectors.  
eLearning Content solutions, Learning Technologies, eLearning Services, 
Supplementary Tools – online books, portals, manuals, Job aids and 
workbooks.  
 Akari Software, Enovation Solutions and Intuition Publishing,  
Digital media 
entertainment 
Mobile content, Interactive TV, Animation, Digital Games, Film/ TV. 
 Brown Bag Films, Jam Media and Kavaleer Productions. 
Travel technology Distribution and reservation technologies, payment solution 
providers, business process and enterprise management solutions, 
CRM, mobile technologies and digital marketing 
 Datalex, Open Jaw Technologies and Mobile Travel Technologies. 
Public Sector Hub, Enterprise solutions, Security & privacy solutions.  
Business process management, Collaboration & productivity tools 
 Careworks, Keelvar Ltd and Quest Computing. 
Telecommunications Applications: Messaging, content, security. Mobility solutions: 
Mobile payments, personalisation. Middleware: billing and revenue 
assurance. Infrastructure: integrated communications and quality 
assurance.  
 E.g. Accuris Networks, IQuate and Openet. 
Financial and 
Enterprise 
Global sourcing and security management. Claims software for the 
insurance industry.  
 Cylon Controls, Vizor Ltd and Zarion. 
Table 3-5: Software Sector Profile and Sample Companies (EI, 2008, p.2) 
Irish firms generate a high proportion of revenue through professional services in 
support of integration and implementation efforts in the client environment. 
Software products are highly replicable however professional services delivering 
client-specific solutions are labour intensive placing additional demands on a 
constrained talent base while dampening potential for scalability. 
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Age-Ownership 
Although the Irish Software sector emerged in the late 1960s (Heavin et al., 2003) 
the indigenous sector is relatively young with firm age averaging less than ten 
years. Founder entrepreneurs populate CEO roles, the majority of them being from 
technical backgrounds with less than 25 percent being sales, marketing and 
financial professionals (Enterprise Ireland, 2008). Appointment of career managers 
to replace founder entrepreneurs is a frequent response to failure to adopt 
formalised approaches to scale (Child & Kieser, 1981), often at the behest of board 
members and investors. In contrast to the engineering sector, displacement is more 
common than succession in software firms. The sector employs a high proportion of 
professional staff and demonstrates more limited levels of family involvement than 
in manufacturing engineering. 
The following section on IPOs is specific to the indigenous software sector (having 
no parallel in the engineering sector). It is included here based on its significance as 
an indicator of investor sentiment and a signal of the potential inherent in the 
sector.  
Initial Public Offerings 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) are a key barometer of the health of the technology 
sector. In the Irish context, the historical success of companies such as Iona in 
middleware, Smartforce and Riverdeep in education and Trintech and Baltimore in 
data security, reinforced by public listings on NASDAQ in the 1990s, resulted in 
software becoming the first industry in Ireland’s history to sow the seeds of a 
virtuous cycle of entrepreneurship (Breznitz, 2007). The subsequent delisting of 
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each of the firms depicts something of a vicious cycle (Table 3-6), largely based on 
failing to meet the challenge of aggressive growth. Through a combination of entry, 
acquisition and dissolution, sectoral revenues have remained relatively static over 
the last ten years. As acquiring firms are largely foreign-owned, they absorb the 
revenues overseas while acquired firms are reported as dissolutions (Evans, 1987).  
Firm Nasdaq IPO Listing Exit from Nasdaq 
Iona   1997 Acquired by Progress Software (US) in 2008 
Smartforce  1995 (CBT Systems) Merged with Skillsoft. Acquired by SSI Investments 
(US) in 2010 
Riverdeep 1999 Delisted in 2002 when the stock price fell below $2 
Trintech 1999 Acquired by Spectrum Equity Investors (US) in 2012 
Table 3-6: Record of Irish Software Company NASDAQ Listings 
In 2012, Fleetmatics, a provider of cloud-based fleet management solutions became 
the first Irish Software company to launch an IPO (New York Stock Exchange) in ten 
years. Fleetmatics is one of the indigenous sector’s top earners with revenues of 
$177.4M (€129M) in 2013, Globoforce with 2012 earnings of approximately $187m 
(€136M) postponed a planned Nasdaq listing in March 2014 (the first by an Irish 
firm in 14 years) stating the intention to await more favourable market conditions.   
While praising Ireland’s policy of encouraging high-tech export businesses, 
Cusumano (2005) suggests that many Irish entrepreneurs are interested in growing 
their companies but, not at the expense of maintaining their lifestyles including:  
independence from large outside investors, from the pressures of public 
stock markets and independence from the syndrome that many US software 
companies face; hectic work schedules, frenetic product launches, 
aggressive attempts at expansion and then bankruptcy or market failure 
more often than we care to admit (p.27). 
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A meta-analysis of the growth patterns of gazelles found that firms who introduce 
new-to-market products are significantly less likely to survive – they are also less 
likely to be acquired than to be liquidated (Parker et al., 2010). This diagnosis 
appears representative of the indigenous sector, perhaps explaining why few 
software companies have scaled beyond €20m and why overall revenues have 
plateaued over the last decade.  
3.7 Conclusion  
Assessment of firm-system fit relies on a contextualised understanding of 
educational and skills provision, the fiscal environment, the technology 
infrastructure, legislation, intellectual property protection, the institutional 
landscape and the relationships between them (Feldman & Kogler, 2010). This 
chapter provides an overview of the economic and policy landscape in the Republic 
of Ireland and documents the significance of the software and manufacturing 
engineering sectors in the global and Irish context. In light of the recession 
prevailing during the primary research phase of this thesis, it can be argued that the 
characteristics and challenges associated with innovating in such circumstances 
present a more useful mechanism for identifying environmental fit than in the 
boom times that preceded it.  
Primary analysis of system dimensions is presented in the analysis chapters (5&6) 
with emphasis on significant associations between firm contingencies and 
perceived fit.  
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
Dialectical pragmatism. 
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4.0 Methodology  
This chapter describes the methodology and methods employed to answer the 
research question. It provides an overview of the research orientation including 
pertinent philosophical and epistemological issues. It offers the rationale for the 
approach adopted to address the research problem followed by an outline of the 
research design used and the methods of analysis adopted in respect of firm 
contingencies (age and strategic intent), and the corresponding fit of key SSI 
dimensions. 
Details of sampling frames, sample selection, the interview guide, survey 
development and administration, data coding and analysis are described within the 
research framework. The mixed methods pragmatic framework is exploratory, 
without a priori hypotheses. To be clear about the boundaries of the research, the 
concern is to establish significant associations between SSI dimensions and firm 
contingencies and as such, it does not consider fit for non-correlated dimensions.  
4.1 Research Problem 
Extant research suggests conflicting hypotheses based on the proposition that 
system-fit is likely to be contingent upon firm age (e.g. Autio et al., 2000; Aldrich 
and Ruef, 2006; Klepper, 1997; Ranger-Moore, 1997; Stinchcombe, 1965) and 
strategic intent (e.g. Baum and Locke, 2004; Berger and Udell, 1998; Levie and 
Lichtenstein, 2009; Lundvall, 1992) among other firm-specific dependencies. The 
critical intersect between age, strategic intent and SSI dimensions, (Carlsson, 
Jacobsson, Holmén and Rickne, 2002; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000) has not been 
tested heretofore. 
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Promoting the utility of cross cutting analysis of SSIs, Malerba (2002) finds that 
most studies focus on a single dimension, ask different research questions, employ 
different methodologies and different units of analysis, reducing the potential for 
analytical consistency. Further, it is suggested that comparative analysis of different 
systems across similar dimensions should help illuminate disparities such that policy 
and practice can be better informed (Lundvall et al., 2009). This study addresses a 
number of these gaps by analysing two distinct sectors, employing parallel 
dimensions and methods within a single national territory to uncover contingency 
based fit. The research seeks to analyse the degree to which firm age and strategic 
contingencies moderate system fit with a view to informing system design and 
improving firms’ innovative capacity. 
The overarching objective of the research is to: 
- Investigate the perceived fit of the sectoral system of innovation (SSI) to the 
needs of indigenous manufacturing engineering firms contingent on age and 
strategic intent 
- Investigate the perceived fit of the sectoral system of innovation (SSI) to the 
needs of indigenous software firms contingent on age and strategic intent 
- Analyse the extent to which contingency-based fit is homogenous across the 
manufacturing engineering and software SSIs. 
Figure 4-0 depicts the research schema which was derived from the literature and 
extant research, in particular, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). 
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Figure 4-0: Sectoral System of Innovation Dimensions  
To follow is an explanation of the research paradigms considered and the methods 
used to gather and analyse the data for this study.  
4.2 Research Process 
Before undertaking research it is important to have an appreciation of the 
paradigms and general theory underpinning alternative methodologies and the 
tools and techniques that are most suited to it. The choice of paradigm has 
implications for research design, data collection and analysis. Alternative paradigms 
are framed within positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, constructivism and 
pragmatism.  
Methodology refers to the theory or philosophy of how research should be 
undertaken supported by methods - the technical procedures used in data 
gathering and analysis. There is broad familiarity with the notions of ‘quantitative 
research (numerical analysis and measurements)’ and ‘qualitative research 
(feelings, perceptions and meanings)’ (McGregor and Murnane, 2010, p.421) as well 
as with their more general characterisation as methods and procedures. In 
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determining a research design, it is recommended that researchers choose a single 
paradigm (Creswell, 2009). Table 4-1 outlines the array of worldviews considered 
for application in the study. Each is discussed concluding with the approach 
adopted in this study.  
Philosophical Worldviews 
Positivism Interpretivism 
- Observable social reality 
- Highly structured methodology 
- Validity 
- Generalisation 
- Understanding 
- Multiple participant meanings 
- Social and historical construction  
- Theory generation 
Postpositivism Pragmatism 
- Determination 
- Empowerment issue-orientated 
- Collaborative 
- Change-oriented  
- Consequences of actions 
- Problem-centred 
- Pluralistic 
- Real-world practice oriented 
Table 4-1: Philosophical Worldviews (Cresswell, 2009, p.6) 
4.3 Philosophical Background 
Paradigms/Theoretical Perspectives 
Paradigms comprise sets of assumptions concerning reality (ontology), knowledge 
of that reality (epistemology), and the ways of knowing that reality or the process 
of research (methodology). In essence, they govern the way we think and act or the 
worldview we adopt in carrying out research. The two research paradigms most 
widely discussed in business and management are positivism from which post-
positivism has evolved and interpretivism which is used interchangeably with 
constructivism and phenomenology. Over the last twenty years, pragmatism has 
grown in status. It is not committed to any one system of philosophy (Creswell, 
2009), but rather employs mixed-methods drawing on both the quantitative and 
qualitative domains. 
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Positivism 
Empirical research in business was historically governed by the positivist paradigm 
which views the world as external and objective. Positivism sees social science as an 
‘organised method for combining deductive logic with precise empirical 
observations of individual behaviour in order to discover and confirm a set of 
probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general patters of human 
activity’ (Neuman, 2003, p.71). Ontologically, positivists view the social world in 
much the same way as natural scientists view the physical world. The positivist 
objectivist approach imposes scientific meanings on individuals to explain singular, 
‘presumed-to-be true’ realities by coding, counting and quantifying phenomena in 
an effort to represent concepts (Gephart, 2004, p.455). Associated with the 
quantitative tradition, the positivist paradigm makes the epistemological argument 
that the researcher and that which is being researched, must be separate from each 
other and that the researcher much be independent and objective. Despite criticism 
from a variety of rival orientations, positivism remains the dominant 
epistemological orientation in management disciplines (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).  
Due to a focus on variable analysis, positivism is perceived to ignore the processual 
character of human sociation (Hammersley, 2008) and therefore fails to take 
account of the underlying mechanisms of social behaviour and how these change 
over time. In a review of research modes, Corbetta (2003) refers to the increasing 
acceptance among quantitatively oriented social scientists that the addition of 
qualitative techniques can yield worthwhile outputs. He ascribes this to the neo-
positivist or post positivist paradigm.  
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Postpositivism 
In the context that one cannot be positive about claims of knowledge when 
studying human actions and behaviour, post-positivism challenges the notion of 
absolute truth (Creswell, 2009). This is akin to failure to reject a hypothesis as 
opposed to proving it. Non-positivistic studies occur in small scale groups where the 
intent is to search for meanings in select contexts rather than for generally 
applicable laws, while positivism seeks validity and reliability as benchmarks of 
rigour, post-positivism strives for trustworthiness rather than unbiased measures 
(McGregor & Murnane, 2010). According to Lin (1998), postpositivism strives ‘to 
uncover the conscious and unconscious explanations people have for what they do 
or believe, or to capture and reproduce a particular time, culture, or place so that 
actions people take become intelligible’ (p. 162). This is an important feature of the 
current study. 
Post-positivism lays claim to a single reality but we may not be able to understand 
what it is or how to arrive at it because of the hidden variables and lack of 
absolutes in nature, therefore reality can never be fully captured but rather, 
approximated through interpretive methodologies (Creswell, 2009; Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). The next stage of paradigmatic evolution witnessed the emergence of 
constructivism and interpretivism which saw theorists adding new dimensions to 
post-positivism.  
Interpretivism  
Interpretivists refute positivistic claims about the logic of science, suggesting that 
theory does not generally precede research but follows it (Cohen, Manion and 
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Morrison, 2007). The research process is qualitative and largely inductive with 
meaning generated from field data. The interpretivist paradigm is concerned with 
the way that humans make sense of the world; seeking the insider view. Just as 
reality is understood to be perceived, different individual and group perspectives 
reflect multiple realities which may change over time (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988) 
seeing ‘people and their interpretations, perceptions, meanings and understandings 
as the primary data sources’ (Mason, 2002, p.56).  
Among criticisms of the interpretive approach is the inability to experience others’ 
thoughts, the absence of validation and the idea that sharing an experience does 
not equate to understanding it (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). Some argue that anti-
positivists abandon scientific procedures of verification, weakening the prospect of 
making useful generalisations (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007). Responding to 
criticisms of ambiguity, Jick (1996) suggests that qualitative research does not aim 
to present unequivocal, quantifiable meanings but rather to describe meanings that 
are potentially contradictory and ambiguous.  
4.4 Pragmatism, Mixed Methods and This Study.  
Determining an appropriate research design 
From a methodological perspective, policy makers and practitioners require 
multiple forms of evidence to document and inform research problems (Creswell 
and Plano Clark, 2007). This is exemplified by Rush, Bessant, and Lees (2004) who 
suggest that the body of knowledge about how to evaluate policy on innovation is 
well established and moreover that it should employ both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. ‘Surveys maximise population generalisability but are low on 
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realism of context and measurement’ (Scandura and Williams, 2000, p.1250), 
whereas interviews are high on realism but lower on measurement precision of 
behavioural variables and generalisability. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) propose that 
‘clarity can be gained by contrasting qualitative research with quantitative research 
that emphasises measurement and analysis of causal relations among variables’ 
(p.8). The use of contradictory methodological arguments allows researchers to 
mobilise the post positivist paradigm in quantitative data collection and the 
interpretivist in qualitative data collection and then to put the two in conversation 
with each other to allow for deeper understanding based on convergence and 
dissonances uncovered (Mertens, 2012) since knowledge is not simply data but is 
rooted in human experience and social context (Lemon and Sahota, 2004). 
This section describes the philosophy underpinning the approach to the current 
research and the methods adopted. Pragmatism counters the idea of 
epistemological incompatibility and offers support for the logic of mixed methods 
to address system fit. Given the complexity of the innovation landscape and related 
evidence on the role of the entrepreneur, management of, and interaction with the 
system (Carlsson, 2006; Rush, Bessant and Lees, 2004), a mixed methods approach 
appears fit for the purpose of this research.  
An important value of mixed methods research and one which deemed the 
approach suitable to the current study is the clarity offered by integrating 
qualitative and quantitative research along with measurement and analysis of 
associations among variables. Recognising that ‘social life is a contingent and even 
emergent process’ rather than a repetition of law-like patterns (Hammersley, 2008, 
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p.23), quantitative research alone would not provide adequate insight into 
executives’ perspectives on the SSI however qualitative data lacks robustness in 
terms of generalisability. Mixed methodology seeks to achieve that generalisability 
and statistical significance in reporting findings while capturing the nuances and 
understanding of each firm's context.  
The current study interprets mixed methods as the integration of two approaches 
to research, rather than the collection and analysis of two types of data. Stressing 
the integrative nature of mixed methods, Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) see the 
approach as ‘research in which the investigator collects and analyses data, 
integrates findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches and methods in a single study’ (p.4). The term ‘dialectical pragmatism’ 
(Mitroff & Mason, 1981, p.20) has been proposed to describe the integration of 
qualitative and quantitative research to develop synthesis.  
Theorists and researchers are increasingly moving towards paradigm relativism 
(Morse & Niehaus, 2009; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The idea of holding a dual 
view of paradigms has gained currency over the last twenty years with many 
researchers adopting a pragmatic viewpoint. Instead of focusing on methods, 
pragmatism emphasizes the research problem and the use of appropriate 
approaches to solving it (Creswell, 2009). As a world view, pragmatism is based on 
an evolutionary perspective typically associated with mixed methods. As a form of 
research strategy, it is also known as convergent or multi-method (Jick, 1979), 
focusing on the primary importance of the question asked and the consequences of 
the research, rather than the methods of data collection (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
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2007; Saldana, 2009).  Observing that mixed methods research is a design with 
philosophical assumptions as well as methods of enquiry, Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2007) encapsulate the approach:   
As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the 
direction of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in the research 
process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analysing and mixing both 
quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its 
central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in 
combination provides a better understanding of research problems than 
either approach alone (p.5). 
Howe (1988) coined the term ‘incompatibility thesis’ to describe the stance of those 
who view the rapprochement of methods as resting on the ‘epistemologically 
suspect criterion of what works’ (p.10), however Wengraf (2001) advocates ‘fitness 
for purpose’ (p.14) as the criterion by  which instruments and procedures for social 
research should be chosen.   
Marrying the requirement to explore and explain and to ascertain how as well as 
how many, mixed method research has become known as the third methodological 
movement (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2009). Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie (2004) advocate use of a method and philosophy that integrate 
the insights provided into a workable solution. Along these lines, they advocate 
consideration of the method of the classical pragmatists (e.g. Charles Sanders 
Peirce, William James, and John Dewey) as a way for researchers to think about the 
traditional dualisms debated by the purists. Among characteristics cited are that it 
‘replaces the historically popular epistemic distinction between subject and 
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external object with the naturalistic and process oriented organism-environment 
perspective and that it endorses practical theory to inform effective practice’ 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p.18).  
These characteristics bear particular relevance to the current research where there 
is a need to gain understanding of the influence of both organisational and 
contextual factors to analyse system fit.  In the absence of more holistic, context 
theorising on both the macro and micro levels, Bamberger (2008) posits that we are 
unlikely to yield research dividends if we fail to introduce a broader range of 
paradigms and perspectives with the tools to create new theories explaining the 
relationships between structures, environments and timeframes on the one hand, 
and attitudes, cognition and behaviour on the other. In line with the objectives of 
the current research, Creswell (2003) proposes that a mixed method design is 
warranted when the researcher wishes to generalise the findings to a population 
while developing a detailed view of the meaning of a phenomenon or concept 
among individuals.  
Critical of the argument that combining qualitative and quantitative data might be 
regarded as a paradigm case of triangulation, Hammersley (2008) suggests that the 
term has come to refer loosely to drawing on different sorts of data within the 
same study, irrespective of how they are used. Flick (1998) notes that triangulation, 
rather than validating results in mixed methods, is in danger of being interpreted as 
an alternative to validation.   
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Triangulation  
Whilst allowing a researcher to use different methods for different purposes in the 
context of one study, mixed methods offer the potential for triangulation. The use 
of a variety of methods to examine a topic is seen as producing more robust and 
generalisable findings resulting in higher external validity (Scandura & Williams, 
2000). Management researchers put forward an argument for mixed methods as 
having the potential to provide more perspectives on the phenomena being 
investigated leading to extensive debate on the benefits and drawbacks of 
triangulation. For this research, a mixed method approach is used not only to 
examine the same phenomenon from different perspectives but also to enrich 
understanding by allowing new and deeper dimensions to emerge (Jick, 1979). 
Offering a critical perspective, Bryman (2007) argues that ‘the metaphor of 
triangulation has sometimes hindered this process by concentrating on the degree 
to which findings are mutually reinforcing or irreconcilable’ (p.21). He advises 
against the tendency to use the outcomes from one method as a ‘support act’ to 
the other, rather than investing in integration arguing that researchers should 
provide justification as to why for example, survey evidence justifies claims that a 
particular theorization has been supported or disconfirmed by interview evidence. 
This logic has been employed in the analysis (chapters 6&7).   
4.4.1 Qualitative Research  
Context-relevant analysis is increasing as economic interactions are in many ways 
embedded in the structures of social relations (Bamberger, 2008; Granovetter, 
1985) typified by systems thinking. In employing participants’ meanings to 
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understand the phenomena of interest (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Neergaard & Ulhoi, 
2007), qualitative data can be ‘particularly difficult to pin down’ because of their 
‘flexibility and emergent character’ requiring ‘highly contextualized individual 
judgements’ (Van Maanen, 1998: xi). In a similar vein, Alvesson (2003) refers to the 
argument that language constructs, rather than mirrors phenomena – both 
perspectives underline the need for caution in interpreting participant data. In 
support of the qualitative approach, Gephart notes that ‘it can provide thick, 
detailed descriptions of actual actions in real-life contexts’ (2004, p.455). 
Qualitative research adopts a perspective of ‘situated, contextual’ knowledge 
where the interviewer’s role is to ensure that the relevant context is set such that 
situated knowledge can be produced (Mason, 2002, p.62). 
Interviews 
Broadly described as a conversation with a structure and a purpose (Kvale, 1996), 
interviews in semi-structured in-depth and loosely structured forms are the most 
commonly used method in qualitative research. Mason (2002) describes 
‘unstructured interviewing’ as a misnomer (p.62) suggesting no research interview 
can be completely lacking in structure or configuration as time and resource 
constraints would make it impracticable. Structured interviews are aligned with a 
neo-positivist perspective whereby the interview is construed as a scientific enquiry 
and the interviewer extracts information based on a rigid script. In depth semi-
structured interviews are planned and flexible exchanges conducted with the 
purpose of obtaining descriptions of the world of the informant (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2009) in order to shed light on their experience of the research 
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phenomenon. Within the current study, semi-structured interviews achieve a 
balance between controlling the topics covered and remaining open to the 
informant’s mode of response including the scope to improvise in a careful and 
theorised way (Flick, 1998; Wengraf, 2001) by employing freeform discussions to 
gather additional information for analysis and interpretation (Autio et al., 2000). 
Alvesson (2003) describes a researcher applying this approach as a ‘localist’ (p.13) 
who sees the interview process as an opportunity to explore the meaning of the 
research topic for both the interviewer and the respondent with the interplay 
between the two participants producing a situated account of the phenomenon in 
question. 
According to Rogers (2003) the very meaning of innovation is worked out through a 
process of social construction. It is crucial for a researcher to know the context of a 
behaviour or event because social beings construct reality and give it meaning 
based on context (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988).  Adding to the debate that 
qualitative interviewing tends to be under-theorised, Wengraf (2001) posits that 
when interview data is used as evidence, it tends to be supported by extra-
interview data and contextual knowledge. This adds to the motivation for the use of 
interview and survey tools in answering the current research question. 
4.4.2 Quantitative Research  
Research concerned with social facts tends to favour quantitative methodologies. 
Formalised procedures of quantification and categorisation present means of 
ordering and structuring the social world (Jick, 1996). Quantitative researchers craft 
concepts into the language of variables and, more particularly, relationships 
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between variables. Due to the settings and limited number of cases used in 
qualitative research, quantitative methods and surveys in particular, are considered 
superior in respect of generalizability (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). 
Surveys 
In studies seeking to model or predict the behaviour of larger groups in society, 
surveys are addressed to large, appropriately targeted, samples of the population. 
A survey design provides a quantitative or numeric description of a population by 
studying a sample with the intent to generalise characteristics, attitudes and 
behaviours from the sample to the population (Creswell, 2009). Employing survey 
or correlational design, data relating to all variables are collected simultaneously 
(Bryman & Cramer, 2011). The approach prescribed in the literature was adopted in 
the current research as outlined below.     
4.5 Research Design Framework 
Research designs are procedures for collecting, analysing, interpreting and 
reporting data. Rigorous designs are important because they guide the choice of 
method and set the logic for analysis and interpretation (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007). Practical issues such as time, availability of resources and access are clearly 
important considerations.   
Design has implications for a study’s ability to have clear practical significance 
(Scandura and Williams, 2000). Addressing the age and strategy contingent effects 
of the SSI on firms’ innovative capacity required both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to reflect the role of the firm, the importance and impact of system 
dimensions and the challenges associated with resource acquisition and 
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exploitation. The sequential approach facilitated use of information from prior 
phases to inform later stages (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007) as well as analysis in 
respect of how the qualitative data help to explain quantitative results and vice 
versa. To that end, the mixed method, sequential framework addressed the trade-
off between the realism of context in the interview phase with the generalizability 
of the survey as advocated by Scandura and Williams (2000).   
Knowledge generation in this context is guided by the need to explore, explain and 
generalise the effects of age and strategic contingency on the engineering and 
software SSI fit. Poole, Van de Ven, Dooley and Holmes (2000, p. 120-121) propose 
that the design of age-related research should reflect three sources of temporal 
change:  
1. Age - The age or temporal duration of the organisation at the time of 
measurement 
2. Cohort - The set of characteristics of all organisations incorporated at the 
same time representing the common historical conditions shaping the 
development of a given cohort 
3. Transient - All the temporary or immediate noncumulative factors that 
influence outcomes or dependent variables at the time of measurement. 
 
Following the exploratory research recommendation of Remenyi (1998), data 
gathering was first broad-based and then more in-depth and specific. A three-phase 
mixed method analysis was employed. Based on a convenience sample, Phase 1 of 
the study consisted of exploratory dual-sector system analysis including data 
collection and inference based on in-depth interviews supported by a loosely 
structured topic guide in the form of a mind map. This involved re-conceptualizing 
the SSI in the participant perspective. Employing an aged-based stratified sample, 
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Phase 2 consisted of semi-structured interviews based on gaps in the literature in 
combination with inferences from the preceding phase. Employing dual sector, 
single stage, self-administered e-surveys, Phase 3 informed by the prior phases, 
provided the basis for the generation of new data. Final meta-inferences were 
made on the basis of the confirmatory or dis-confirmatory age and strategic 
contingencies determined through the survey – supported by the interview data.  
4.5.1 Research Process 
The approach used is summarised in Table 4-2 which articulates a progression from 
early stage exploration of the sectors, to age based analysis of enabling and 
constraining SSI dimensions, concluding with a wide-ranging survey. 
Phase Inputs Outputs 
Literature/ 
Secondary 
data  
- Review of academic/policy research 
on SI firm age and life-course 
- Engineering and software and sector 
profiles, agencies and industry 
bodies. 
- Documented 
preliminary 
understanding 
pertinent to 
innovative capacity. 
Schedule September – December 2008                               January 2009 
Phase 1 
Loosely- 
structured 
interviews 
- Exploratory interviews n=10 
- SMEs (n=4), Agencies (n=2), Industry 
bodies (n=2) and Venture Capital 
Companies (n=2) based on 
convenience sample. 
- Qualify system 
perception 
- Inform semi-
structured interview 
phase 2 
Schedule Pilot: January 2009                                                 February 2009 
Phase 2 
Semi-
Structured 
Interviews 
- Develop and pilot interview guide 
- In-depth, face-to-face interviews 
engineering (n=9) and software firms 
(n=9) based on stratified sample  
- Perceived system fit 
by firm, sector and 
maturity 
Schedule Pilot: May 2009                                                       May - July 2009 
Phase 3 
Sector 
Surveys 
- Development and testing of 
questionnaire 
- Expert panel review and cognitive 
interviews. 
Survey of both sectors 
(n=676) 
Schedule Pilot: October-November 2010.                          Survey: Jan – Mar 2011 
Table 4-2: Research Process and Timeframes 
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4.5.1.2 Phase 1: Exploratory research - loosely structured interviews 
Bamberger (2008) promotes the use of qualitative methods in the early stages of 
research as a means to better understand the situational and temporal 
contingencies potentially shaping the phenomena of interest, contending that ‘pre-
research’ (2008, p.843) may help inform the inclusion of new context-related 
constructs and the exclusion of others. Distinguishing between mapping and 
modelling, Wengraf (2001) describes the process of moving from exploratory 
research where a phenomenon is given preliminary ‘mapping’, to theory-testing 
where the provisional map is analysed against reality (p.51), he advocates moving 
from lightly structured to semi-structured prior theory interviewing in a planned 
sequence.  
Having generated information about aspects of the phenomenon and provided a 
broader understanding of the research problem, inductive, lightly structured 
interviews were designed to gain an understanding of how executives perceive and 
articulate the SSI. This provided a measure of how provisional the researcher’s 
understanding was (vis-a-vis the conceptual framework) in advance of 
operationalising the more advanced elements of the design. This phase involved 
preliminary interviews with cross industry organisations including SME chief 
executives from within the respective sectors, sectoral specialists from EI and IBEC 
and, given the emphasis on funding constraints in the literature, two venture 
capitalists. The phase was designed to obtain executive’s views on the dimensions 
of the SI and the firm-system interplay.   
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The phase 1 purposive sample involved a relatively small number of organisations 
because they could provide particularly valuable information related to the 
research question (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). While the common innovation 
infrastructure sets the general context for innovation in an economy, it is ultimately 
firms, influenced by their microeconomic environment, that develop and 
commercialise innovation (Furman et al., 2002). See Phase 1 overview of interview 
sites at Appendix 1. 
Phase 1 - Operationalisation 
A review of the literature and policy documents was undertaken to facilitate the 
creation of a mind map (tentative SSI model – Figure 4-1), to depict the respective 
software and engineering innovation systems. Innovation systems (Carlsson et al., 
2002; Sharif, 2006) and Ireland’s innovation system have been well documented  
e.g. (Acs, O’Gorman, Szerb, & Terjesen, 2007; Forfás, 2004a; O'Malley, Hewitt-
Dundas, & Roper, 2008), as have SSI (e.g. Malerba, 2002, 2005; Hirsch-Kreinsen, 
2008). Policy documents include reviews of the software (IDC, 2008; Enterprise 
Ireland; 2009) and the engineering sectors (IEEF, 2011) along with the Forfás Annual 
Business Survey of Economic output (Forfás, 2009, 2010) and the Oslo Manual 
(OECD, 2005).  
Appropriate to the application of mixed methods to achieve a comprehensive and 
nuanced understanding of SSI fit, collection and analysis calls for effective 
operationalisation, a term widely used in quantitative research but commonly 
underplayed in qualitative work (Wengraf, 2001). The patterns and pace of 
innovation were discussed and the relationship between resource availability and 
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innovative activity were explored within the broader context of the strategy of the 
firm. A mind map charted system components identified in the literature and policy 
reports. Mind mapping pioneered by Buzan and Buzan (2000) enables the rapid 
expansion and exploration of ideas because it utilises the skills commonly 
associated with creative thinking including idea association (Roffe, 1999). The 
concept is similar to the model of knowledge management developed by Nonaka 
and Takeuchi (1995) and specifically, their identification of the processes permitting 
tacit-explicit knowledge conversion.   
Based on informant input, both sector maps enabled adaptation of the approach to 
phase 2 interviews based on sector specific components and vocabulary. An image 
of the engineering system map is included below (Figure 4-1).  
 
Figure 4-1: Preliminary Engineering SSI Review (Phase 1) 
A brief description of the respective dimensions is included in Table 4-3 below. 
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System Dimensions Components 
Management  Managerial structure of the enterprise. Ability to devote staff to innovation 
activity versus operational/production requirements 
Knowledge Factors: 
Labour Market: 
Education, training 
and development 
Innovation potential (R&D, design, etc.). Availability of qualified personnel 
within the enterprise and the labour market. Primary, secondary, tertiary and 
fourth level education. Sources of knowledge on technology and on markets. 
Availability of external support services. 
Representative and 
Industry bodies 
Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation (Irish Engineering Enterprises 
Federation). Engineers Ireland.    
Institutional factors/ 
State Agencies 
Infrastructure. Property rights, Legislation, regulation, standards, taxation. 
Agencies:  EI, FAS, Enterprise Boards, Science Foundation Ireland. 
Cost/Funding factors Funds within the enterprise: Owner’s starting capital/equity (incl. friends and 
family), owner’s loans and retained earnings.  
External Finance: Debt, equity finance, public/agency funding, Business 
Expansion Scheme.  
Partnering/ 
Networks 
Supply-side co-operation: product & process development (suppliers, 
universities, consultants and research institutions) and demand-side 
partnerships (customers and marketing/sales channels) 
Growth Trajectory  
Strategic Intent  
 
Strategic Orientation: Scale or customised offering. Export orientation. 
Organisational posture. Demand for innovative goods and services.  
Competitive landscape.  
Innovation Output Products, Services, Processes and Business Model change.  
Table 4-3: Engineering SSI Components 
4.5.2.2 Phase 2: Semi Structured Interviews  
In-depth semi structured interviews were conducted with CEOs and director-level 
informants during June and July 2009. As qualitative sampling is determined by the 
representativeness of the phenomenon under study (Morse and Niehaus, 2009), 
stratified sampling was employed to identify the sub groups in the engineering and 
software populations representative of sectoral age distribution. The eighteen firms 
were selected by stratified quota derived from the preliminary population database 
(detailed below) developed in support of this research (table 4.4). Sampling is an 
important aspect of qualitative research in terms of implications for subsequent 
generalisation (Mason, 2004; Wengraf, 2001). Nine engineering and nine software 
companies were sampled from the young, adolescent and mature strata.  
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 Engineering Software 
Young – 25th percentile 11 6 
Adolescent –  50th percentile 21 9 
Mature –  75th percentile 28 13 
Table 4-4: Research Population – Age Quartiles 
Aside from practical reasons such as costs and time, decisions on the number of 
interviews to undertake are driven by the data that is needed for comparison and 
the extent to which the sample enables that. Distinct from sampling for 
quantitative analysis, the intent here is to enable replication to build theory. The 
method and number adopted allows for the comparison and contrast of specific 
perceptions that could not readily be encapsulated in the idea of a stereotypical 
company. Firms were selected to provide coherence and cross-comparison without 
excessive variation, providing for literal replication. Multiple informants enabled 
greater confidence in theory building as idiosyncratic observations could be 
weighed against the data of others, until no new information was revealed. Nine 
interviews per sector provided scope for theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner). 
Interview Population  
Interviews were conducted primarily at Chief Executive Officer (CEO) level within 
the selected firms. A summary of the interview sites is included at Appendix 2. In 
the case of relatively small companies such as those in the current study, the CEO 
tends to have direct influence on all aspects of the business with the result that 
s/he tends to have a much greater effect on organisational outcomes than in the 
case of larger organisations. Bartholomew and Smith refer to the ‘CEO effect’ 
(2006, p.85) on the basis that s/he may be the sole individual with authority to 
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participate based on their knowledge of firm background, strategy and key activities 
including institutional interactions. This informed selection on the basis of CEO, MD 
or director level positions. 
Interview Administration 
Companies were contacted and interviews were arranged subject to confirmation 
of age, employee numbers and agreement to participate. The Phase 2 interviews 
were conducted according to an interview schedule (Appendix: 3) based on extant 
theory and the themes that emerged from Phase 1. 
A pilot was carried out in May 2009 which resulted in minor refinements to the 
interview protocol. Interviews ranged from 60 to 90 minutes duration. In the 
engineering sector, time on site was generally extended to include a tour of 
production facilities. Based on the interview guide, data were collected about 
founding history, turnover, employees, the main activity of the enterprise, sources 
of differentiation, innovation activities, strategic intent, categorisation of the 
technology and sector growth, markets, innovation funding, protection of IP and 
key competitors alongside perceptions about dimensions of the SSI. An expanded 
version of the Phase 1 mind map was drawn up to illustrate participant perspectives 
(figure 4-2) in support of analysis. A more structured aspect of the interview 
concentrated on the fit of five key system dimensions (listed below) over the 
preceding three year period (2006-2008):    
1. Quality and skills of workforce over the period [availability and impact] 
2. Capability development/staff progression [availability and impact] 
3. Availability of funding over the period. [availability and impact] 
4. Innovation partnerships  and co-operation [access and impact] 
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5. Technological Innovation [e.g. products, services, processes]  
6. Non-technological innovation [e.g. business model, organisational].   
Figure 4-2 articulates aspects of the SSI dimensions that emerged from Phase two 
 
Figure 4-2: Software SSI Map (Phase 2) 
All interviews were transcribed and analysed iteratively using manual coding of 
responses to increase the analytical potential of the data. Following a priori 
theoretical orientation (Creswell, 2007), the extant theory used to frame the 
research influenced the data collection and the thematic coding in parallel. The 
qualitative data were later refined and used to support analysis of the Phase 3 
statistical results based on in-depth perspectives on significant dimensions. 
Consistent with mixed methods, the approach allowed the researcher to establish 
to what extent and in what ways the semi-structured interviews could contribute to 
a more nuanced understanding of the SSI as operationalised and reported in the 
survey.   
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Interview Coding 
Consistent with qualitative research, data collection and data analysis are not 
overly delineated. The researcher moves back and forth from capturing the data, 
immersing themselves in it, coding, categorising, and identifying themes, assessing 
new data as it is presented to test for fit to the emerging theory (Green, et al., 
2007). A code is generally a word or short phrase that assigns a ‘summative, salient, 
essence-capturing attribute’ (Saldaña, 2009, p.3) to a portion of the interview 
transcript. The coding filters were based on SSI themes and sub-themes from the 
literature. Interview transcripts were condensed into more succinct forms within 
sectoral and age categories. Firms’ strategic intent was established in Phase 3 as 
outlined below.  
4.5.3.2 Phase 3 – Sector Surveys  
Phase 3 was designed to achieve a quantitative description of perceptions and 
attitudes to the SSI by studying the dual populations with a view to generalising 
from the respective samples. Consistent with the chosen methodology and existing 
research in the domain, the survey was deployed as the final element of the 
primary research. (See Appendix 5 for copies of the survey). The cross-sectional 
design provides a quantitative description of the sample population using self-
reporting measures. The output was analysed using cross tabulation in SPSS. 
Survey Population  
In order to ensure adequate data analysis within both sectors, a large sample was 
required. The intention was that every engineering and software SME (excluding 
those firms incorporated within the previous three years in line with the reference 
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period) in the Republic of Ireland should be included in the study. Consistent with 
the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) instrument, the target population 
for the research comprised companies with ten or more employees. Following the 
European Commission definition (2003/361/EC), SMEs comprise firms employing 
fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 
million euro, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding 43 million euro.  
Researchers in the area of small, privately held firms can experience difficulty in 
respect of the limited obligation to declare information coupled with state agency 
reluctance to share company data in light of risks to client confidentiality. Access to 
individual firm information is generally problematic for researchers working outside 
government agencies and public custodians of data (Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010). 
More widely, primary research among entrepreneurs and small businesses is 
confronted by a dearth of publicly available data. As small firms and new ventures 
tend not to be publicly traded, there is a lack of published information (e.g. 
shareholder reports, commercial analyses) which is compounded by reluctance 
among small business managers to divulge commercial information. 
Efforts to establish detail on the respective populations of both sectors included 
obtaining data from Forfás (2007) and the FAME database. Neither was adequate in 
terms of completeness and accessibility of company-specific detail. A population 
database of all engineering and software companies operating in the State was 
created by combining lists from EI and Data Ireland. Data Ireland is a commercial 
provider of business listings linked to the national postal service (providing mailing 
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lists for over eighty business sectors from a pool of 200,000 business contacts). The 
two sources were combined to build a robust population database for Phase 3.  
Based on a confidentiality agreement, access was gained to EI’s 2008 client 
database (engineering and software divisions) with data confined to company 
name, sector classification and date of incorporation. This included 333 software 
companies (media entertainment firms were excluded) and 590 engineering 
companies at the time of receipt on March 15th 2009. For reasons of client 
confidentiality, contact details were not provided.  
Examination of the databases uncovered significant gaps. Within the EI database, a 
number of companies had ceased trading or been acquired by overseas entities. 
Others had fewer than 10 employees and in some cases the date of incorporation 
did not match that provided by the Central Registrations Office (www.cro.ie). The 
commercial database contained more complete information including contact 
names and details. After exclusion of erroneous items, Data Ireland indicated 
respective populations of 454 software firms and 529 engineering companies 
employing ten or more people. All companies were contacted by phone to confirm 
willingness to participate and secure e-mail addresses. Table 4-5 below, summarises 
the survey population.  
Survey Population Engineering  Software  Total 
Enterprise Ireland Client list (firm, age, sector) 590 333 923 
Data Ireland database (firm, CEO, contact details) 529 454 983 
≥10 employees/≥3 years since incorporation 
Agreed to participate   
362  314  676 
Table 4-5: Survey Population 
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Population Age and Response Rates 
Empirical research on organisational age refers to tenure within a particular 
industry cohort or population. In the case of the population of interest, 
organisational age and tenure are the same (de novo foundation) for all firms. Firm 
age is defined as the number of years since incorporation, in effect; the length of 
time the firm has been in operation.  
As age is a key control variable for the research, multiple sources were used to 
verify the founding year. The Companies Registration Office was the definitive 
source of the firms’ date of incorporation. Company websites were also checked to 
ensure that they were indigenously owned and engaged in primary production as 
opposed to marketing, consulting or distribution. Companies in each sector were 
divided as follows: Young (25th percentile), Adolescent/median (50th percentile) 
and Mature (75th percentile). The population strata derived from the original EI 
database alongside those represented in the survey are indicated in Table 4-6 
below.  
 
Strata 
Engineering Software 
EI client 
database 
Survey based 
percentile 
EI client 
database 
Survey based 
percentile 
Young –  25
th
 percentile 11 17 6 5 
Adolescent –  50
th
 percentile 21 24 9 10 
Mature – 75
th
 percentile 28 32 13 14 
Table 4-6: Survey Age Strata – Survey Population and Response Profile 
Questionnaire development  
To minimise content and construct validity issues, the questionnaire items were 
largely derived from a review of previous instruments and established constructs 
used by researchers in the fields of innovation and firm growth. Thirty dimensions 
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of system-fit were selected. Sources included the Community Innovation Survey, an 
instrument developed by the European Commission under the Lisbon Strategy to 
provide a comparative assessment of the innovation performance of EU Member 
States (Hollanders & van Cruysen, 2008) and the third edition of the Oslo Manual 
(OECD, 2005) which is generally described as the foremost source of guidelines for 
the collection and use of data examining the nature and impact of innovation 
activities in industry. Product, process, organisational and marketing innovations 
are defined in line with other surveys of business-level innovation such as those 
devised by Roper (2001), Jordan and O’Leary (2011) and the EU Community 
Innovation Survey 2008-2010 (Forfás, 2012a). 
The survey aimed to assess fit based on SI dimensions prominent within the 
literature but which lack evidence of combined utility in the context of firm age and 
strategic intent. The questionnaire design was further informed by the phase one 
and two interviews which reflected firm and sector contexts, for example the 
absence of venture capital as a component of the engineering SSI.  
Among substantive constructs over and above those included in the CIS were:  
- Employee disciplines and qualifications 
- Scale for strategic intent adapted from Autio, Sapienza and Almeida (2000) 
- Importance of technical and commercial disciplines to innovation performance 
- Ease of filling staff vacancies in senior management, technical and commercial 
disciplines  
- Effectiveness of internally and externally provided  training and development  
- Effects of FDI/multinational presence on the skills base  
- Output of patents copyrights and trademarks  
- Ease of securing intellectual property protection 
- Funding sources for innovation in the reference period (sector specific) 
- Importance of funding sources to innovation  
- Distinguished between spend on R&D and broader, non-R&D spending 
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Following the approach of Bailey, Johnson and Daniels (2000), item development 
comprised three stages: Generation of a pool of items which reflected the context-
specific characteristics of each dimension and which were suitable for use in a self-
completion questionnaire; The evaluation of the item pool by a panel of academics 
experienced in the method; The evaluation of the item pool by five practising senior 
executives based on cognitive interviews to establish the face validity of the 
instrument. The panel make-up and the feedback provided are listed in Appendix 4. 
The experienced managers who participated in cognitive interviews were asked to 
complete the survey to establish the validity of questions, appropriateness of 
wording, format, etc. This type of interview is important in survey design as it 
allows the researcher to craft constructs in ways that enable target respondents to 
understand the questions (Dillman, 2007). The exercise measured the time required 
for completion in addition to collecting feedback. The process resulted in a number 
of refinements and pilot surveys produced a final selection of 31 items. The survey 
questionnaires for engineering and software are included at Appendix 5.  
Scales  
To ensure a consistent frame of reference in rating, respondents were informed 
that the items were designed to assess current conditions for innovation among 
Irish-owned engineering/software companies noting the requirement for access to 
employee talent, customers, suppliers, information, funding and other resources. 
The survey employed rating and ranking scales with emphasis on the former. 
Dillman (2000) advises that the same order of response categories is preserved 
across categories to avoid confusing respondents and questions included both 
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positive and negative statements to keep respondents engaged. With the exception 
of categorical responses and two ranking questions, items were rated on a five 
point scale. The scale was anchored only at the extremes based on two categories:  
Importance of the dimension (1) ‘Not at all’ and (5) ‘To a significant extent’  
Firm access to the dimension (1) ‘Difficult’ and (5) ‘Easy’  
Survey Administration 
Planned use of a dual mode survey encompassing web and postal formats was 
revised based on pilot survey feedback. It was envisaged that that dual-mode 
administration would help to overcome non-availability of e-mail addresses while 
accommodating individual preferences for completion online or in hard copy. The 
use of two or more survey modes in a single data collection effort raises the 
possibility of increased response rates however it also raises the likelihood of 
obtaining different answers to each mode (Dillman et al., 2009). Software pilot 
respondents strongly advocated web-only administration pointing out that they 
would regard hard-copy surveys as somewhat archaic and too time consuming. The 
feedback from engineering pilot respondents was less categorical but a decision 
was taken to check preferences in the telephone survey which was required to 
confirm respondent identity, establish willingness to participate and secure e-mail 
addresses. Dillman (2007) advocates the use of the phone to determine to whom a 
questionnaire should be sent and to establish eligibility, followed by a mail contact 
to help establish credibility and legitimacy.  Only one engineering CEO respondent 
requested a hard copy version of the survey. This facilitated personalisation of all e-
mails. A commercial communications platform (www.newsweaver.com) was used 
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to facilitate personalised messages as well as to verify which mails had been 
opened and which respondents had clicked on the survey link. As the survey offered 
anonymity, the platform allowed for the automation of reminder e-mails which 
would otherwise have required global renewal of the survey request.  It is the policy 
of some firms not to do questionnaires; others declared that they did not have time 
to engage. 
Survey sponsorship influences how a questionnaire is viewed by the recipient and 
the likelihood of responding (Dillman, 2007). University sponsorship is used as a 
form of external endorsement in almost all studies published in academic journals 
(Bartholomew & Smith, 2006) and Dublin Institute of Technology was clearly 
identified as the researcher’s employer. Based on cognitive interview feedback 
relating to survey fatigue and concerns about use of public funds, email requests 
emphasised that the survey was self-funded.  
Operationalisation of variables 
The constructs selected represent the outcome of several iterations based on 
discussions with an expert panel (Appendix 4), agency representatives and 
executives in the sample population. Careful consideration was needed in the 
interests of achieving a balance between the response rate and the time and level 
of detail required to complete the survey. Asking people to check records makes it 
more difficult to obtain responses as unavailability becomes an important reason 
for non-response. While precise numbers are preferable, some questions (e.g. R&D 
as a percentage of turnover or proportion of sales revenue generated by 
products/services developed in the last three years) were categorised in ranges.   
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A web-based survey was published using a commercial provider of internet surveys 
(Survey Monkey). This was active for 90 days (Jan–March 2011) during which time 
the URL and background details were circulated (and recirculated) by email to 676 
senior executives in the Engineering and Software sectors -  362 Engineering and 
314 Software firms had agreed to participate. Dillman (2007) recommends that 
varied procedures have a substantial effect on response rates including contact 
procedures, token financial incentives, telephone follow-up and addressing target 
individuals. The procedures outlined in Table 4-7 (overleaf) were applied.  
Stage Survey procedures 
1 Initial telephone contact 
2 Personalised e-mail containing e-survey link, suggested completion date and the 
commitment to make a charity donation for each response 
3 Reminder e-mail to identified non-respondents two weeks later  
4  Final reminder e-mail.  
Table 4-7: Survey Procedures 
Survey response 
The initial sample of 983 (529 Engineering and 454 Software) firms was drawn from 
the Data Ireland database. Based on a telephone campaign to request participation 
in the survey, close to 70% of companies in the respective sectors (362 Engineering 
and 314 Software) agreed to participate. The survey yielded 200 usable responses 
as outlined in Table 4-8. Response rates of 15 per cent for Engineering (80 
responses) and 26 per cent for Software (120 responses) were achieved.  
Population Engineering  Software  Total 
Data Ireland database  529 454 983 
Agreed to participate  362  314  676 
Response Rates 80 (15%) 120 (26%) 200 (20%) 
Table 4-8: Survey Response Rates 
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Bartholomew and Smith (2006) in a review of survey response rates in small 
business research reveal that (mail) surveys published in Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice and the Journal of Small Business Management over the period 1998-
2004 indicate an average response rate of 27%. They contrasted this with higher 
response rates achieved in surveys of large business citing the resource constraint 
and reliance on the CEO in smaller firms.  
Selected survey variables - Descriptive statistics. 
The average age of software respondents was 10 compared with 24 years for the 
engineering sector. Software businesses were two thirds the size of engineering 
firms with almost triple the number of employees having undertaken tertiary 
education. The primary strategic intent expressed by software respondents was 
revenue growth while engineering sector respondents prioritised profitability.  
Employment and skills profile: 
The 120 software respondents had an average of 36 employees in 2010, 85% of 
whom had a third-level degree (62% Science-Engineering, 25% other degree and 
13% non-degree). Employee numbers had increased by 21% in the 2008 to 2010 
reference period.  The 80 engineering respondent firms had an average of 47 
employees, 27% of whom had undertaken tertiary education (17% Science-
Engineering, 10% other degree and 73% non-degree). Average employment 
remained flat over the reference period.  
Innovation Output: 
To achieve stated growth objectives, software respondents engaged primarily in 
product and service innovation, followed by marketing and sales process 
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innovation. Engineering firm innovation in the reference period was similarly 
oriented to product, marketing and sales process innovation. As might be 
anticipated, production process innovation was more important than service 
innovation.  
Impact of Foreign Direct Investment 
Respondents in both sectors cited competition for talent as a by-product of the 
presence of foreign multinationals in the economy. This was countered by FDI 
firms’ positive impact on the overall skills base. With respect to spill over, 
respondents cited minimal impact on domestic demand due to the presence of FDI.  
Perceived obstacles to Software and Engineering Sector innovation 
Survey respondents indicated the degree to which SSI dimensions (e.g. Financial 
and Human Capital, tax incentives and Intellectual Property protection) were 
perceived to have constrained innovation in the reference period (Figure 4-3 
overleaf provides a summary for both sectors). In line with D’Este et al. (2012), 
funding is indicated as the most significant constraint for the software sector 
followed by labour costs. For the engineering sector, labour costs were perceived to 
be marginally more constraining than funding for innovation, perhaps significant of 
higher concentration on cost-based competition.  
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Software Sector - SSI Constraints Engineering Sector – SSI Constraints 
  
Figure 4-3: Key obstacles to innovation in the Software and Engineering Sectors 
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Data Analysis 
Having outlined selected variables from the dual sector surveys, the following 
paragraphs chart the steps taken to analyse the quantitative and qualitative data 
employing the pragmatic philosophy to guide the research process. 
Survey Analysis and Convergent Validation 
In keeping with Jick’s (1979) convergent validation, Bryman (2007) recommends 
that outputs should talk to each other, much like a debate in order to construct a 
negotiated account of what they mean together. To develop generalisable findings 
built on accepted theoretical constructs, the quantitative findings led to repeated 
examination of the qualitative data, resulting in the identification of contingencies 
which were compared with existing literature. 
Chi-square 
The model was tested using the standard chi-square test frequently associated with 
analysis of contingency tables. Chi-square is used in two ways. As a descriptive 
statistic, it measures the strength of association between variables, as an inferential 
statistic chi square weighs the probability that any association found is likely to be 
due to chance factors (Neuman, 2003).  
A chi-square test was performed to test the null hypothesis of no association 
between SSI dimension fit, firm age and strategic intent in both sectors using the 
Pearson chi-square test of independence at the 0.05 significance level. The validity 
of the test depends on both the sample size and the number of cells (Elliott & 
Woodward, 2007). Employing Cochran’s measure for goodness-of-fit, the 
approximation was deemed adequate if none of the expected cell frequencies is 
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less than one, and no more than 20% are less than five. Unlike many other tests, 
the finding of a significant result in contingency analysis does not explain why the 
results are significant so examination of the differences between observed and 
expected counts were undertaken in conjunction with the relevant qualitative 
analyses.  
The qualitative data were used largely to supplement the quantitative results (Jick, 
1979) for fit, the survey output became more meaningful when interpreted in that 
light. The integrated analysis employed Jick’s (1996) guidelines for reporting 
interview data, key among which were: contextualising and interpreting quotes, 
balancing quotes and text and use of the most illustrative quotes rendered in 
written style (p.266-267). Strict attention was paid to the integration of the 
quantitative and the qualitative findings rather than using them for comparative 
purposes. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter outlined the research design and methodology used to test the 
research propositions. It described the rationale for choosing mixed methods for 
data collection and triangulation. It communicated the theoretical and practical 
considerations involved in choosing the selected constructs. The source of the 
interview data and the data analysis process was discussed. The drafting and testing 
of the questionnaire and the administration process involved in the survey are 
outlined. The characteristics of key respondents are described. A pragmatic, mixed 
methods approach was deemed appropriate as in-depth senior executive 
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perceptions of the innovation system were sought alongside sector-wide views 
which justified the use of a survey.  
A number of external or environmental factors inevitably affect the results of this 
type of study. As articulated in in the previous chapter, firms were asked primarily 
about their innovation activity during the period 2008-2010 which coincided with 
recession in Ireland. This is controlled for as all samples are from the same 
population.  
Chapters five and six present the empirical analysis for the software and 
engineering sectors respectively.  
   
173 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Software SSI Fit 
SSI-dimension fit at the intersect with age and 
strategic contingencies  
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5.0 How conducive is the software SSI based on firm 
contingencies? 
This chapter analyses the primary data collected on the software sector. It is 
presented in two distinct sections. Age and strategy contingencies are addressed in 
sequence using both the quantitative and qualitative data sets to assess perceived 
SSI-fit.  
The central motivation of the thesis is to ascertain whether SSI dimensions are 
more or less conducive to innovative capacity as firms mature. A secondary 
consideration is the degree to which the SSI is more or less advantageous to firms 
of contrasting strategic dispositions. The CEO of an adolescent telematics firm 
emphasised the importance of strategic intent alongside the ability to access the 
necessary resources for innovation-led growth. 
If you were to single out one dimension that makes a difference in a big 
way, it’s strategic intent. And for that you need leadership and you need 
vision, and then you need the resources to back it. [S2x_CEL] 
Strategic aspiration emerged from the interviews as a potentially important 
determinant of firm-system fit. Based on a growth construct proposed by Autio et 
al. (2000), strategic orientation was added to the survey to generate a deeper 
understanding of the ways in which firms’ internal context might influence 
perceived fit. A chi-square test was performed to test the null hypothesis of 
association between the software system dimensions, firm age and strategic intent 
as reported by the senior executives surveyed. This chapter highlights significant 
relationships, supported by micro data from the interview process.  
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Insights from the field research are linked to theory, and where apposite, 
associations between the manufacturing engineering (focus of Chapter 6) and 
software contexts are recorded. As anticipated, the two sectors differ in many 
respects; however a number of similarities emerged. Discussion of the findings is 
divided into two sub-sections, firstly those SSI dimensions significantly correlated 
with age and secondly, those correlated with strategic intent. Conclusions are 
developed and a discussion of managerial, policy and theoretical implications are 
outlined in the summary. 
As identified in the methodology chapter, the system measures selected represent 
the output of literature review, exploratory interviews, peer review discussions and 
chief executive feedback from interviews and pilot surveys. The key dimensions 
identified in the qualitative phase of the research comprise; skills, funding, 
innovation types, sources, partnering and intellectual property protection.  
5.1 Overview of Software Contingencies 
Table 5-0 and Figure 5-0 present an overview of significant system dimension-
age/strategy associations. The associations indicate potential to impact innovative 
capacity. The survey sought information on thirty dimensions of system fit. Using 
the Pearson chi-square test of independence, associations are analysed and 
illustrated using an alpha level of .05, significance at the .10 level is also noted. 
Contingencies are coded according to age and strategy as outlined below. Interview 
participants are labelled by cohort age. 
 Age: young (y), adolescent (a) mature (m)   
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 Strategic aspiration to maximise: sales growth (g), profitability (p), technical 
superiority (t), the value of the firm for eventual sale (e) firm 
longevity/stability(l)  
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Table 5.0 summarises significant age contingencies across all system dimensions. 
System Dimension  Age Cohort Strategy Cohort 
Skills - Importance to performance     
Leadership/General Management 0.03 ** Adolescent+   
Foreign multinational presence      
Expands skills base  0.008**   Adolescent +   
FDI increases competition for talent 0.005** Mature- 0.046** Technology- 
FDI expands lobbying potential  0.02** Adolescent +   
Dilution of government support    0.077* Profit- 
Funding     
Sought external funding   0.064* Technology+ 
Access to angel investment  0.048** Young-   
Business expansion scheme   0.083* Exit+ 
Bank capital  0.083* Mature - 0.010* Exit+ 
Venture capital  0.036** Mature ne   
Enterprise Ireland grants 0.053* Adolescent -   
Innovation vouchers 0.079* Adolescent ne   
EI stabilisation funding 0.049** Mature+   
Retained earnings 0.068* Young-   
European Framework (FP7) funding    0.091* Technology+ 
Innovation types, sources, IP     
Importance of customers  0.005** Young ne   
Organisation/Marketing impact     
New/significantly changed sales/ distribution    0.035** Revenue+ 
Improved production or service   0.027** Longevity+ 
Import of innovation sources     
HEIs (product/process)   0.004** Growth ne 
Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 5-0: Software SSI - Summary of Significant Contingencies 
5.2.1 Age-Skills Dimensions 
This dimension comprises the skills, education, experience and ingenuity associated with 
human capital. The availability and impact of technical, commercial and general 
management personnel, as well as the effectiveness of mechanisms for talent development 
in-company and through external provision are analysed. Table 5-1 summarises the results 
of chi-square tests examining the relationship between the skills dimension and firm age.  
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Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 5-1: Software SSI Age-Skill Contingencies 
Age-Skill Contingencies  
Significant Contingencies are:  
 The degree to which leadership/general management competence is perceived as 
advantageous to adolescent firm performance  
 The extent to which FDI benefits adolescent firms through education provision 
 The perception among mature firms that FDI increases competition for talent 
 The extent to which adolescent firms perceive that FDI boosts lobbying capacity. 
Leadership and General Management impact on adolescent firms 
The adolescent cohort reports superior performance associated with leadership team 
competence. A chi-square test indicates a significant positive association with 72% of 
adolescent firms reporting positive effects [X² (8, n=119), =16.780, p=<.032], compared to 
levels of 48% and 47% for the young and mature cohorts respectively. This may be due to 
prior learning on the part of adolescent firm management teams enabling them to 
System Dimension Contingency Cohort 
Importance of skills to company’s performance  
Technical/Engineering Skills 0.48  
Business/Commercial Skills 0.16  
Leadership/General Management Skills  0.03** Adolescent + 
Ease of filling vacancies   
Qualified technical and engineering talent 0.90  
Qualified business/commercial talent  0.21  
Leadership/General management  0.25  
Effectiveness of training and development programmes   
Technical/Engineering 0.51  
Business/Commercial 0.27  
Leadership/General Management 0.93  
Impact of presence of foreign owned multinationals  
Expands skills base through education and training provision  0.008** Adolescent + 
Increases competition for talent in the sector 0.005** Mature (-) 
Increases pool of managerial talent available to the sector  0.495  
Expands the domestic customer base 0.712  
Expands the sector’s lobbying potential  0.02** Adolescent + 
Dilutes government support for indigenous companies 0.31  
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effectively design and iterate strategies and business models. This aligns with the findings of 
Kim et al. (2012), albeit for foreign subsidiaries, who determined that for adolescent 
subunits, the liability of newness is offset by the strength of senescence whereas the liability 
of senescence is offset by the strength of newness. This signals a potential tipping point in 
firms’ life courses at which adolescence confers the benefit of management team learning 
without the liability of age. It may also highlight the need for agency engagement to address 
opportunities for scaling.  
The CEO of an adolescent firm referenced the benefit of ten years’ experience informing the 
management team’s ability to set the innovation agenda. However, despite the findings for 
the cohort, and the contention that managers of firms in high velocity industries are likely to 
be more proactive innovators (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), the CEO implies risk aversion as 
measured by revenue stagnation over the three prior years (€2.5m 2006-08). 
I think strategically what we want to do is revitalise ourselves with a new vision 
based on innovation. We've so much experience of the market from what we've 
done over ten years, there's no reason why we shouldn't move into being an 
innovative company.....we’re at a little bit of a crossroads. I suppose ten years in 
existence, in some ways that's probably a natural milestone. Also, given the market 
conditions, there's a little bit of an external stimulus to look at where you're at and 
what the next ten years is going to be about. [S2.2_Or] 
FDI-driven educational provision perceived positively by adolescent software firms  
Continuing the theme of positive system effects for adolescent firms, respondents indicate 
that foreign owned firms drive the expansion of the skills pool through demand for 
education and training. While there was strong agreement across the age groups on the 
skills base, a chi-square test indicated significant association (at .10) with 33% of adolescent 
firms reporting beneficial impact on the education and training infrastructure [X² (8, n=117), 
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=20.831, p=<.008] compared to levels of 12% and 14% for the young and mature cohorts. 
This lower ranking echoes interview narratives on the competing demand for skills among 
indigenous and foreign-owned firms.  
Participant narratives on gaps in the talent pool are reflected in a survey of Irish businesses 
(IBEC, 2011) which cites software development among the main skills shortages, with Java 
developers and project management skills also lacking. In addition to overseas recruitment, 
a number of interviewees referenced outsourcing abroad. Similar constraints in Silicon 
Valley necessitated widespread offshoring of R&D in the 1990s (Saxenian, 2006). One 
adolescent company rated the availability of technically skilled talent in the previous three 
years (2006-08) as highly inadequate. They recruited largely from Eastern Europe and Asia.  
We have had to go abroad. I think there's a major issue in Ireland over contention 
for the supply of, not just software engineers, but scientists in general [S2.2_Or].  
Mature firm perception that FDI presence aggravates the skills shortage 
With respect to indigenous firms competing for talent against the perceived might of the FDI 
cohort, there was a significant difference in the perception of mature respondents, with 91 
per cent indicating that competition for talent had a potent negative impact on innovation 
capacity [X² (8, n=116), =22.065, p=<.005], in contrast to 74 per cent of adolescent and 67 
per cent of young firms reporting detrimental effects. Interview data supports the 
perception of systemic disadvantage among mature firms, albeit feedback across cohorts 
was broadly similar. 
Beyond the technical domain, one mature firm CEO described his company’s marketing 
function as underdeveloped, rather than attributing the problem to skill constraints. 
Competition from foreign multinationals is however seen to pose a retention challenge.  
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On the marketing side it’s relatively easy to fill positions. Our company may be 
underdeveloped in that area but I don’t think that’s anything to do with being able 
to hire people. The main problem that we find is with retention of staff in 
competition with the MNCs. [S3.2_Oc] 
The CEO also highlighted the perceived difficulty confronting indigenous companies 
accessing talent, suggesting that opportunities for on-the-job training and development in 
indigenous firms are outweighed by the employment security, superior earnings and career 
paths offered by multinational subsidiaries.  
From the point of view of the root of the [skills] problem, I think the biggest problem 
is that the good ones go to the MNCs for higher wages – I think the training might 
be better in indigenous companies but notionally you might think you would benefit 
more from the regimes that exist in the larger companies. [S3.2_Oc] 
An adolescent firm survey respondent reflected similarly: … very difficult to hire technical 
staff in Dublin due to competition from Google [S.2_Saa] 
Adolescent firm perception FDI presence expands the sector’s lobbying potential 
With regard to policy advocacy, there was a significant disparity between age cohorts on the 
perceived impact of FDI. Sixty four per cent of adolescent firm respondents suggested that 
their FDI counterparts make a positive contribution, compared to 36% of young and mature 
firms [X² (8, n=117) =17.714, p=<.023]. This may relate to the number of adolescent firms 
that are motivated to become involved in sector initiatives when they have reached a 
certain scale or maturity. 
The following section addresses significant age associations in the funding domain.  
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5.2.2 Age-Funding Dimensions  
Sources of external finance for software sector innovation include debt funding (bank 
borrowings through loans, overdrafts and mezzanine funding); equity (public and private 
venture capital and informal/angel investment); and grant aid. Venture debt did not feature 
in the Irish system until the entry of the Silicon Valley Bank in 2012. Internal funding sources 
include retained earnings and personal funds. Access to equity markets through public 
offerings and trade credit were excluded from the survey, as neither had an impact within 
the reference period.  
Some participants identified distinct requirements for funding risk and working capital, but 
others did not specifically attribute expenditure on innovation, potentially signalling the 
near-market focus of development. For young companies, sources of capital are used 
interchangeably as principals seek to build technology and commercial capacity in tandem. 
One founder CEO articulated the position of his young firm. 
We don't really cost expenditure on innovation … it's evolving: there is no 
differentiation in terms of costs to innovate versus costs of doing business. [S1.1_Az] 
Banks are not typically equipped to finance start-ups, or even more established companies, 
without tangible forms of collateral. In the context that most Irish start-ups are knowledge 
based and absent tangible security for traditional debt financiers, or predictable cash-flows 
to service loans, venture capital can be the default solution. Informants indicated that 
knowledge, skills and a customer base with contracts for supply and service have hitherto 
not been considered acceptable forms of collateral. Growing government pressure on 
indigenous banks to fund high technology companies with potential to scale may lead to a 
new approach to the valuation of intangible assets.  
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In the context of global competition, a number of respondents suggest that constraints in 
respect of the supply and drip-feeding of risk capital sit in stark contrast to comparative 
funding in the US. One adolescent telecoms firm reported having raised three million dollars 
in venture finance, but cited how a Silicon Valley based competitor had later raised ten 
times that level at a much earlier lifecycle stage.  
There is no shortage of innovation and market vision in Ireland...the simple and 
fundamental issue is a lack of substantial risk funding for indigenous businesses. As 
an example, a US competitor received over $30M in series A-venture finance, as 
opposed to $3M for my company, a whopping factor of 10. This allowed the 
competitor to enter the market a few years after we received our initial finance and 
yet catch us up and garner market share in a short period of time.  
Unfortunately, there's serious risk aversion in Ireland compared to the US. When we 
get over that, Ireland can build a substantial indigenous base. Otherwise, we just 
stick to being innovative small suppliers that may turn into early Merger and 
Acquisition targets. [Sy_Shen] 
Such disparities have consequences for firms’ potential to scale and might be construed as a 
barrier to entry, or as an inducement to exit. Where venture capital is limited, trade sales 
represent the sole alternative when financial constraints inhibit scale (Dahlstrand and 
Cetindamar, 2000). 
Another young firm respondent echoed the effects of drip-feeding and the consequences 
for competitiveness, restating the contrast with early stage funding for US competitors.    
The main difficulty we ran into was not being able to raise funding while our US 
counterparts, who entered the market after us with weaker technology, were 
adequately funded, grew and exited. The main lesson is that if we want to pursue 
consumer/digital product business models, we need to move to the US to raise 
funding. [S_SyLoc] 
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Underscoring the capital market limitations which preclude small firms from raising funds to 
support R&D, insufficient levels of risk capital and delayed access to funding featured in 
interviews. This feeds the argument that private sector investment focuses on short term 
returns and thus public investment is needed to compensate in order to secure longer term 
growth (Dahlstrand and Cetindamar, 2000). Investing in over 70 High Potential Start-Up 
(HPSU) companies each year, EI manages a portfolio of investments in over 1300 client 
companies (Enterprise Ireland, 2013) on behalf of the Irish government. An exploratory 
interview with a Dublin-based VC yielded a broader view of funding: 
Money is a facilitator because it allows you to bring in more people and invest ahead 
of the curve, so you don’t have to fund it by cash flow etc., but it is not the sole 
driver of success. This is one criticism I have of many entrepreneurs, ‘if only I had five 
more people, I could go into the US’. In my view, they don’t get it. They need to 
prove it [their business model] on a smaller scale and say ’Now all my sales people 
are at their full capacity. They’re all making their bonuses. They have 5 customers 
they can service, but there are another 20 they can’t get to. [VC_DEL Exploratory] 
 
Table 5-2 summarises results of tests of the relationship between funding and age.  
System Dimension Contingency Cohort 
Sought external funding .570  
Funding requests rejected  .232  
Business Expansion Scheme  .791  
Business Expansion Scheme Impact  .369  
Angel Investment Access  .048** Young (-) 
Angel Investment Impact  .636  
Bank capital access  .436  
Bank capital Impact  .083* Mature (0) 
Venture capital Access  .535  
Venture capital Impact  .036** Mature (-) 
Hire Purchase/Leasing  .410  
Hire Purchase/Leasing Impact  .410  
Enterprise Ireland equity  .223  
Enterprise Ireland equity Impact  .217  
EI Grants (R&D, RTI, Vouchers, FP7, Stabilisation)  .053* Mature + 
Innovation Voucher impact  .079* Adolescent (-) 
R&D Funding/RTI Grant impact  .852  
Stabilisation funding impact  .049** Mature + 
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R&D Tax Credits impact  .912  
European Framework impact (e.g. FP7) .307  
Retained Earnings impact  .068* Young ne 
R&D Tax credits access  .288  
Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 5-2: Software SSI Age-Funding Contingencies 
There was no significant difference in the number of firms seeking external funding 
contingent on age. Overall 72% of 114 respondents had sought external finance within the 
reference period (this contrasts with 55% in the manufacturing engineering sector). With 
respect to age, 78% of young; 71% of adolescent and 67% of mature firm respondents 
sought funding within the reference period. The data indicates a tenuous association 
between maturity and the ability to fund innovation internally and suggests a preference on 
the part of older firms to reinvest profits to that end. One mature company CEO reflected 
the views of a number of participants on external funding with emphasis on time lags. 
... the problem is every time we raised money, we were using it to cover mistakes 
rather than to go forward because it takes so long to raise it. If we started today and 
I say I need a million – I would have it spent by the time I got it. [S3.1_Sn] 
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5.3.2.1 Age-Funding Contingencies  
Among significant contingencies were;  
 The scant impact of bank and venture capital funding on mature firms 
 The relative ease of access to EI grants by adolescent firms  
 The perceived positive impact of EI stabilisation funding on mature firms  
 The difficulty accessing BES funds for investment capital for young firms 
 The negligible impact of retained earnings on young firms’ capacity to innovate  
 The non-impact of the EI innovation voucher scheme on adolescent firms 
 The non-impact of venture capital on mature firms.  
Venture Capital 
The survey indicated that 95% of mature companies rated VC as having zero impact on their 
capacity to fund innovation in the reference period – although significant differences 
emerged across age groups [X² (6, n=74), =13.5, p=<.036] with 14% of young firms rating VC 
as highly impactful against only 4% of mature firms. While the survey data reflects the views 
of informants that VC is not an important enabler, the contrasting impact reported by 
younger firms is noteworthy and may be indicative of the greater availability of public VC 
administered by EI for young firms demonstrating potential to scale. One test for potential is 
that recipient firms must raise matching funding.  
A young telecoms infrastructure provider described how the founders’ exit from their first 
venture provided the matching funding that rendered the company eligible for EI 
investment. The agency provides matching funds subject to strict eligibility criteria. In many 
cases the associated paperwork and processes are cited as onerous.   
EI gave us initial matching funding – we put in €300k personal funds based on our 
exit from the previous business and they matched that. All of the various 
programmes help but the application process is demanding. [S1.1_Az]  
 
 
One young cohort CEO contrasted VC funding with bootstrapping. Early in its life course, his 
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Interviews revealed accounts of companies who succeeded in securing early stage VC 
funding and those who subsequently came to regard rejection as a lucky break, as their 
technologies failed to launch successfully. Firms questioned their investor-readiness and the 
viability of their business plans as evidenced by the comments of a mature firm CEO.  
We never had a problem raising money we had a good story we genuinely believed 
it at the time, the business plan was great - but it was the biggest load of fiction. I 
had a number of mentors at the time [and] they were all saying go for it.... If I were 
going back seven years I would put ‘me’ against the wall and say ‘look this is never 
going to happen’. It was so blatant, that it was never going to happen. [S3.1_Sn] 
The experience of the founder-CEO of a telecoms infrastructure firm in relation to accessing 
venture capital pointed to caution on the part of VCs. 
The feedback was that we were too early and needed to establish a customer base. 
In reality I’m very happy that we didn't get funding three years ago because we 
would be toast by now. We would not have achieved the targets that we had set out 
we would be in a very different place now. [S1.1_Az] 
The primary research yielded mixed views on VC - some firms had succeeded in securing 
investment, but others regretted the absence of smart investors with technology, market 
and product expertise backed by networks of experts in the relevant area  (Dahlstrand 
(Dahlstrand & Cetindamar, 2000; Norton & Tenenbaum, 1993). Some participants suggested 
that, despite their success in securing funds, they had not been investor-ready, due to 
inadequate business models or fledgling technologies. Consistent with Stinchcombe’s (1965) 
liability of newness, the challenge associated with the successful launch and growth of a 
new (if not radical) technology is exacerbated by firms’ lack of credibility and demonstrable 
track records (Hoffman, Parejo, Bessant, & Perren, 1998).  
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In terms of the start-up VC funding that we got……we made a plan around our 
product which was based on a new standard. We built an engineering team of about 
ten people and we also built up other areas with key capability. We had about four 
or five people in marketing and product management, roles like that. As it turned 
out we were too early to the market - nobody was interested, it was two years 
before we did our first material deal on the original product roadmap. [S1.2_Ro] 
This last point was echoed by a number of informants in respect of the development and 
diffusion of frontier technologies where commercialisation occurred considerably later than 
envisaged. Consistent with the technology adoption lifecycle, early stage companies 
frequently described the challenge of ‘the valley of death’ or ‘crossing the chasm’ (Moore, 
1999), whereby the ultimate validity of the technology equated to companies’ domain 
expertise, as larger firms were more adept at commercialisation, perhaps revealing 
coincident liabilities of newness and smallness (Child and Kiezer, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965). 
Angel Investment 
Angel investment has varied impacts on age cohorts, with 87% of young respondents rating 
access as difficult, compared to 57% of adolescent and 67% of mature firms [X² (8, n=25), 
=13.965, p=<.048]. Given that young firms may be in a weaker position than their older 
counterparts in terms of liabilities affecting potential returns on investment, investors may 
prefer candidates with stronger management and financial track records. Hoffman et al. 
(1998) refer to calls for governments to expand their role in providing subsidised medium to 
long term R&D finance on an equity basis. In the case of the BES, for example, the 
government provides tax relief on investments up to a maximum of €150,000 in each tax 
year - relief is given at the individual investor's highest rate of income tax. 
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One CEO discussed the availability of angel funds following the flotation of an Irish company 
in his sector (e-learning), demonstrating the potential value of a system endowed with 
capital generated by IPOs and trade sales where high net worth individuals join the angel 
investor community. This signals the potential of serial entrepreneurs among sources of 
start-up funding allied to capacity to offer domain expertise and access to networks.  
…  CBT Systems had made a fortune for a number of people and Riverdeep had 
floated. We were riding the wave, we were in the right place at the right time, if we 
had waited another few months we wouldn’t have raised a penny. [S3.3_Wb] 
Assessing financial drivers of technical entrepreneurship, Eisenhardt and Forbes (1984, p.32) 
cite ‘the availability of venture capital, the savings rate, the existence of a wealthy elite and 
access to a stock market’. In respect of the wealthy elite, the capital generated in Ireland by 
previous exits can be described as emergent in respect of proving adequate funding for next 
generation firms. Despite a number of indigenous firm exits in the last decade, the scale of 
funds generated is insufficient to plug the gap in the software system’s capital needs, this 
may be intensified by niche crowding (Aldrich, 1999) among knowledge-based firms, with 
numbers seeking funding far-exceeding the system’s capacity to provide it.  
Grant Aid 
In the context of EI’s R&D, training and capability building budget of €77.7m in 2010 
(Enterprise Ireland, 2011), informants suggest that agency funding had a mid-range impact 
on their ability to innovate encompassing EI, County Enterprise Boards and Inter Trade 
Ireland as public sources. While marginally above the conventionally accepted 95% 
threshold of significance, there is an association between EI grant aid for innovation and 
firm maturity [X² (4, n=77), =9.328, p=<.053]. Fifty four per cent of mature companies rated 
EI grants as easily accessible, against 41% of young and 29% of adolescent firms. An 
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assessment of specific funding types produced another indication of significance - an 
association between stabilisation funding and the number of mature firms who saw it as 
having a significant and positive impact [X² (4, n=70), =9.513, p=<.049] on their capacity to 
innovate in the reference period. A significant number of respondents engaged in that fund 
for which detailed business plans constitute a key element of the qualification process. 
Innovation Vouchers 
In respect of innovation vouchers, there was an association above the significance threshold 
[X² (4, n=75), =8.381, p=<.079], with 85% of adolescent respondents ranking them as having 
no impact compared to 65% of mature and 55% of young firms perceiving them as being of 
limited value. Two respondents cited significant difficulty with the scheme:  
We got an innovation voucher in 2009 for €5k. Had to give it back, as we found it 
difficult/time consuming to get any of the colleges to do the work. We outsourced 
the job to India for €400 [S_SySta6] 
An adolescent firm CEO commented on the research Technology and Innovation (RTI) fund 
available through EI. Companies afforded High Potential Start-Up (HPSU) status based on a 
new or innovative and exportable business idea in the manufacturing or internationally traded 
services sphere are eligible for RTI funds if they can demonstrate adequate matching 
resources based on two year cash flow projections. 
In the past, there have been huge sources of R&D funding. We've principally had it 
through Enterprise Ireland RTI. The ratios are a bit odd. It's 35% spend in some cases 
and 50/50 in others, so it's not as lucrative as you might think. But there doesn't seem 
to be a lot of funding available at the moment, your only option is whatever's there 
plus commercial venture funds, which we wouldn't be on for [S2.2_Or]. 
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Retained earnings 
Findings for the mature category contrast somewhat with prior research, as the survey 
found that internal funds are Irish software firms’ primary source of finance (Hogan and 
Hutson, 2005; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010), albeit that no distinction is made between 
working and risk capital.  
A mature company CEO recounted multiple rounds of funding including friends and family, 
public and private equity investment. Based on this experience, he suggested that a more 
iterative, bootstrapping approach to funding and early commercialisation would offer a 
superior route to growth throughout the life course of the business.  
We’ve had a bit of self-funding and equity funding (Eircom Enterprise fund, EI 
funding and a bunch of investors). I’ve had very supportive backers – I fell into that 
as opposed to telling you that’s what we should have done. The way we should have 
done it was to go out and get orders in the marketplace and then get the minimum 
family, friends and seed capital and nothing else. You have to create something that 
‘others want to get in on’ as opposed to the other way around. [S3.1_Sn] 
Lean Start-Up 
The above position is consistent with emerging Lean Start-Up thinking (Blank, 2005; Maurya, 
2012, Ries, 2011), whereby software companies are encouraged to build a Minimum Viable 
Product (MVP) and engage in bootstrapping prior to seeking external funds. Echoing this, 
the CEO of one adolescent software company suggested that the Irish funding environment 
was adequate, offering a somewhat uncharacteristic assessment of the landscape: he 
articulates the lean approach. 
Any business I’ve developed it has always been self-financed, except whenever self-
financing was matched by government agencies, so 50:50. …. If I was working on a 
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project that was going to take millions to develop I would never do it. I wouldn’t take 
any investors, I couldn’t be bothered, if it takes nine months to develop .., it’s going 
to take six years to get it to market. I’ll leave that to the academics. [S2.3_ Gt] 
Bank funding 
In relation to bank funding, 81% of mature firms rated access as difficult compared to 57% 
of young firms. Although significant at the 90% level, this suggests the differential 
availability of innovation funding across cohorts [X² (8, n=75), =13.96, p=<.083]. While 
interviews presented limited evidence of bank finance, the higher impact of short term bank 
debt on young firms may reflect the retained earnings constraint typical of newer firms 
compounded by the absence of alternatives, since raising external equity depends on the 
capital return an investor can expect (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997). The CEOs of young and 
mature firms share similar views about bank funding.  
We never really had any discussions with the banks. For some reason I have in my 
psyche, that's not a way to go. [S1.1_Az] 
Bank funding (laughter).Do banks fund? Not just now, did they ever? We looked at a 
couple but it was pointless. It’s not that they don’t understand the business, they are 
not in the business of taking risk but they don’t admit it…. [S3.1_Se14] 
Interviews revealed that mature companies enjoyed greater success in securing bank 
funding from overseas institutions, and that by way of exception in Ireland, banks were seen 
as a source of working rather than risk capital. Mature company perceptions differed 
somewhat, they referred to the positive attitude of UK and US-based banks. 
We have been quite successful in raising mezzanine type bank funding in the UK. We 
have very little from the Irish banks - an overdraft facility of €100k, we got that up 
from €50K last year. We have about £2.8m debt in the UK. We have a guy there who 
will securitise software support contracts. Irish banks don’t have the expertise and 
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the wherewithal to do that. When you have a software support contract you have 
fixed payments going into the future – one client is a million a year for the next 5 
years so we can borrow against that, principally to make acquisitions [S3.2_Oc]. 
We talked to the banks here – they wouldn’t support us to lease computers as we 
hadn’t made any money. We went to Silicon Valley Bank, …, we met guys in chinos 
who gave us coffee and asked whether we were ‘pre-revenue or pre-profit’. I asked 
whether it would make a difference and they said no, they were just curious. The 
environment is so different for companies like ours over there [S3.3_Wb]. 
 
The CEOs of adolescent and mature firms reflected the need for a systemic approach to 
working capital in the Irish banking mind-set. Such funding would primarily cover working 
capital requirements alongside intermittent needs to finance renewal or expansion efforts. 
The Irish banks ask whether we have any unencumbered property and when we say 
no – the door closes, even cash-flow and projects don’t have any impact on our 
discussions with them. Another thing that stunts the growth of this sector is that 
there’s no working capital finance, there’s no regular finance available which is why 
you must end up with the VCs. Equity is suitable for financing things like R&D but for 
working capital requirements, it’s not. I cannot understand why we don’t have it. I 
think that if the industry had access to the equivalent of two months’ revenue, it 
would grow a lot faster. [S3.2_Oc] 
The lines between funding for innovation and working capital are somewhat blurred. The 
banks’ apparent inability to deal with the moral hazard implicit in software businesses, as 
distinct from more tangible (e.g. property) investment was a consistent theme in interviews. 
While there was limited evidence that software companies were discouraged from making 
loan applications for fear of rejection (Kon and Storey, 2003), the wider perception was that 
the banking system was a poor fit, supported by empirical research in the Irish software 
194 | P a g e  
 
sector suggesting that in many cases, software executives prefer outside equity to debt 
(Hogan and Hutson, 2005). An alternative interpretation coincides with the view of Han et 
al. (2009) that discouraged borrowers generally demonstrate a higher risk profile than other 
capital seekers, creating a stalemate between the banks and investment candidates.  
5.2.3 Age-Innovation Dimensions 
This section illustrates significant age contingencies in relation to innovation types, sources, 
protection of intellectual property and partnership dimensions.  
In the context of market- or customer-led innovation, the implication that customer need 
equates to market validation is frequently not borne out, many informants indicated that 
products initially designed to fit niche requirements prove unscalable in the long term.  One 
adolescent company CEO reflects negatively on technology push referring to the lesser 
success of research-led initiatives in comparison to customer-driven development.  
Our solution has very much been driven by customers, it came out of the customer 
base rather than us dreaming it up in the lab and putting it out there. So that's 
probably a good thing because, it's quite focused on addressing a real need, a 
paying need. We really need a kind of proof positive to ourselves. We can’t afford to 
do much beyond that [S2.2_Or]. 
The same CEO alludes to the company’s financial constraints, the need to get past its 
current crossroads status, and the desire to innovate beyond existing, contract-based 
customer requirements. This emphasises the risky nature of basic technical research which 
can result in underfunding by private firms. 
The big challenge is the investment. We've done it in an agile way in that we've 
innovated on the back of our customer base, which is a way of lowering the bar in 
terms of the amount of funding. But if you're targeting a serious R&D initiative, the 
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big challenge would be the investment associated - the cost and the resources. 
[S2.2_Or]. 
In keeping with lean-thinking, another adolescent company CEO articulated a value-based 
view of innovation with a primary focus on profit. As the only non-engineer among the 
software CEOs interviewed, he prioritised market over technical orientation. With the 
benefit of hindsight, other adolescent firm informants concurred with this view. 
We could talk about our early stage, even pioneering, implementation of Software 
as a Service (Saas) but because I’m not a technology person, I can sell both the 
technology and the outcome ..…the software is only a tool to fix a problem. 
Unfortunately what people see is a [technical] solution. The less innovation the 
better in my view. It doesn’t have to be revolutionary …... you only need to be that 
much better than your competitor, you have to be that bit more innovative, you 
don’t have to invent something that will take you two years to bring to market, 
speed to market is more important. I don’t want to be an innovative entrepreneur; I 
want to be a rich entrepreneur. [S2.3_Gtm] 
Table 5-3 indicates significant contingencies. The 56 variables spanning innovation types, 
sources, IP and partnership dimensions uncovered just one significant variable.  
System Dimension Contingency Cohort 
New-to-market products or services before competitors .653  
New-to-firm products or services available from competitors .883  
New-to-market processes before competitors .872  
New-to-firm processes already employed by competitors .570  
Developed mainly within your company .674  
Developed by company with other companies/ institutions .169  
Developed mainly by other companies or institutions  .411  
Innovated through acquisition of machinery, equipment, software .696  
New or significantly changed company strategy  .601  
New/improved systems for information, knowledge & skills  .153  
Major changes to the organisation of work within the firm .430  
New/significant changes in relations with other firms/institutions .928  
Advanced management techniques (e.g. Lean)  .312  
Significant changes in how product is offered to the market  .969  
New/significantly changed sales or distribution methods .906  
New/significantly changed marketing methods  .721  
Apply for a patent .249  
Register a trademark .582  
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Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 5-3: Software SSI Age-Innovation Contingencies 
Customers as sources of innovation  
While much research has focussed on collaboration mechanisms that facilitate innovative 
output, young firm respondents reported customer input as having lower impact on 
innovation than adolescent and mature firms. A chi-square test indicates significant 
Claim copyright .643  
Patenting to prevent duplication/facilitate licensing .295  
Patenting to deliver royalties .370  
Copyrighting/trademarking .275  
R&D (in-house or external) .544  
Employees recruited from competing organisations .797  
Employees or contractors qualified to PhD level .398  
Technology licensed from others .332  
Publications or technical meetings  .646  
Reverse engineering & patent disclosures .823  
R&D (in-house or external) .238  
Employees recruited from competing organisations .165  
Employees or contractors qualified to PhD level .484  
Technology licensed from others .197  
Publications or technical meetings  .423  
Reverse engineering & patent disclosures .178  
Increased range of products/services .200  
Entered new markets or increased market share .315  
Improved quality of products/services .706  
Improved flexibility of production or service provision .838  
Improved capacity of production or service provision .629  
Reduced labour costs per unit output .920  
Reduced materials/energy per unit output .376  
Consolidated range of products/services .369  
Co-operation on innovation activities (Yes/No) .526  
Internal to your company .239  
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software .168  
Clients or customers .005** Young (0) 
Competitors or other companies in your sector .884  
Consultants, commercial labs or private R&D organisations .691  
Industry networks .457  
Government or public research institutes .471  
Higher Education Institutions (recruitment/talent development) .141  
Higher Education Institutions (product/process-projects) .220  
Enterprise Ireland .102  
County Enterprise Boards .778  
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association with 35% of young firms reporting that clients had a neutral effect on innovation 
over the reference period [X² (8, n=77), =22.136, p=<.005].  
The Customer-Technology Nexus 
As exemplified below, firms emphasise the collective importance of product, process and 
service technologies to performance. The sales director of one young business process 
software company highlighted technology as its core value, which predetermined potential 
viability in terms of being able to attract funding, employee talent and customers.  
The technology is our key enabler. The reason being, the technology enabled us to 
attract the investment, the salespeople and also the market. The product offering 
(the technology), has allowed us gather those constituent parts along the way. The 
marketplace is obviously important but fundamentally, it boils down to the 
technology. The other bits were contributors, catalysts but not the core. The 
technology is what will deliver year on year [S1.0_VS]. 
A mature firm founder echoed this qualification, speaking of how his technology focus had 
yielded to an emphasis on market share. In line with previous accounts, he suggests that 
technological prowess is pivotal but, at a certain stage, domain expertise takes precedence. 
One might interpret innovation as being more informed by market factors at later stages of 
the development lifecycle, when the technology reaches maturity and the solution (e.g. 
design, implementation and support services) is developed in line with current and 
emerging customer needs. While core technology is perceived as pivotal to firm value, 
implementation, customisation and services deliver on-going value and differentiation. 
In terms of the balance of our growth – growth to date has definitely been down to 
our technology base and our products and the skill of our engineers. We are an 
engineering-led company and that has proven to be a long term recipe for non-
failure, rather than success. That’s why we’ve survived when the marketing bubble 
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companies failed. Over the last 3 years, part of our growth has been through 
acquisition but again, we are selecting engineering led companies, we are buying 
them for their engineering IP and their specialist expertise in our area – we are 
buying them for their customer base as well. The tipping point happened at the end 
of 2006 where the commercial plank outweighed the technology expansion so we 
are now engaged in buying market share. .... our proposition is changing from pure 
technology to being a company that can deliver. [S3.2_Oc] 
The CEO of an adolescent firm involved in engineering support systems for manufacturing 
referred to customer led innovation and how that was funded externally through EI’s RTI 
programme matched by working capital. He earlier described how the company was at a 
strategic crossroads: having initially adopted a risk adverse approach, management was 
challenged as to the next phase of the company’s life course.  
We're innovating within the customer base which has strengths and weaknesses. 
We were spending between 5% and 10% of working capital, it has been proactive. It 
was RTI sponsored. We did one serious project and it didn't really work out, but 
we've done a low risk one which is much more commercially successful with EMI 
[Enterprise Manufacturing Intelligence], but you know...  that is part of the issue for 
this company. How do you leverage it? I don't think we've any choice in the matter 
because, …… we're at a decision point between continuing in classic systems 
engineering mode with a lot of big systems out there to be engineered … or taking 
time to strategically pursue innovation through R&D and get to a different place. 
[S2.2_Orb].  
The founder-CEO of an adolescent telecoms software company commented on the limited 
potential to protect or differentiate the firm based on emerging technology. Efforts to 
define intellectual property rights in software continue to stretch the limits of existing legal 
structures. In a theme that resonates with other informants commenting on wider 
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technological innovation, the CEO referred to significant reliance on relationship 
management and customer service.  
I think the value of the business has been in the relationship with [our customers] O2 
and Vodafone. That was key to this whole business because the technology wasn’t 
there. There was no protection of it, there was no IP behind it, it was just an idea, 
and it couldn’t be protected. The only protection was to deliver a top quality service 
to Vodafone and O2 to their customers. [S2.3_Gtm] 
The CEO of a mature company described the approach to building their most recent 
platform, advancing the notion of bringing customers on board with basic product 
functionality and nurturing them carefully through the product lifecycle. The lean approach 
to building a minimum viable product (MVP) with a readiness to reorient the offering 
according to customer needs (Blank, 2005; Ries, 2011) delivers the twin benefits of a 
revenue stream to fund development, combined with live validation, testing and fast 
iteration of the product. The adoption of such leaner organisational forms could support 
young firm entry as they attack more established organisations that have become inefficient 
in their use of resources (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). 
Crossing the Chasm emphasises – instead of rushing the building of the product, get 
it out there to your first five customers and then ramp it up -use whatever resources 
you need to get it to 1st, 2nd 3rd base – over a two year timeframe we built out the 
software. It’s the quality of the product that drives the growth – not the quality of 
the sales team. The initial growth comes from the sales team but if you want to get 
serious global growth it has to come from the adoption of the product.  [S3_Sen] 
This echoes earlier points about the parallel functions of technology and product bundles, 
each of which iterates with the product lifecycle and company life course, building on the 
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marketing concept that a single solution offers less value than one that can be combined 
with others to deliver greater functionality.  
The foregoing analysis discussed the contingent effects of age on software SSI dimension fit. 
The following section enumerates strategic contingency effects.   
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5.4 Strategy Contingent Effects 
The effect of growth intent on firm performance has been the subject of much interest in 
the literature (e.g. Baum and Locke, 2004; Berger and Udell, 1998; Ucbasaran et al., 2008). 
Following analysis of semi-structured interview output, a measure of firms’ growth 
aspirations was included in the survey to assess the degree to which it might affect SSI fit.  
5.4.1 Strategy- Skills Dimension 
The following analysis of workforce skills dimensions integrates the output of interview and 
survey analysis to illustrate perceptions linked to firms’ strategic aspiration. As with the 
tests for age, the availability and impact of technical, commercial and general management 
personnel were addressed in addition to talent development.   
Table 5-4 summarises perceived skill and development contingencies.  
Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 5-4: Software SSI Strategy-Skills Contingencies 
System Dimension  Contingency Cohort 
Importance to company’s performance  
Technical/Engineering Skills .333  
Business/Commercial Skills .268  
Leadership/General Management Skills  .733  
Ease of filling vacancies in the last three years  
Qualified technical and engineering talent .560  
Qualified business/commercial talent  .104  
Leadership/General management  .785  
Effectiveness of training and development programmes  .051** Technology (-) 
Technical/Engineering .661  
Business/Commercial .680  
Leadership/General Management .135  
Impact of presence of Foreign owned multinationals 
Expands skill base through education & training provision  .952  
Increases competition for talent in the sector .046** Profit (-) 
Increases managerial talent available to the sector  .198  
Expands the domestic customer base .777  
Expands the sector’s lobbying potential  .279  
Dilutes government support for indigenous companies  .077* Technology  (-) 
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5.4.1.1 Strategy-Skill Contingencies 
Significant contingencies relate to the experience of those firms seeking to maximise profit 
and those seeking to maximise the technological superiority of their offerings; 
 Firms seeking to maximise technical superiority perceive current commercial training 
and development offerings to be of limited benefit to their innovative capacity  
 The technology-led cohort perceive that government support for foreign-owned 
software multinationals is significantly and negatively related to the resources 
available to indigenous firms  
 Firms seeking to maximise profits perceive that the presence of the foreign-owned 
sector increases competition for the limited supply of qualified talent. 
Business and Commercial Skills  
There was a significant difference among cohorts as to the perceived effectiveness of 
upgrading business and commercial skills. 42% of companies seeking to maximise technical 
superiority recorded available programmes as minimally effective, against an average of 
17% across all strategy types [X² (16, n=95), =26.230, p=<.051]. Learning and adaptation are 
widely identified as critical to firm growth, similar to extant research findings, age and 
experience are among the factors driving absorptive capacity (Geroski, 1995). With respect 
to competing for talent with FDI firms, there was a significant difference in perception 
among respondents seeking to maximise profitability, with 68% indicating competition with 
FDI as having a significant negative impact against an average of 36% across all strategy 
types [X² (16, n=116), =26.626, p=<.046].  
The CEO of a mature firm suggests that indigenous companies need to engage actively in 
the battle for scarce talent, especially with higher education institutions.  
My sister was working with Maynooth [University] when we originally got involved 
there, that contact allowed us to get the pick of the students but that’s not the 
norm. One of the disadvantages that indigenous companies face is that we don’t get 
the pick of the students; they are siphoned off by the multinationals. [S3.2_Ocu] 
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Informants referenced the higher wages in the FDI sector, and the apparent short-
sightedness of candidates to potentially greater role autonomy in indigenous firms. As 
outlined by the CEO of a young firm, competition from larger players demands a niche 
approach to recruitment as larger competitors are better positioned in respect of 
remuneration while exerting stronger influence over institutions as referenced earlier. 
We promote other things that employees find attractive rather than have the big 
players relieving us of our guys for a higher salary to work for the likes of JP Morgan. 
At a certain age €10k seems like a huge amount of money. [S1.2_Roc] 
Competition for Technical Talent 
While above the 95% significance threshold, 46% of firms aspiring to technical superiority 
suggest that FDI restricts the human capital supply to indigenous firms, the measure across 
all strategic cohorts for this dimension was 24% [X² (16, n=118), =24.588, p=<.077]. Large 
firms’ strategic decisions are known to have a bearing on the levels of technical activity and 
economic competitiveness within sectors (Pavitt, 1990), an argument that appears to align 
with the survey and interview data.  
5.4.2 Strategy-Funding Dimensions 
Table 5-5 summarises perceived funding contingencies.  
System Dimension  Contingency Cohort 
Sought external funding  .064* Growth+ 
Funding requests rejected  .741  
Business Expansion Scheme  .203  
Business Expansion Scheme Impact  .083* Exit+ 
Angel Investment Access  .626  
Angel Investment Impact  .497  
Bank capital access  .544  
Bank capital Impact  .010** Exit+ 
Venture capital Access  .627  
Venture capital Impact  .809  
Hire Purchase/Leasing  .806  
Hire Purchase/Leasing Impact  .806  
Enterprise Ireland equity  .143  
Enterprise Ireland equity Impact  .139  
EI Grants (R&D, RTI, Vouchers, FP7, Stabilisation)  .824  
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Innovation Voucher impact  .576  
R&D Funding/RTI Grant impact  .440  
Stabilisation funding impact  .213  
R&D Tax Credits impact  .569  
European Framework impact (e.g. FP7) .091* Technology+ 
InterTrade Ireland impact  .649  
Retained Earnings impact  .185  
County Enterprise Board access  .212  
R&D Tax credits access  .315  
Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 5-5: Software SSI Strategy-Funding Contingencies 
5.4.2. Strategy-Funding Contingencies 
Significant associations in regard to funding and strategic contingency include: 
 A positive association between those seeking to maximise technology and external funding 
requests 
 A positive association between those seeking to maximise technology and EU Framework 
impact 
 A positive association between firms seeking to maximise exit value and the importance of 
bank and BES funding.  
Technology Innovation and External Funding 
Firms expressing intent to maximise technological superiority lead the preference for 
external funding at 92%4. This may suggest greater emphasis on R&D investment. The 
lowest proportion of external funding (at 47%) was sought by those firms intent on 
maximising exit value, in contrast with the average level of 72% across all strategy types, 
which may indicate reluctance among owners to dilute equity while mitigating the risk of 
reduced autonomy. 
Exit intent and Bank Funding 
With respect to bank funding, a chi-square test indicates a significant and positive 
association between the importance of bank funding for innovation and the intention to 
maximise exit value [X² (16, n=75), =32.065, p=<.010]. Forty three per cent of companies 
                                                     
4
 Parallels engineering  
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indicating exit intent ranked bank funding as significantly important to innovation in the 
research period, compared to an average of 8% across strategy groups. The distinct impact 
of non-equity funding may reflect the desire to maximise value and owner equity in advance 
of a prospective exit event. One adolescent firm CEO described the need for state funding of 
working capital, adding that his firm had secured a debenture [medium-long term loan 
without collateral] in 2008. Prior to the interview, the firm had been in talks with an Israeli 
company regarding a trade sale but had failed to reach agreement.  
The state doesn't have a venture fund for companies like us….they're doing it in the 
UK, and if you were serious in this country about indigenous industry you would have 
that. I feel the bias in Ireland is to FDI. We have a loan at the moment. It's been 
good, but it was put in place pre-September ’08 and backed by the history of quite 
good banking from our end. [S2.2_Orb] 
Business Expansion Scheme 
Although above the 95% threshold, there is an association between Business Expansion 
Scheme (BES) impact and strategic intent [X² (8, n=72), =13.96, p=<.083]. Fifty seven per 
cent of firms seeking to maximise exit value perceived BES funding as having a positive 
impact on innovation capacity in the reference period, compared to an average of only 18% 
across all groups. BES funding is attractive in that it delivers a capital injection of up to €2M 
with limited equity dilution or oversight by investors, providing greater managerial latitude 
than would be the case with angel or VC funding. The CEO of a mature firm illustrates the 
effectiveness of BES as an interim source of capital and refers to lower entry costs for 
software start-ups which may lead to more promising outcomes for this type of funding.  
…in the middle part of our story 1997 – 2001 we raised 750K in BES and then did a 
further £250K when it came around again. I think we are one of the BES success 
stories. It’s been great for us…  They have extended BES to €2M, I think that’s an 
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adequate amount and I think we will see the fruits of that in 2 or 3 years’ time - if 
and when software companies take it up. €2m is enough to get traction. The entry 
cost of setting up a software business has dropped now with all the cloud stuff. It 
will allow many more companies to avoid the clutches of the VCs. [S3.2_Ocu]
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5.4.3 Strategy-Innovation Dimensions 
This section assesses significant strategic contingencies associated with innovation types, 
sources, intellectual property and partnership dimensions. Table 5-6 summarises significant 
strategic contingencies across all system dimensions. 
                                                     
5
 As for engineering 
System Dimension Contingency Cohort 
New-to-market products or services before competitors .612  
New-to-firm products or services available from competitors .347  
New-to-market processes before competitors .312  
New-to-firm processes already employed by competitors .466  
Developed mainly within your company .375  
Developed by company with other companies/ institutions .709  
Developed mainly by other companies or institutions  .847  
Innovated through acquisition of advanced machinery, equipment, software .472  
New or significantly changed company strategy  .619  
New/improved systems for information, knowledge & skills  .296  
Major changes to the organisation of work within the firm .532  
New/significant changes in relations with other firms/public institutions .467  
Advanced management techniques (e.g. Lean)  .694  
Significant changes in how product is offered to the market  .138  
New/significantly changed sales or distribution methods5  .035** Growth + 
New/significantly changed marketing method .227  
Apply for a patent .838  
Register a trademark .316  
Claim copyright .526  
Patenting to prevent duplication/facilitate licensing .166  
Patenting to deliver royalties .181  
Copyrighting/trademarking .567  
R&D (in-house or external) .594  
Employees recruited from competing organisations .396  
Employees or contractors qualified to PhD level .768  
Technology licensed from others .859  
Publications or technical meetings  .615  
Reverse engineering & patent disclosures .839  
R&D (in-house or external) .566  
Employees recruited from competing organisations .277  
Employees or contractors qualified to PhD level .952  
Technology licensed from others .943  
Publications or technical meetings  .591  
Reverse engineering & patent disclosures .428  
Increased range of products/services .742  
Entered new markets or increased market share .277  
Improved quality of products/services .225  
Improved flexibility of production or service provision .848  
Improved capacity of production or service provision .027** Longevity + 
Reduced labour costs per unit output .198  
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Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 5-6: Software SSI Strategy-Innovation Contingencies 
5.4.3.1 Strategy-Innovation Contingencies  
Significant association with respect to strategic contingencies are; 
 Firms intent on maximising sales growth demonstrated significant adoption of new 
or significantly changed approaches to sales and distribution methods 
 Firms seeking to maximise stability and longevity rated improved production 
capacity and service provision methods as having high impact  
 Firms aspiring to maximise growth indicated that universities and Institutes of 
technology were not important sources of product/process related innovation.  
Firms aspiring to maximise sales growth indicated significant differences in innovation in 
their sales and distribution methods, with sixty per cent rating the impact of these 
innovations highly [X² (16, n=89), =22.597, p=<.035] compared to 10% across alternative 
strategy types. Given the link between effective sales and company growth, this relationship 
might be anticipated. The CEO of an adolescent company with a clear focus on commercial 
outcomes referred to designing products and prioritising profitable routes to market.  
Market accessibility is highly significant; access to market was our key to success. 
People make it difficult for themselves. If I was designing a business tomorrow I 
Reduced materials/energy per unit output .107  
Consolidated range of products/services .367  
Co-operation on any innovation activities .100  
Internal to your company .590  
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software .681  
Clients or customers .823  
Competitors or other companies in your sector .515  
Consultants, commercial labs or private R&D organisations .846  
Industry networks .474  
Government or public research institutes .489  
Higher Education Institutions (recruitment/talent development) .567  
Higher Education Institutions  (product/process-related projects) .004** Growth ne 
Enterprise Ireland .534  
InterTrade Ireland .558  
County Enterprise Boards .803  
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would look at the network of people who are going to use it, I would then find out 
how difficult it is to get access and then I’d design the product. [S2.3_Gtm] 
A mature firm CEO described his sales and marketing challenge and his plan to innovate 
using a viral/client referral programme necessitated by the lack of resource for alternative 
channels, an approach bolstered by the networked nature of the company’s online solution.  
We don’t have the money to go out and spend on marketing and communications, 
so it has to be viral. I’m looking at referral to allow our product to take off because 
we don’t have the money to do anything else. [S3_Sen] 
In respect of improved production and service provision, those firms seeking to maximise 
longevity rated them as significant. A chi-square test indicates significant and positive 
associations, with 56% of firms with sustaining strategies reporting that innovation in 
production or service capacity delivered significant impact [X² (16, n=108), =28.511, 
p=<.027]. In respect of process innovation, a mature company CEO commented on a change 
of approach as his business pivoted, placing significant emphasis on productivity and 
process design following lessons learned in prior iterations:  
In terms of non-technology processes, we micromanage that better than most. We 
looked at every process and we said – ‘why are we doing these things this way’, in 
other words we looked at the whole cost model ... People sympathised with us – 
going through 2 years with practically no money. We were limited in what we could 
do in that period – but we got more out of it. Adversity is a great servant. [S3.1_Sen] 
Reflecting on high tech service-related output, an adolescent firm CEO refers to the 
consequences of transitioning from technology to human input and cost competitiveness.  
Information engineering is bringing this kind of technology and industry knowledge 
together. Systems engineering is the painful process of projects, and it's as much 
human as technology (based). In fact, it's more human than technology, so one 
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assumes our friends in the East are going to eat our lunch. And we wouldn't be the 
only Irish company saying that right now. [S2.2_Orb] 
A young firm participant talked about process improvement in general, and how offering a 
hosted service (Software as a Service – SaaS) enabled fast and efficient commercialisation. 
In the last 12 months there were 158 innovations of note. Not daily but weekly, 
there would be changes and innovations. Because it’s a hosted service, the whole 
client community has access to our updates right away. There is a very small amount 
of personalisation to the end-user client, so everybody has access to the tool, it’s an 
enterprise tool. We do productise it but we don’t customise it, we would sell it to 
someone in collections as a ‘collection tool (and) to logistics as a ‘logistics tool’. The 
whole product is the same for everyone, they just configure it differently. [S1.0_VS] 
 
Firms seeking to maximise growth indicated that universities and institutes of technology 
were not important sources of product/process related innovation. Forty per cent of these 
firms ranked third level institutions as having no impact at all on innovative output [X² (16, 
n=76), =34.89, p=<.004] compared to 15% across the other strategy classes.  
Albeit referring to human resources rather than product or process developments, one 
young firm CEO summarises industry-third level relationships as ‘pretty tragic’. Another CEO 
who described his firm’s technology as having ‘plateaued’ in terms of growth, talked about 
how academics or students would not be motivated to work on it.  
We have tried consistently to keep engaged with all of the universities. What that 
means is finding one or two people to form a relationship with it order to keep an 
eye on what's going on. So in UCD we have a couple of people that will allow us to 
give a talk. I get to meet some of the students at the wireless mobile classes. It's the 
same in Trinity and Waterford Institute of Technology. I'm a true believer in having 
211 | P a g e  
 
some sort of virtuous cycle of engagement that we ourselves drive through the 
colleges. It works much better in the US. Here it’s pretty tragic. [S1.2_Roc] 
I think you just get yourself on certain computing programmes and bring in projects 
but the win-win is you get good graduates. In this climate and two or three years 
down the road, there'll be so many masters’ graduates; I suspect there's an 
opportunity. We've never been able to harness them. I remember we tried a couple 
of students here and our technology for those students would be relatively old. You 
know, it just wouldn't be... it's not a playground [S2.2_Orb]. 
This chapter analysed significant associations between firm contingencies and SSI 
dimensions in the software sector. Following the summary of findings below, Chapter Six 
provides parallel analysis for the engineering sector.   
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5.5 Summary of Findings - Software SSI 
The significant relationships affecting system-contingency fit for the three age and five 
strategic intent cohorts in the reference period are summarised below. With respect to age, 
young software firms perceived the SSI as offering the least best fit, compared to their 
adolescent and mature counterparts. With regard to strategic aspiration, those firms 
aspiring to maximise technical superiority perceive least fit with the system. 
Young firms  
The survey identifies largely negative associations for young firms in respect of funding. The 
cohort recorded significant association in respect of access to Angel funds, a deficiency 
aggravated by firms’ inability to compensate with retained earnings. The survey findings, 
with some exceptions, correlated with informant interviews. An unanticipated finding for 
this cohort was the negligible importance attached to clients as sources of innovation.  
Adolescent firms 
The adolescent cohort indicates positive and significant fit in respect of the perceived 
impact of leadership and general management on firm performance. The cohort also 
recorded positive correlation in relation to benefits derived from the presence of foreign-
owned subsidiaries driving the skills base through the education and training systems. The 
cohort also positively identified the impact of multinationals in respect of lobbying capacity. 
The relative non-impact of the EI innovation voucher scheme on adolescent firms’ 
innovation capacity contrasted with the positive and significant correlation with access to EI 
grants. In the former case, engagement with third level institutions appears to have been a 
source of frustration and delay in the delivery of the voucher scheme, a response which 
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echoes the views in the engineering sector, where there was a perceived a lack of urgency 
and business acumen within third level institutions.  
Mature firms 
There was a significant positive correlation in respect of the impact of EI stabilisation 
funding on mature firms: otherwise, the balance of associations was negative, with the 
perception that foreign multinationals increased competition for talent putting pressure on 
an already inadequate talent pool. In terms of funding innovation, the qualitative data 
appears to suggest that bank and venture capital funding have no impact on mature firms’ 
capacity to innovate, and reflects a lack of access to external funding rather than 
management reluctance to deploy it (Vos et al., 2007).   
Firms seeking to maximise profitability 
Firms in the profit-oriented cohort indicate negative associations with respect to FDI 
creating competition for the limited supply of talent. Given that competition in the 
recruitment of high quality technical staff has been identified as a serious constraint to 
growth (Hoffman et al., 1998), policy makers and state agencies should be cognisant of the 
liability of scarcity (Carroll and Hannan, 1989; 2000) and the potential for adverse impact on 
the innovative potential of indigenous firms.  
Firms seeking to maximise sales growth 
Firms aspiring to maximise sales growth demonstrated significant adoption of new or 
significantly changed sales and distribution approaches during the reference period. As 
reflected across a number of age and strategy groups, this cohort indicated significant 
negative associations with HEIs as potential sources of product and process innovation.  
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Firms seeking to maximise technical superiority 
The survey indicates a positive relationship between firms aspiring to technological 
superiority and successful bids for external funding, and a related correlation was found 
with EU Framework programmes having positive impact. In terms of recruitment and talent 
development, those seeking technical superiority perceived current commercial training and 
development offerings as having limited impact on innovation. The survey also found that 
government support for foreign-owned software companies was significantly and negatively 
related to the resources available to indigenous firms. This competition for resources 
reflects views expressed by interview informants in respect of public funding and talent.  
Firms seeking to maximise value for eventual exit/acquisition 
Firms expressing strategic intent to exit through a trade sale or acquisition indicated positive 
and significant associations with bank and BES funding sources for innovation: both sources 
are likely to preserve management autonomy while building value for sale or acquisition.  
Firms seeking to maximise the longevity of the firm 
Firms aspiring to longevity and stability rated improved production capacity and service 
provision methods as having positive and significant impact on innovation. The interview 
data supports this finding suggesting that there may be a link between the desire for 
longevity and patterns of innovation across the product lifecycle whereby process 
innovation overtakes product innovation over time (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). 
McGahan and Silverman (2001) find no evidence of a shift from product to process 
innovation with firm maturity, though it cannot be assumed that the desire for firm 
longevity is solely an aspiration among older firms.  
The next chapter assesses system fit for the manufacturing engineering sector. 
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Chapter Six 
Engineering SSI Fit 
SSI dimension-fit at the intersect with age and 
strategic contingencies 
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6.0 How conducive is the engineering SSI based on 
contingency?  
Following the pattern of analysis of the software SSI in chapter 5, this chapter presents the 
analysis undertaken on the engineering system to ascertain whether, employing an age lens, 
system dimensions are more or less conducive to younger or older firms. This is followed by 
consideration of the degree of SSI fit related to differing strategic aspirations.  
6.1 Overview of Engineering Contingencies 
The survey sought information on thirty dimensions of firm-system fit. To follow is an 
overview of significant associations combined with associated data on micro level activities. 
Contingencies are coded and mapped by age and strategic aspiration:   
 Age: young (y), adolescent (a) mature (m)   
 Strategic aspiration to maximise: sales growth (g), profitability (p), technical 
superiority (t), the value of the firm for eventual sale (e) firm longevity/stability(l)  
Significant relationships employ an alpha level of .05, while significance at the .10 level is 
also noted. Employing Cochran’s goodness-of-fit, the approximation is adequate if no 
expected cell frequencies are less than one and no more than 20% are less than five. 
Table 6-0 (overleaf) summarises system dimension fit in terms of significant age and 
strategy relationships. 
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System Dimension  Age Cohort Strategy Cohort 
Skills     
Ease recruiting leadership/general management .052* Young+   
Leadership/general management training effect .072* Young+   
FDI competition for talent in the sector   .076* Technology- 
Funding     
Funding requests rejected .016** Young- .058* Technology- 
Access to bank capital .080* Young-   
Access to EI Grants .083* Young- .057* Revenue+ 
Impact of retained earnings  .045** Mature+   
Innovation Types/Sources     
New-to-firm prods/services available from competitors .018** Adolescent+   
Development mainly within the company .014** Adolescent+ .044** Longevity+ 
New/significant changes in sales/distribution   .046** Longevity+ 
Innovated via adv. machinery, equipment or software .093* Young-   
Access to industrial design registration advice .079* Young-   
Access to copyrighting trademarking advice .074* Adolescent+ .043** Profit+ 
Access to R&D resources .050** Adolescent+   
Impact of innovation in materials/energy .080* Mature+   
Import of consultants, commercial labs, private R&D .016** Young-   
Import of networks as an innovation source   .088* Profit - 
Govt./public research as an innovation source    .004** Profit - 
Degree of impact of InterTrade Ireland support   .020** Longevity+ 
Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 6-0: Engineering SSI - Summary of Significant Contingencies 
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6.2 Age Contingent Effects  
6.2.1 Age-Skills Dimensions 
This section analyses skill and workforce dimensions relative to significant age associations. 
The field research presents a picture of a sector in transition. During the boom many 
companies struggled to meet demand, hiring indiscriminately in order to ‘get product out 
the door’ (E1.2), but post-boom, firms shifted focus to maximising operational efficiency 
through lean initiatives and, to a lesser extent, new products and services.  
Informants employing diversification or growth strategies hire graduates with the intent of 
moulding their skills. Production skills were largely developed on the job or provided by 
trade-certified migrant workers as these skills are in short supply domestically. One 
participant described an agency subsidised recruitment campaign in Poland which led to a 
workforce of approximately one third Polish origin. Another firm employs Polish, Latvian, 
Russian and Chinese nationals and credits its migrant workforce with sustaining the 
business. Despite the broad reach of recruitment efforts, mechanical engineering design 
skills remain lacking in Ireland (IBEC, 2011).  
The field data further indicate limited supply of hybrid technical-commercial skills, a gap 
mirrored in the software sector. Hybrid skillsets appear widely sought-after in sales and 
business development roles where technical competence is an important component of 
market awareness, solution design and customer relationship management. The following 
quotation represents the view of an adolescent firm survey respondent on recruitment. 
 [It is] very difficult to find technical people that have qualifications and experience 
in product development. [E_Sy_Mic] 
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The dearth of skills may be assuaged by the number of family firms where hybrid capabilities 
are developed by management over time, or absorbed by long-serving employees.  
Firms aspiring to growth describe in-market recruitment of sales personnel to capture 
appropriate language, cultural skills and market intelligence. With the exception of sales 
roles, participants describe moulding employee skills to firm-specific needs allied to a 
preference for staff living within the locality. Some firms experienced difficulty transitioning 
personnel who had previously held operational roles in large scale multinationals cementing 
the desire to home-grow staff. This can result in sector-based knowledge becoming highly 
idiosyncratic at the firm level (Malerba, 2002) reducing the potential for knowledge to 
diffuse among firms over time. Consistent with that, structural training deficits are 
addressed through in-house initiatives which in turn limits the potential for achieving scale. 
Changes to the trade apprenticeship system drove a need for greater engagement at firm-
level. For many participant companies this constituted the sole mode of entry for new 
employees. Promotion opportunities are generally available to those graduating through 
the company system. The state sponsored apprenticeship programme is generally perceived 
as inadequate. Firms suggest standards are grounded in subjective measures of quality 
creating a competitive drag for host companies. Many candidates present with limited skills 
in basic measurement and part making. The problem appears not to be unique to Ireland - 
informants report similar challenges among UK peers. 
A number of participants described the need for senior management training and 
development while recognising that this tends to lag functional and operational priorities. 
Learning is widely identified as critical to growth. As already noted, the post boom period 
saw companies make the transition from order-takers to crafting survival strategies 
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including new products and entry to new markets with new customers, placing heavy 
demands on management.  
Learning by doing 
The connection between skills and technology intensive production is a consistent theme in 
comments about firm-level employee development. Informants describe a machinery 
oriented approach, which embeds on-the-job training, as one informant noted: 
Training is part and parcel of the acquisition of new machinery. Suppliers come in for 
two weeks, return after two months and deliver another week and so on. That’s the 
majority of our technology training [E3.2_Pre]. 
The research addressed the availability and impact of technical, commercial and general 
management personnel, and the effectiveness of mechanisms for talent development in-
house and through the formal education and training system. The survey also sought to 
establish the impact of FDI. A number of informants referenced negative effects including 
diversion of human capital and dilution of government support. The revenue potential from 
local subsidiaries presents very limited scope for compensation. 
A number of relationships emerged with more prevalent differences in the perceived 
conditionality of age than strategic aspiration. In the skills category, none qualify at the 95% 
confidence level. Notably, the limited availability of leadership and general management 
skills was perceived to impact negatively on innovation among adolescent software firms, 
whereas young engineering firms found it easy to recruit during the reference period (2008-
2010). Young respondents also perceived that the training and development provision at 
senior management level is effective. Contrary to the positive impact of FDI in promoting 
the needs of the software sector, there is no related fillip to engineering sector skills and 
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lobbying capacity. Significant contention for staff with FDI subsidiaries was perceived solely 
by those firms seeking to maximise technology leadership. Table 6-1 summarises the output 
of the contingency analysis between skills and firm age.  
Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 6-1: Engineering SSI Age-Skill Contingencies 
6.2.1.1 Age-Skill Contingencies 
Significant age-skill contingencies are;  
 Positive impact on young firm recruitment at general management level  
 Positive impact expressed by young firms on the effectiveness of structured 
programmes to upgrade leadership and general management capability. 
Leadership and General Management Recruitment 
With regard to recruitment for management positions, there is a positive association 
(marginally above the 95% threshold) with 50 per cent of young firms reporting ease of 
recruitment [X² (8, n=55), =1.40, p=<0.052] compared to only 15 per cent of adolescent and 
System Dimension Age Cohort 
Importance to company’s performance 
Technical/Engineering Skills .577  
Business/Commercial Skills .190  
Leadership/General Management Skills  .148  
Ease of filling vacancies 
Qualified technical and engineering talent .405  
Qualified business/commercial talent  .285  
Leadership/General management  .052* Young+ 
Effectiveness of internal/external training and development 
Technical/Engineering .261  
Business/Commercial .429  
Leadership/General Management .072* Young+ 
Rating impact of foreign owned multinationals in the sector 
Expands skills base through education and training provision  .392  
Increases competition for talent in the sector .214  
Increases pool of managerial talent available to the sector  .311  
Expands the domestic customer base .669  
Expands the sector’s lobbying potential  .168  
Dilutes government support for indigenous companies  .825  
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mature firms. This contrasts with the general contention that young firms’ capacity to 
recruit experienced management represents a liability  
The survey and the interviews related difficulty in hiring appropriately skilled sales and 
technical candidates; however neither was significantly correlated with firm age. In terms of 
commercial and business skills, the MD of one young engineering company described how 
recruitment had ‘shifted up a level’ from responding to market demand in the boom 
(revenue grew from €2M in ‘04, to €4M in ‘05 and €8M in ‘06) to hiring sales 
representatives and professional engineers to generate new business in the downturn.  
Because we had plenty of work, we didn’t focus on selling. Effort was put into 
getting the job done and getting it out the door so you took in whoever you could to 
do that whereas now we have a sales manager, we’re looking at product 
development, all that sort of stuff. We have a couple of graduates here from 
Queen’s University and different places over the last three years so that’s sort of 
shifted up a level. [E1.2_Ini] 
Leadership and General Management Training  
In parallel with the findings for general management recruitment, young firm respondents 
reported positive impact in respect of structured leadership and general management 
training. An association above the 95% threshold was found, with 50 per cent of young firms 
reporting high impact [X² (8, n=59), =14.4, p=<.072] compared to levels of 7 per cent for 
adolescent and 22 per cent for mature firms. 
Enterprise Ireland’s client management development portfolio is available to all firms 
demonstrating potential to scale. Programmes originally designed in conjunction with high 
tech industry groups (e.g. Leadership for Growth at Stanford University, Accelerated Growth 
Programme for CEOs at Cambridge University) have subsequently been made available to 
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selected firms across all sectors. One young firm MD referred to lack of attention to 
management development and a tendency to become too involved in operational activities.  
… management development training would be the big gap. I have a production 
manager and getting him to move away from the day-to-day stuff to do actual 
management is the big challenge. You can clock up your hours and justify your 
salary at the end of the week by getting orders out whereas you’re leaving the 
management stuff behind. [E1.2] 
This may suggest a need for greater monitoring and support from non-executive directors, 
agency development advisors and mentors. It also speaks to the importance of firm-level 
contingency within the SSI – in this case, managerial engagement.  
6.2.2 Age-Funding Dimensions 
The sources of external finance for innovation explored in the interviews spanned debt 
funding (bank borrowings, hire purchase and leasing) equity (government backed and angel 
investment) and grant aid. Internal sources included retained profits and founders’ 
equity/personal savings. Contrary to expectation, trade credit did not feature significantly. 
Venture capital was excluded as it was not a feature of the landscape in the reference 
period.  
Innovation funding is dominated by retained earnings. Informants emphasise reinvestment 
of profit in plant, machinery and training as key platforms for innovation and productivity 
growth. Informal risk or angel investment was not perceived as a component of the funding 
system, with the exception of one firm engaged in the BES. Hire purchase agreements 
appear to constitute the most common form of funding for capital equipment. In some 
cases machinery acquisition and related training are partially subsidised by state agencies.  
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Agency funding for the engineering sector was provided by County Enterprise Boards (CEB) 
and more commonly by EI and InterTrade Ireland, the latter largely in the form of support 
for business-academic partnerships. In line with findings on the UK Small Firms Training 
Loans Scheme, the majority of companies surveyed indicated that training would not have 
happened so quickly, or at the same level, had support not been available (Storey, 2004). 
Similarly, empirical data indicate that agency funds are accelerators of rather than 
gatekeepers to innovation, conferring additionality in terms of the timing of outputs. Where 
agency funding is not forthcoming, development projects are generally self-funded, which 
parallels findings from the software sector, where informants report that projects are no 
longer mounted to capture state funding (terms such as ‘grant syndrome’ and ‘grant 
harvesting’ are used), but rather to escalate execution.  
Mature firms demonstrated comparatively greater aversion to external funding. Having 
survived previous economic shocks, financial autonomy is tied to limiting dependence on 
external sources. The relatively stable financial status of mature and adolescent firms 
renders the banks supportive in respect of routine services and working capital rather than 
risk capital. In many cases, overdraft facilities had been secured although the banking crisis 
created pressure to convert these to loans.  
Of the dimensions researched, owner equity and self-funding emerge as the most important 
enabler of innovation, the latter comprising the exclusive source of finance in the majority 
of cases; the external capital market is perceived on a continuum from inadequacy to 
irrelevance. The data suggests that state agency funding has a low impact compared to 
perceptions in the software SSI. The survey distinguished between those respondents who 
had sought external funding for R&D or wider innovation activity and those who had not.  
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Table 6-2 summarises significant age contingencies across all system dimensions. 
Funding Contingency Cohort 
Sought external funding  .268  
Funding requests rejected  .016** Young- 
Business Expansion Scheme  .169  
Business Expansion Scheme Impact  .281  
Angel Investment Access  .361  
Angel Investment Impact Constant**  
Bank capital access  .080* Young- 
Bank capital Impact  .274  
Hire Purchase/Leasing  .995  
Hire Purchase/Leasing Impact  .361  
EI equity .174  
EI equity Impact  .437  
EI Grants (R&D, RTI, Vouchers, FP7, Stabilisation) .083* Young- 
Innovation Voucher impact 650  
R&D Funding/RTI Grant impact  .114  
Stabilisation funding impact  .272  
R&D Tax Credits impact  .983  
European Framework impact (e.g. FP7) .527  
InterTrade Ireland impact .245  
Retained Earnings impact  .045** Mature+ 
R&D Tax credits access .121  
Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 6-2: Engineering SSI Age-Funding contingencies 
6.2.2.1 Age-Funding Contingencies 
With respect to age, the significant contingencies were;  
 the proportion of young firms seeking external funding  
 the level of rejection experienced by young firms 
 the degree to which angel/informal risk investment is not a functioning component 
of the system  
 the prevalence of self-funding among mature firms. 
Although there was no significant difference among age groups, an aggregate 55% of 
engineering respondents indicated they had sought external funding in the reference period 
compared to 72% of software companies): the majority (68%) were young firms compared 
to 46% of adolescent and 57% of mature firms. This might be considered counterintuitive, 
given the minimal physical asset requirements associated with software production, 
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however financing is often required to conduct R&D at the pre-product or pre-service stage 
(Westhead & Storey, 1997).  
External Funding Rejection Rates  
Young firm respondents reported higher rejection rates in applications for funding R&D and 
wider innovation activities, perhaps due to funding agencies seeking levels of accountability 
associated with more established organisations. A chi-square test indicates a significant 
association [X² (4, n=78), =12.23, p=<.016], with 32 per cent of young applicants being 
refused, in contrast to levels of 6% of adolescent and 4% of mature firms. This may be a 
consequence of the liability of newness and smallness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; 
Stinchcombe, 1965), signifying the greater degree of moral hazard and unpredictability 
confronting younger firms who lack the track record and security of more mature 
counterparts.  
Field data demonstrate limited potential for equity funding in the context of the market for 
engineering risk funding. Given generally low returns to scale, equity investment is 
practically non-existent. An exploratory interview with a partner in a VC indicated that time-
to-money and potential to scale in the sector fall short of venture capitalist’s expectations. 
Similar to the perceptions about bank funding in the software sector, this dimension 
appears absent from the system. No cross tabulation measures were computed for the 
impact of angel investment. One MD described his young firm’s stance in relation to the 
organic funding, raising questions as to whether the company might generate superior 
innovation led growth were risk capital more accessible.  
In relation to Bank funding and Business Expansion Schemes, we haven’t needed 
that over the eleven years. After the first year, we have been sufficiently profitable 
to fund our growth. And we have been continually in profit since. [E1.1_Com] 
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There was one reference to BES (Business Expansion Scheme) investment in the semi-
structured interviews. The scheme’s long term impact was perceived to have been 
detrimental to the company’s financial position in the context of a subsequent 50 per cent 
drop in turnover. The BES funds were raised and managed by the company’s accounting 
firm: the owners understanding of the commitments involved for the firm was unclear.  
The BES would have been for a particular project. There was some capital equipment 
bought with it but a higher portion of it went into working capital and then we’ve 
had bank funding for both capital equipment and working capital as well. I think 
looking back as to when the BES funding first started about four years ago, there 
wasn’t really a plan as to how to ….., as to how to re-finance. ... Our accountant put 
the scheme in place with their clients so the funding came through them. They were 
managing it, so there really wasn’t a good understanding of some of the 
implications on our side. [E3.1_Mca] 
The suggestion that a high proportion of BES funding was employed to fund working capital 
reveals liquidity constraints with funds diverted from growth initiatives to operating costs. 
In a further reference to angel funding, a mature firm informant suggested that external 
funding was not required, again in the context of retained earnings. 
It’s all self-funded. There is no angel investment. There’s enough margin in the 
business to sustain development. [E3.2_Pre] 
Agency Funding  
Young and adolescent firm participants reported positive feedback in relation to agency 
funding; however this was found not significant for any cohort in the survey. There was a 
negative association in respect of age and access to EI grant funding, albeit above the 95% 
threshold [X² (8, n=39), =13.966, p=<.083]. 46 per cent of young firm respondents indicated 
significant difficulty in securing grants, compared to much lower levels for adolescent and 
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mature firms. This relates to the impact rating for R&D and Research Technology and 
Innovation (RTI) funding, with 54% of young firms indicating that the grants had no impact 
at all, against only 15% of adolescent and mature firms sharing that perception: again, the 
level of significance was above the 95% threshold [X² (4, n=38), =8.265, p=<.082]. Some 
informants referred to the costs of establishing and managing agency relationships, 
suggesting that young firms find it difficult to justify diverting resources to the effort. One 
young firm MD reflected on his experience of seeking agency funding through his County 
Enterprise Board. 
They seem to grant aid farcical projects, they don’t look for scalability. They asked 
for a business plan. I spent a bit of time putting it together and they came back and 
offered us three grand. It cost me more to do the business plan [E1.3_Dl]. 
Another young firm MD explained his rationale in relation to innovation funding. The 
onerous application process aside, the firm was successful in securing a grant.  
… whereas before we would have thought we’ll do it to get the grant, over the last 
two years you do it because you think it’s worth doing. Then you apply for the grant 
and if you get it well and good, if you don’t you carry on anyway [E1.2_In]. 
The experience of one adolescent company in respect of EI requirements for matching 
funding was mixed. The stabilisation fund, launched in 2009, was designed to support viable 
but vulnerable businesses during in the economic downturn. Linked to a business plan, it 
involved granting preference shares to EI.  
We had a problem with EI stabilisation fund. Their hurdle rate is too high. They 
wanted us to put money aside for five years but we don’t want to tie it up for that 
long. As one of our strategic goals, we want to identify new products that leverage 
our core technology and that will require flexibility.  
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There was some help from EI in the very early days that wasn’t really used properly; 
it was the old grant syndrome. We manage that very tightly now. [E2.2_Dr] 
A mature firm director alludes to reliance on agency support in securing funding to bolster 
the company’s finances in light of a significant drop in earnings due to the recession.  
We will be talking to EI about their stabilisation fund. There is a variety of financing 
options available and our accountants are working on that but probably not as hard 
as I’d like them to be. We’d love this to be all self-funding but it isn’t. [E3.1_Mc] 
Self-Funding and Retained Earnings  
Self-funding was reported as the principal source of innovation and working capital among 
engineering informants and this was generalised in the survey. There is a significant and 
positive relationship between self-funded innovation and mature firms [X² (4, n=36), =9.730, 
p=<.045], with all respondents indicating the high impact of self-funding, against 62 and 58 
per cent ratings for young and adolescent firms respectively.  
Interview extracts underline the prevalence of self-funding, with some informants 
suggesting it as preferred - if not exclusive. Contract research revenue (e.g. prototype design 
and build) represents an increasing source of capital and input into product and process 
innovation. Two of the three mature firms interviewed claimed to have had no recourse to 
external capital: both expressed steadfast commitment to self-funding having learned from 
experience that financial independence was core to survival.  
We’ve had no agency funding. We fund innovation from cash-flow. It’s been that 
way since the start. It’s a strong business that way. There is a bit of cash there in the 
background. The premises were bought and paid for. We lived through the 80s, so 
we’ve seen this before. We’ve been with the same bank since 1966 [E3.3_Lmh]. 
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Bank Funding  
There was no significant difference with respect to age and bank funding. With few 
exceptions, participants reported low impact on innovation, associating banks with 
overdraft facilities and the provision of general services rather than risk finance. As reflected 
by the managing director of one adolescent firm, the majority of SME relationships with 
their banks are based on routine services (Binks & Ennew, 1997).  
…we’ve quite good relationships with our bank. I suppose if you hadn’t their support 
you’d be in trouble. …. We’re a positive cash flow company so we wouldn’t be using 
an overdraft, we’d only be using it as a lot of people would use their bank. [E2.1_Bel] 
The MD of an adolescent firm describes his position on self-funding, and how its relatively 
stable financial situation underpins a broadly supportive banking relationship:  
In relation to the banks, we are in a relatively good position. We didn’t go out and 
buy a company. There’s no millstone around my neck. We have small stock, no 
major debt. The bank has helped us with funding which is adequate at the moment 
but if we were in a different situation, they would be very difficult. Historically we 
have been self-funded all along. The growth has been organic and external funding 
has not been particularly critical to that. [E2.2_Dr] 
While the research depicts innovation as principally fuelled by retained earnings, the 
working and risk capital constraints reported by young firms suggest significant system 
weaknesses in bank funding, compounded by state agency restraint. Adolescent and mature 
firms perceive no real alternative to self-funding while external funds dilute autonomy. This 
raises questions as to whether growth prospects are subject to the retained earnings trap 
(Walsh, Niosi, & Mustar, 1995).  
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6.2.3 Age-Innovation Dimensions 
This section provides an assessment of innovation types and sources, partnership and 
intellectual property dimensions. Innovation modes vary significantly across the sector. 
Many mature firms are engaged in modifying their portfolios to address product and 
customer lifecycle maturity, leveraging core competencies and technologies to develop new 
applications and services. Productisation of services featured across age groups in the drive 
to maximise revenue and competitiveness through customer preference. Services previously 
provided gratis are being monetised. In some cases, prototype and design services provide 
opportunities for downstream product development and manufacturing sub-supply.  
Innovation mode 
The survey indicated a significant relationship between adolescent firms and the 
introduction of products and services already available from competitors. In other cases, 
novel applications were designed based on existing or, less frequently, new platforms. 
Instances of proactive innovation were driven by problems with existing portfolios or efforts 
to address unbalanced revenue profiles. For companies operating in mature markets, 
informants referred to addressing over-dependence on key clients through product and 
process innovation, largely through productivity improvements, lean innovation 
programmes and maximising automation through investment in machinery and training.  
Collaboration 
With some exceptions, engineering firms did not perceive their suppliers as active 
innovation partners, although there was evidence of collaboration on process innovation. 
One young firm had extended its relationship with a UK-based supplier to a partnership 
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offering consulting expertise in return for lead referrals. A mature firm established a similar 
relationship with a UK-based sheet metal supplier including the provision of design services.  
In the area of intellectual property (IP) management, while young firms refer to expense and 
complexity, there is recognition that IP offers additional advantage through branding and 
tax relief. One mature firm planned to engage in offshore production under licence, but the 
design had been released into the public domain and the initiative was withdrawn 
undermining plans to scale overseas production. The survey revealed several significant 
associations between age and innovation. Contingent effects were more prevalent for 
strategy than age cohorts. Table 6-3 summarises the age- innovation contingency analysis.  
Innovation Dimensions Contingency Cohort 
New-to-market products or services before competitors .775  
New-to-firm products or services available from competitors .018** Adolescent+ 
New-to-market processes before competitors .802  
New-to-firm processes already employed by competitors .756  
Developed mainly within the company .014** Adolescent+ 
Developed by company with other companies/ institutions .461  
Developed mainly by other companies or institutions  .148  
Innovated through advanced machinery, equipment or software .093* Young- 
New or significantly changed company strategy  .805  
New/improved systems for information, knowledge & skills  .295  
Major changes to the organisation of work within the firm  .972  
New/significant changes in relations with other firms/institutions .466  
Advanced management techniques (e.g. Lean)  .854  
Significant changes in how product is offered to the market  .681  
New/significantly changed sales or distribution methods  .460  
New/significantly changed marketing methods  .444  
Apply for a patent .525  
Register and industrial design .484  
Register a trademark .853  
Claim copyright .746  
Patenting to prevent duplication/facilitate licensing .111  
Patenting to deliver royalties .403  
Registering an industrial design .079* Young- 
Copyrighting/trademarking .074* Adolescent+ 
R&D (in-house or external) .127  
Employees recruited from competing organisations .542  
Employees or contractors qualified to PhD level .372  
Technology licensed from others .205  
Publications or technical meetings  .900  
Reverse engineering & patent disclosures .572  
R&D (in-house or external) .050** Adolescent+ 
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Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 6-3: Engineering SSI Age-Innovation Contingencies 
Figure 6-2 maps SSI fit in terms of significant (95%) positive and negative age contingent 
relationships reported in the survey. Indications of correlation (negative, positive and 
neutral) are identified by dimension and cohort group.  
The data indicates that much innovation focussed on increased productivity and 
differentiation, although profiles varied among firms engaged in producing finished goods 
and those engaged in sub-supply. Firms describe entry into adjacent technology and market 
fields, leveraging the potential to apply existing knowledge and skills and driving operational 
excellence through new production processes and labour-enhancing technologies. A 
significant number of firms described the imperative of redressing overreliance on large 
Employees recruited from competing organisations .558  
Employees or contractors qualified to PhD level .463  
Technology licensed from others .727  
Publications or technical meetings  .453  
Reverse engineering & patent disclosures .131  
Increased range of products/services .488  
Entered new markets or increased market share .110  
Improved quality of products/services .492  
Improved flexibility of production or service provision .390  
Improved capacity of production or service provision .737  
Reduced labour costs per unit output .190  
Reduced materials/energy per unit output .080* Mature+ 
Consolidated range of products/services .306  
Co-operation on any innovation activities in the last 3 years  .503  
Internal to the company .637  
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software .335  
Clients or customers .681  
Competitors or other companies in your sector .410  
Consultants, commercial labs or private R&D organisations .016** Young- 
Industry networks .900  
Government or public research institutes .288  
Higher Education Institutions (recruitment/talent development) .851  
Higher Education Institutions (product/process projects) .693  
EI .267  
InterTrade Ireland .193  
County Enterprise Boards .608  
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customers. Diversification through product development and licensing-in technology were 
among potential alternative sources of revenue cited. 
Servitisation  
As referenced earlier, the impact of the recession on capital expenditure led to design 
services emerging as a new revenue source. Servitisation creates value by adding services to 
product offerings (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1989). In the manufacturing sector, servitisation 
appears to be driven by the parallel emergence of more complex customer demands and 
the need to raise defences against competition (Santamaría , Jesús Nieto, and Miles, 2012), 
particularly from lower cost countries. Manufacturing servitisation has been shown to 
deliver transformative impact on what might otherwise be relatively low value or 
commoditised products. 
Design services and servitisation 
The tendency for software ventures to fund product development through consulting 
revenue emerges as an important and less cited feature of innovation in engineering firms, 
particularly within the mature cohort. Consistent with absorptive capacity developing as a 
by-product of a firm's manufacturing operations (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), initiatives 
include the exploitation of design and prototype opportunities to boost revenues and 
expand income streams, alongside the assurance of standards for OEM partners. The 
sector’s services output appears broadly in line with manufacturing companies across 
Europe, with servitisation levels of approximately 6 per cent (Eurostat, 2009). This contrasts 
with findings that over 25% of cash flow in Irish software firms is generated by services 
(Hogan and Hutson, 2005), largely driven by the need for integration with source data and 
legacy systems.  
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6.2.3.1 Age-Innovation Contingencies 
Among the important associations with respect to innovation type and age were: 
 young firms’ limited tendency to innovate through machinery, equipment or 
software acquisition 
 young firms’ difficulty seeking advice on registering industrial designs 
 adolescent firm propensity to introduce new-to-firm products or services already 
available from competitors 
 adolescent firm tendency to introduce new offerings developed mainly in-company  
 adolescent firms access to advice on copyrighting and trademarks 
 adolescent firm access to in-house and external sources of R&D   
 young firms found consultants, commercial labs and R&D providers of limited import  
 energy and material efficiency innovation were most marked among mature firms 
A significant difference emerged in relation to adolescent firms’ introduction of new-to-firm 
products and services which were already available from competitors [X² (2, n=75), =7.897, 
p=<.018]. Market-based innovations often employ simpler new technologies (Zhou, Kin and 
Tse, 2005) and the preliminary stages of product innovation in Irish SMEs tends to be 
dominated by design and marketing personnel with engineering and production playing a 
secondary role (Roper, 1997). Replication was discussed in interviews to a limited extent, 
while a number of participants described a more disruptive approach aimed at bringing 
simplified versions of more complex products to the market as described by two CEOs:  
We took (waste recycling) bailers and did a Ryan Air on them, we took a ‘no frills’ 
approach….. How cleverly can we build our products? The fewer components we 
have, the quicker and the better we can make it. It’s got to do with the process but 
it’s fundamental to the design. If we don’t design simplicity in, we can’t process 
equipment in the right way. The Germans are masters at over processing. The first 
thing we ask is; can we make the product with 3 or 4 pieces rather than 8 or 10? We 
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can be as good as the benchmark if we cut the waste, by cutting out components 
and PLCs [programmable logic controllers]. Given the level of people operating the 
machinery, it needs to be a button or a lever, it needs to be simple [E2.3_Ma] 
If you take Germany, you would automatically think that they want the latest and 
the most up to date technology. We have been very successful in Germany, because 
a lot of companies are dissatisfied with the units breaking down. That doesn’t mean 
the German companies buying our product wouldn’t be selling a highly sophisticated 
product of their own, but they want a basic solution to do the basic job. [E1.1_Co] 
The MD of an adolescent engineering firm referred to charging for services delivered to 
OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) partners. The firm monetised its existing design 
offering which had previously been provided gratis as a source of differentiation to gain 
‘preferred supplier’ status.  
With the OEMs, we provide a design service and it’s something, taking a look at our 
competition, we are getting better at charging for. Before, it would have been a 
source of differentiation but we think more about it now and we charge for all that 
[E2.2_Dr].  
Allied to replicating competitor offerings, there was a significant positive association in 
respect of adolescent firms relying mainly on in-company capabilities when developing new 
offerings [X² (2, n=69), =8.492, p=<.014]. While supply chain channel partnerships are more 
common, upstream innovation partnerships are rare. Beyond the tendency to craft new 
offerings with customers, proactive collaborations with suppliers, competitors and 
institutions appear infrequent. One adolescent cohort MD described a prospective 
acquisition or partnership strategy for development of complementary offerings, a practice 
not reflected by other informant firms. The company outsourced design and compliance 
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work to compensate for human capital constraints within the system, on a commercial 
rather than a partnership basis.  
Outsourcing (our) design is structured, planned and budgeted. Colm [Project 
Engineering firm offering mechanical design, project management and CE marking] 
has very solid qualifications and competencies. ... At the time we brought Colm in, 
we couldn’t get anybody else with the required skills. He can put bodies into the 
business on an as-needed basis. It’s very flexible – we do pay more for it but at the 
end of the contract we are not obliged to carry forward. The level has reduced 
recently. You can only do so much development. [E2.3_Ma] 
In relation to engineering firms innovating through the acquisition of new machinery, 
equipment or software, there was a difference at the 90% level of confidence in the number 
of young firms reporting not having done so during the reference period [X² (12, n=64), 
=4.75, p=<.093]. This may be due to firms continuing to leverage investments made prior to 
the recession, or lack of investment capital. The MD of one young engineering firm 
described how the bulk of the company’s profits were reinvested in machinery. 
Basically anything the company made over the last five years was ploughed back in. 
We’ve probably spent about five million on machinery over the last ten years and 
that’s mostly CNC (Computer Numerically Controlled) machinery. [E1.2_In] 
Protection of intellectual property was generally perceived as important, and interview data 
indicated that the ease with which firms could obtain protection depended on experience 
levels. Young firms indicated significant difficulty in respect of advice and support on 
industrial design registration [X² (6, n=29), =11.327, p=<.079]. In contrast, adolescent firms 
found it easy to access information on copyrighting and trademarking [X² (6, n=28), =11.507, 
p=<.074]. One young firm MD described the company’s array of protection mechanisms 
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including design copyright, and referred to the disadvantages of patent registration 
exposing it to the threat of reverse engineering.  
A lot of the patents that we have filed are for specific areas of the product, not the 
complete unit. We also have design copyrights on the overall look of the product. In 
1998 we filed one patent …... But one of our competitors figured a way around it and 
since then I don’t file patents for the sake of filing. It educates your competitor; it 
makes it too easy for them, you are handing it to them on a plate. [E1.1_Co] 
Alluding to the difficulty experienced by firms exploring intellectual property protection, a 
young firm MD suggested the need for a ‘one-stop-shop’, including comprehensive 
understanding of the costs and time involved. 
How do you go about it? Who is out there to offer that? You’ll get EI to come in and 
say, we’ll do a bit for you….. If you could get a one-stop shop and get an expert to 
say it will cost you €60k to patent that product. It’s the amount of time you have to 
put into it yourself is the killer. [E1.2_In] 
This may signal the need for improved communication on the supports available from 
organisations such as incubators and EI. The data also indicate the value of learning-by-
doing in regard to leveraging IP. A significant proportion of engineering sector production 
constitutes sub-supply rather than entire value chains of activity, so IP largely rests with 
contracting clients. This has implications for companies choosing to diversify, as 
subcontractors are less likely to carry out R&D, and may lack the market and technical 
competencies to develop original solutions.  
Nearly everything we do is sub-supply. We are manufacturing things that other 
people have designed so patents don’t apply. [E3.2_Pre] 
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Internal and external R&D sources 
Adolescent firms reported finding in-house and external R&D resources easy to access 
during the reference period [X² (8, n=62), =15.533, p=<.050], although there was more 
evidence of development than of research, with many participants indicating that much 
R&D was customer driven or near-market based.  
We are investing about 9% of our turnover through R&D tax credits. We have a 
dedicated R&D team on the premises. When we had 200 people (now 160) we had 
about 40 involved day-to-day in R&D. That could mean new products or improving 
existing products. That doesn’t mean they are all engineers - some are factory floor 
guys, putting it together. People-wise 20% of our employees are dedicated to R&D, 
compared to 10 % of our turnover. R&D is a lot more labour intensive. [E1.1_Co] 
Our R&D budget about 2-3% of turnover. Lean is a separate issue. We have a weekly 
R&D meeting, a structured team and a process that goes with that. [E2.3_Ma] 
R&D is the one thing we’d all love to be doing but it’s kind of up there in plans. There 
are things happening where the guys are, maybe not constantly but occasionally 
trying to reduce cycle times but that’s part of the process. We’ve had an RTI grant, 
we’ve had the productivity improvement fund and we’ve just got the growth fund. 
The RTI grant we got when we got into the automotive game to help us fund the 
engineering time put into manufacturing components because it was new for us, 
there were new methods of machining that we had to learn and experiment with, 
…..it worked out that it was a lot more of our time than we thought so we were 
grateful for the grant. There was a huge amount of work when it started, we had 
test beds and we had fifty different trials. .. we learned a lot from the whole 
experience that enabled us to quote other business, so that was a success. [E2.1_Be] 
In a related area, young firms reported the relatively limited importance of consultants, 
commercial labs and private R&D providers in supporting innovation activities [X² (6, n=48), 
=15.676, p=<.016]. This may be related to their greater focus on near-market development 
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with direct response to customer needs, reducing risk, minimising unknowns and potentially 
allowing them to build retained earnings for future innovation initiatives.  
The foregoing concludes the analysis of age-related contingencies and impacts on 
innovation capacity. The next section analyses the impact of strategic contingencies.  
  
241 | P a g e  
 
6.3 Strategy Contingent Effects  
Having analysed SSI-age contingent effects on firm capacity to innovate, this section 
analyses system dimension fit in line with firms’ strategic aspirations encompassing profit 
maximisation, sales growth, technological superiority, maximising exit value and enterprise 
longevity (Autio et al.,2000). Structural factors are analysed against each cohorts’ stated 
intent. One study of SMEs in the manufacturing industry found that the outcomes of 
business strategies were directly related to the strength of the resource base (Hewitt-
Dundas and Roper, 2000). The research also pointed to industry maturity as an important 
aspect of market structure, which seemed to determine the scope for technology based 
product innovation, a finding which is particularly pertinent to this research, juxtaposing the 
dynamism of the software industry with the relative stability of the manufacturing 
engineering sector. In the wider debate about whether companies are driven by industry or 
firm-specific factors - strategic intent being central to the latter - Mason (1939) points to the 
significant influence of firms’ reactions to the prevailing market. Linked to firm age, Child 
and Kieser (1984) highlight the role of management change when incumbent leadership 
identifies with a development strategy whose relevance may reduce over time. 
6.3.1 Strategy-Skills Dimension 
Table 6-4 summarises the output of the contingency analysis. It indicates only one 
significant contingency at the 90% level.  
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Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 6-4: Engineering SSI Strategy-Skills Contingencies 
6.3.1.1 Strategy-Skills Contingency 
One significant skill contingency emerged: 
 the perceived negative effect of competition for talent with foreign-owned firms 
among those expressing intent to maximise technical superiority   
62 per cent of technology led firms at the 10 per cent level of confidence [X² (16, n=78), 
=24.7, p=<.076] perceive significant competition for talent with the FDI sector compared to 
an average of 41 per cent across all strategy groups. Unlike the software sector where skills 
are more transferable, the engineering sector appears to be battling public perception in 
relation to careers in manufacturing. Rather than competing directly for talent, the limited 
presence of multinationals manufacturing in the sector may act as an impediment to 
educational provision based on the reduced demand for graduates. The correlation of FDI 
talent rivalry with firms seeking to maximise technical superiority may be due to graduates 
who could otherwise contribute to leading-edge innovation in indigenous firms being drawn 
to work, not only for foreign-owned companies, but also in the sectors they dominate 
Skills Strategy Cohort 
Importance to company’s performance 
Technical/Engineering Skills .404  
Business/Commercial Skills .161  
Leadership/General Management Skills  .662  
Ease of filling vacancies in the last three years 
Qualified technical and engineering talent .509  
Qualified business/commercial talent  .282  
Leadership/General management  .181  
Effectiveness of internal/external training/development 
Technical/Engineering .969  
Business/Commercial .412  
Leadership/General Management .135  
Rating impact of Foreign owned multinationals in sector 
Expands skills base through education & training provision  .464  
Increases competition for talent in the sector .076* Technology- 
Increases pool of managerial talent available to the sector  .484  
Expands the domestic customer base .750  
Expands the sector’s lobbying potential  .453  
Dilutes government support for indigenous companies  .441  
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As previously cited, the need to home-grow skills, appears due to the lack of appropriate 
human capital infrastructure and the difficulty firms experience in attempts to integrate 
experienced recruits from multinationals. The dearth of trade skills was perceived to be 
rooted in a growing cultural aversion to manufacturing roles allied to inadequacies in the 
education and training systems. The ‘Making it in Ireland: Manufacturing 2020’ report 
(Forfás, 2013b), outlining the Irish government’s vision for the sector, cites the need to 
address negative perceptions of manufacturing and to promote its inherent career 
potential.  
Public perception aside, demand for trade skills emanates almost uniquely from indigenous 
firms narrowing the prospects available to job seekers. In output terms, foreign-owned 
firms represent a much lower share of the manufacturing category (Forfás, 2013b) with 
consequent dilution of the lobbying power more typical of the software and pharmaceutical 
sectors. One mature engineering firm informant suggested FDI bias on the part of state 
agencies.  
…..what really is annoying is that they put huge effort into the multi-nationals. They 
get premises for them, they give them training and research grants, they help them 
locate markets, and they find subcontractors including people like us who can help 
them, all orientated towards them. Nothing orientated towards companies that are 
actually trying to build locally. [E3_SSM] 
6.3.2 Strategy-Funding Dimensions 
Table 6-5 summarises funding contingencies relative to respondents’ strategic intent. 
System Dimension Contingency Cohort 
Sought external funding  .036** Technology+ 
Funding requests rejected  .058* Technology- 
Business Expansion Scheme  .136  
Business Expansion Scheme Impact  .874  
Angel Investment Access  .392  
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Angel Investment Impact Constant**  
Bank capital access  .329  
Bank capital Impact  .742  
Hire Purchase/Leasing  .301  
Hire Purchase/Leasing Impact  .996  
EI equity .697  
EI equity Impact  .912  
EI Grants (R&D, RTI, Vouchers, FP7, Stabilisation) .057* Growth+ 
Innovation Voucher impact .935  
R&D Funding/RTI Grant impact  .693  
Stabilisation funding impact  .978  
R&D Tax Credits impact  .819  
European Framework impact (e.g. FP7) .583  
InterTrade Ireland impact .536  
Retained Earnings impact  .829  
County Enterprise Board access  .423  
R&D Tax credits access .671  
Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 6-5: Engineering SSI Strategy-Funding Contingencies 
6.3.2.1 Strategy-Funding Contingencies 
Among the important funding associations with respect to strategy were:  
 external funding reliance of firms intent on maximising technical superiority  
 the level of rejection for funding on the part of firms targeting technical superiority 
 the ease with which growth-oriented firms can access EI funding  
A significant difference emerged in the levels of external funding sought among engineering 
strategy cohorts, all those seeking to maximise technical superiority had sought external 
funding [X² (4, n=73), =10.26, p=<.0361]as against approximately 50 per cent across all other 
categories. This may reflect the capital intensity inherent in product and process innovation 
for technologically advanced outputs. This association was underlined by the relationship 
(albeit outside the conventional 95 per cent threshold) between technology-led firms and 
those who had had a request for R&D or broader innovation funding rejected [X² (8, n=78), 
=15, p=<.058]: Thirty per cent of technology-driven respondents had external funding 
requests rejected, against an average rate of 12% across other cohorts.  
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Agency funding is provided by the CEBs, EI and Inter Trade Ireland. The survey indicated 
mixed experience across strategy types: at the 96% significance threshold, 80 per cent of 
growth oriented firms recorded EI grants as accessible [X² (8, n=39), =15.123, p=<.057] 
against an average of 44% across the strategy types.  
One firm obtained assistance from EI in a licensing initiative undertaken to redress the 
effects of the downturn (their largest sub-supply customer equated to 70% of turnover). The 
MD described the onerous procedures associated with grant aid. 
Agency funding I would say, the usual cry you probably hear everywhere is 
accessibility and the amount of paperwork that you need to get it. [E1.2_In] 
Interview participants generally perceived agency funding availability as favourable. In line 
with feedback from the software sector, grants accelerate implementation rather than 
having a gatekeeping effect. Interview extracts are indicative of the general view - that 
innovation projects must meet internal return on investment criteria: if agency funding is 
secured thereafter, that is advantageous but it is not an end in itself. Some accounts suggest 
this was not the case historically.  
In relation to RTI, we probably wouldn’t do as much without the support. The way I 
look at a grant is; if you can’t justify doing it without the grant, don’t do it. I am 
working on one at the minute and they are getting more difficult. [E1.1_Co] 
Finance for us is a matter of self-financing. We invest and write it off every year. We 
get state finance for capital plant. EI funded the lean project – we would not be able 
to run it at the rate we have if state support was not available. [E2.3._Ma] 
We don't do grant harvesting with EI. We did a round of RTI a couple of years ago 
but it's our preference to go it alone. If a project only stands up because of grant aid, 
there's no point. If the business case is strong, we can fund ourselves. [E3.2_Pre] 
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6.3.3 Strategy-Innovation Dimensions 
Strategic aspirations had a more substantial impact than age a number of significant 
relationships emerged. Table 6-6 summarises output from the contingency analysis.  
System Dimensions Contingency Cohort 
Introduction during the last three years   
New-to-market products or services before competitors .208  
New-to-firm products or services available from competitors .530  
New-to-market processes before competitors .291  
New-to-firm processes already employed by competitors .695  
(If yes) Who developed these innovations?   
Developed mainly within the company .044** Longevity+ 
Developed by company with other companies/ institutions .242  
Developed mainly by other companies or institutions  .199  
Innovated through adv. machinery, equipment or software .796  
Organisational or marketing innovation impact    
New or significantly changed company strategy  .471  
New/improved systems for information, knowledge & skills  .754  
Major changes to the organisation of work within the firm .547  
New/significant changes in relations with other firms/institutions .360  
Advanced management techniques (e.g. Lean)  .330  
Significant changes in how product is offered to the market  .483  
New/significantly changed sales or distribution methods  .046** Longevity+ 
New/significantly changed marketing methods .337  
IP protection sought in the reference period    
Apply for a patent .389  
Register and industrial design .237  
Register a trademark .134  
Claim copyright .321  
Ease of obtaining advice on IP protection   
Patenting to prevent duplication/facilitate licensing .455  
Patenting to deliver royalties .405  
Registering an industrial design .115  
Copyrighting/trademarking .043** Profit+ 
Importance of sources of innovation in the reference period   
R&D (in-house or external) .179  
Employees recruited from competing organisations .478  
Employees or contractors qualified to PhD level .627  
Technology licensed from others .580  
Publications or technical meetings  .358  
Reverse engineering & patent disclosures .131  
Ease of access to sources of innovation   
R&D (in-house or external) .730  
Employees recruited from competing organisations .245  
Employees or contractors qualified to PhD level .339  
Technology licensed from others .183  
Publications or technical meetings  .432  
Reverse engineering & patent disclosures .987  
Impact of the innovation activity in the reference period   
Increased range of products/services .263  
Entered new markets or increased market share .622  
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Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and neutral/no effect (ne). 
Table 6-6: Engineering SSI Strategy-Innovation Contingencies 
6.3.4.1 Strategy-Innovation contingencies 
Among the important associations with respect to strategic intent were:  
 the degree to which companies aspiring to longevity developed new products and 
services in-company  
 the positive impact achieved by firms seeking longevity through new or significantly 
changed sales or distribution methods  
 the degree to which firms seeking longevity found InterTrade-Ireland to be 
significant to their innovation activity  
 the ease with which profit seeking firms secured support in relation to copyright 
protection and trademarking  
 the limited impact of industry networks on the innovation activities of profit seekers 
 the low impact of government/public research for profit seekers 
In-house innovation 
Among firms who innovated within the reference period, those seeking longevity were most 
likely to do so independent of other organisations or institutions [X² (4, n=69), =9.793, 
p=<.044], this echoes the EU commission finding that Irish SMEs are mostly inclined to 
Improved quality of products/services .506  
Improved flexibility of production or service provision .811  
Improved capacity of production or service provision .896  
Reduced labour costs per unit output .727  
Reduced materials/energy per unit output .741  
Consolidated range of products/services .603  
Co-operation on any innovation activities  .763  
Importance of the sources to innovation activity   
Internal to your company .793  
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software .776  
Clients or customers .945  
Competitors or other companies in your sector .281  
Consultants, commercial labs or private R&D organisations .360  
Industry networks .088* Profit(-) 
Government or public research institutes .004** Profit(-) 
Higher Education Institutions (recruitment/talent development) .894  
Higher Education Institutions (product/process projects) .831  
Enterprise Ireland .315  
InterTrade Ireland .020** Longevity+ 
County Enterprise Boards .141  
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innovate in-house (EC, 2012, p.9). Cooperation in respect of sales processes and routes to 
market dominated interview discussions. Sales partnerships were prominent whether 
through customers, channels or networking with competitors: but there was scant evidence 
of co-operative product and service innovation. The General Manager of one firm described 
the approach to openness in general.  
We have an independent streak. …. We had a guy who came in and chaired our 
meetings, he was known and trusted. We talked about where we were going and 
how we were going to get there. Perhaps it’s because an accountant owns the 
company, we hold our cards close to our chest. [E3.3_Lmh] 
Further illustrating the company’s independence, despite being listed as an EI client, the 
firm claims to have no relationship with the agency. Another firm’s Business Development 
Director described the company’s position on co-operation while describing his desire to 
work more closely with partners.  
We are not involved in any lobby groups or industry associations, we don’t have the 
time. I would like to see a closer relationship between the likes of ourselves and the 
spinouts from 3rd level. I see a lot of research going on in 3rd level for foreign 
multinationals…. Which is easier – to sell an idea to Intel and they send you a nice 
tax-free royalty cheque every month or to try to set up a business, possibly make 
more and possibly make nothing but employ people and create wealth? [E3.2_Pre]  
The implication is that university researchers prefer to partner with larger firms, in this case 
FDI. In regard to R&D collaboration with the third level sector, the linkages between 
enterprise and academia are few – but the higher incidence of collaboration among foreign 
companies with third level education - both inside and beyond Ireland - is noteworthy 
(Forfás, 2004b, Ramirez et al., 2013). As noted above, individuals may seek to reduce risk by 
partnering with large firms with the prospect of earning royalties as opposed to establishing 
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a start-up. This lends support to the notion that, globalisation strengthens the need for 
national and sectoral innovation policies, rather than reducing it (Edquist, 2011).  
Channel-Process Innovation  
There was a significant and positive association between firms seeking to maximise 
sustainability and the degree of impact achieved by using new or significantly changed sales 
and distribution methods [X² (16, n=58), =26.623, p=<.046]. 75 per cent of firms seeking 
longevity rated such innovation as high impact. A number of firms placed significant 
emphasis on securing effective routes to market. One informant described indirect sales 
channels and how partners offer much greater scale via an agency approach. With limited 
exceptions, suppliers don’t engage in referral due the competitive nature of the market.  
We use feed supplier channels …. There’s not a standard, it’s different for each mill. 
Overseas that will be the main approach. On the scale of it – we’re looking at CB in 
the UK, they’ve got four mills and forty four reps covering that whole area. The mills 
Ireland will have a maximum of six reps, it’s a different scale and we’d be lucky if we 
get a bin out of one rep at a time. ……. They have loose relationships with our 
competitors over there but we have got a competitively priced product and it’s 
unique so we’re quite optimistic. [E3.1_Mca] 
Finding good distributors that we can get insurance cover and a credit limit on is 
key. All our sales are through distribution. Even if something comes in directly, we 
fulfil indirectly, you couldn’t run it any other way. [E2.3_Mac] 
Copyright Protection and Trademarking 
There was a significant difference between the perceptions of different strategy groups on 
the ease with which firms could secure copyright protection and trademarking during the 
reference period [X² (9, n=28), =17.360, p=<.043]. 71 per cent of profit seekers reported 
advice as highly accessible. Interviews indicated that firms who engaged routinely in IP 
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protection had established relationships with experts, and were highly selective about the 
types of patents they sought in order to avoid exposing blueprints to their competitors.  
Industry Networks 
There was significant association, at the 10 per cent level, between firms seeking longevity 
and network engagement, with 60 per cent reporting the positive impact of networks on 
innovation [X² (16, n=48), =24.051, p=<.088]. The significance of distribution/supply chain 
networks was widely referenced with regard to growing sales internationally with less 
reference to product-based network collaboration as noted earlier. One MD suggested a 
strong preference for building and managing his own network - largely oriented to 
generating leads. This was mirrored by a software informant who engaged primarily in 
networks focussed on customers rather than communities of practice.  
We don’t bother with the Chamber of Commerce and stuff like that, we make our 
own contacts. We have a good network of technical sales guys in Ireland and around 
the world. [E1.3_Dal] 
MD reflected on participation in a regional network addressing sector-specific issues and 
also to partnership with educational institutions.  
Every 8 weeks there are about 6 companies that meet in Mullingar, we’ve been 
meeting for about the last 10 years. ……It’s hard to know when to engage, you 
should not just engage when you are going to get something out of it. …. you never 
know what’s going to come of those relationships, you always learn something. The 
company works with Engineers Ireland and with IEEF to a limited degree. Also DIT 
Bolton St. features a lot. I forged very strong relationships with them. We also have 
strong relationships with TCD, Harper Adams and Loughborough. [E2.2_Dr] 
The MD of an adolescent firm commented on her firm’s unofficial network membership:  
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The Irish Medical Device Association (IMDA) - we’re not officially members but I 
think we’re included because we’re an EI client. They are very strong. Boston 
Scientific is part of the IMDA and they really push on that front. That is an 
organisation worth keeping in with, I went to the last thing they had …….. and made 
a few contacts and kind of just figuring out who’s who in Galway and what’s 
happening and the smaller companies. It’s good for that type of thing but it’s an 
unofficial network as far as we’re concerned. [E2.1_Bel] 
Government and Public Research Institutes 
There was a significant association relative to the impact of government and public research 
institutes on innovation, with 80 per cent of profit seeking firms perceiving low impact [X² 
(16, n=48), =34.897, p=<.004], and firms seeking longevity recording the highest levels of 
dissatisfaction. Given the largely science-led nature of public research in Ireland, such 
engagement would primarily be centred on third level institutions. The interview data allude 
to the long lead times associated with third level research, and the perceived lack of fit 
between the work of Science Foundation Ireland and the engineering sector. The interview 
extracts support the survey output. 
People who need prototypes go to universities or colleges and it takes forever to get 
anything done because they work six months in the year …. They’re starting to turn 
away from universities to commercial people like us. The thing about colleges is if 
you’re not fashionable, they don’t want to know. It’s not leading edge stuff but as 
far as we are concerned, design work puts food on the table [E1.2_Ini]. 
Coming back to agencies like SFI, we had a presentation within our (Government 
appointed) Enterprise Group and I asked the question; ‘if you take our business,  
could you give me the name of someone within SFI that I could at least communicate 
with to understand whether they are doing anything that might help us?‘ But the 
reply was ‘why would you need to talk to anyone within SFI?’ And I said; ‘is it not 
there to help us?’ When we probed further, we discovered there are very few people 
within EI who know what goes on there. [E1.1_Com] 
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This coincides with prior research emphasising the lack of pre-competitive research in the 
engineering disciplines (IEEF, 2011) and the notion that frontier research in Ireland is more 
likely to serve the needs of the FDI population (Ramirez et al., 2013). 
InterTrade Ireland  
Firms seeking longevity found InterTrade-Ireland to be a highly impactful contributor to 
innovation [X² (12, n=48), =24.033, p=<.020]. Interviewees ranked its capability 
development programmes highly in the technical/production area. Management 
development in general was seen as offering potential to counter reactivity among 
informant companies. In both contexts, InterTrade Ireland’s Fusion programme was 
perceived as being of significant importance. One firm aiming for both fast growth and 
longevity refers to Fusion in the company’s context.  
We are availing of the Fusion Programme through InterTrade Ireland. We took on a 
graduate just over two years ago for Lean Manufacturing and that has worked out 
very well. The programme is over and that graduate is with us fulltime. We have 
done a second programme focussed on Design for Manufacturing and Assembly 
(DFMA) and that graduate will start soon. I have found the Fusion programme very 
good; it is run in conjunction with the University of Ulster. I wouldn’t have employed 
a graduate this year otherwise. We would have continued on with our product 
development and incremental development on that slant. ….. I don’t just want to 
invest in the programme for eighteen months; I want that person to stay on 
afterwards. In reality it is [still] home growing people. [E1.1_Com] 
This outcome reflects outcomes of similar innovation programmes in the Netherlands. The 
link to knowledge centres, and the percentage of turnover invested in R&D were found to 
be the most important factors for innovation in Dutch manufacturing SMEs (Keizer et al., 
2002).   
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6.4 Summary of Findings - Engineering SSI 
The significant relationships mediating system fit according to the age and strategy cohorts 
are summarised below. With respect to age, young engineering firms perceive the SSI as 
offering the least best fit, compared to their adolescent and mature counterparts. With 
regard to strategic aspiration, those firms aspiring to maximise technical superiority 
perceive poorest fit with the SSI. 
Young firms  
The survey identifies positive associations in respect of leadership recruitment and training 
however the balance of the system fit for young firms is negative, including rejection of 
funding requests, restricted access to EI grants and bank capital. This cohort delivers lower 
levels of innovation through advanced manufacturing technology, and perceives the degree 
of access to advice on registering industrial designs as inadequate. Engagement with 
consultants, commercial labs and sources of R&D is also sub-optimal. 
Adolescent firms 
Adolescent firms indicate positive and significant system fit in respect of new-to-firm 
products and services, access to advice on copyrighting and trademarking and R&D 
resources. These variables underline the association between new products, the 
development effort required to select, create and launch offerings and the parallel need to 
secure property rights. As represented by informants, this cohort appears to have engaged 
to a greater extent in business change including succession planning.  
Mature firms 
There were significant associations in respect of funding innovation through retained 
earnings and process innovation outcomes. The association between maturity and 
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innovation retained earnings funding is consistent with interview data: in the context of 
challenges to secure external funding through earlier stages of the company lifecycle, self-
funding may be a product of necessity and philosophy in parallel.  
The significant positive association with process innovation aligns with the theory 
suggesting this type of innovation increases with firm and product lifecycle maturity 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). However, it contrasts with findings of generally low levels 
of process innovation in the LMT sector (Heidenreich, 2009) and also in the Irish high tech 
sector (Jordan and O’Leary, 2011), which indicates that older businesses are less likely than 
younger ones to introduce new processes.  
Firms seeking to maximise profitability 
Profit oriented firms indicate significant negative correlation with network participation and 
government/public research institutes as innovation sources. The qualitative data revealed 
some scepticism about the value of networks not directly related to sustaining or securing 
sales revenue. Engineering firm experience with regard to government and public research 
institutes, consistent with the findings of Ramirez et al. (2013), suggests that third level 
institutions lack urgency and that Science Foundation Ireland and related institutes are not 
designed to serve the needs of the sector. A positive relationship exists in respect of access 
to copyrighting and trademarking advice, which may indicate superior leverage of property 
rights to secure market preference and to assert competitive differentiation.  
Firms seeking to maximise sales growth 
The cohort aspiring to maximise sales indicate positive correlation with regard to accessing 
EI grants. Given the assumptions surrounding revenue and jobs growth, it might be 
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speculated that the business and market plans prepared to support EI funding requests are 
viewed positively in line with the agency’s qualification criteria.  
Firms seeking to maximise technical superiority 
The survey indicates a negative relationship between firms aspiring to technological 
leadership, competition with FDI for talent and rejection of external funding applications. 
The former may be linked to the need for advanced engineering skills. The FDI sector’s high 
tech orientation, along with superior remuneration and career paths, may divert high 
performers away from the indigenous manufacturing sector.  
Firms seeking to maximise value for eventual exit/acquisition 
Exits are not a feature of the mechanical engineering sector: no significant associations were 
found. This is consistent with industry norms and qualitative research output.  
Firms seeking to maximise the longevity of the firm 
Firms aspiring to longevity identified positive relationships in respect of support from 
InterTrade Ireland, and also the impact of process innovation on sales and distribution 
methods. These firms also indicated positive correlation with innovations produced mainly 
within the company – as noted earlier, the in-company orientation correlates with 
informant input and extant research.  
This concludes the empirical analysis for the engineering sector. The concluding chapter 
presents aggregate analysis of findings in relation to both sectors in line sectoral 
dimensions, contingency variables and the frameworks employed as a basis for the 
research.  
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Concluding 
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7.0 Conclusion 
Since its inception, the National Systems of Innovation (NSI) concept has evolved to 
recognise the territorial, technological and sectoral heterogeneity of institutional 
interactions. While the concept has adapted to reflect meso variants, including the sectoral 
systems of innovation (SSI) framework applied here, it remains agnostic about firm-level 
contingencies exposing an important gap in our understanding of factors that potentially 
impede innovation. The findings of this research offer a number of important insights into 
how firm contingencies affect system fit, given that the ability to acquire and systematise 
resources are known to be significant predictors of growth.  
This chapter outlines the key theoretical, management and policy implications of the thesis. 
It describes the major contributions of the research and notes that in some instances the 
absence of statistical support for a theoretical relationship in one sector represents a 
significant observation on system fit in another (see Table 7.0), supporting the adoption of a 
dual-sector approach. The chapter concludes by noting the primary limitations of the study, 
potential opportunities for future research and central contributions to theory and policy. 
Arguments for more functional analysis of SSIs encompassing the parallel emergence and 
transformation of firms and institutions have had limited impact on the theoretical debate 
thus far. Responding to demands for studies adopting a problem-solving approach to the 
design of sectoral policy (Edquist, 2005; 2011), this research advocates micro-level analysis. 
It also seeks to combine institutional theory with strategic choice theory insofar as internal 
factors are known to be more important determinants of success than external variables 
(Acs et al., 2014; Hoffman et al., 1998).  
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Integrating the SI, firm age and strategy literature, a framework was developed to capture 
the regulating influence of firm-level variables on system fit. Analysis of the results indicates 
empirical support for adaptation of the current framework. Insights developed into the 
impact of age and strategic aspiration, an area not subject to prior examination; represent a 
valuable contribution to our knowledge of SSI fit. The framework proposed (Figure 7-0) 
suggests that improvements can be achieved in capacity and performance by examining the 
effect of contingencies on key system dimensions, with important implications for theory 
and policy. The research also signposts the need for more research to establish firm-level 
variables that may regulate system fit e.g. firm size, R&D expenditure and export intensity. 
 
Figure 7-0: Proposed Micro-Level SSI Contingency Framework 
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7.1 Firm Contingencies – System Dimensions and Fit 
Despite longstanding theoretical and practical focus on SME innovation by academics and 
policy makers, the degree and effects of interaction between firm-level and system-level 
variables remain unclear. As such, increasing awareness of the micro conditions that 
promote positive interaction with the SSI represents a valuable contribution. The framework 
assessed how previously unexamined associations regulate fit. The results indicate that the 
relationship between firm age, strategic aspiration and SSI dimensions is significant in 
respect of a number of measures.  
Virtually all theories about organisations presuppose some process of adjustment over time. 
Just as the institutional infrastructure supporting start-ups is likely to prove unproductive 
for adolescent and mature organisations, the resources that support a venture’s survival are 
completely different from those required for technology leadership. In parallel with growing 
emphasis on the temporal aspects of evolutionary processes within organisations, there is 
growing recognition of significant difference in the strategic direction of high-growth and 
non-growth firms suggesting that policy makers should adopt a more adaptive mind-set 
with regard to age and strategic orientation. 
While the dynamics influencing growing firms have not been fully understood, this research 
shows skills and training, funding, innovation sources and processes to be among the most 
important resources in designing environments for innovation. Within the wide range of 
variables analysed, these dimensions emerged as the most significant in correlation with 
firm age and strategy. Table 7-0 below provides an overview of significant positive and 
negative associations and demonstrates important patterns for selected cohorts. 
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 Contingency Age Strategic Intent 
 System Dimension 
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Leadership/General 
Management availability 
 .03 **       
Leadership/ Management 
Training access 
.052*        
Leadership/Management 
training effect 
.072*        
FD
I P
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n
ce
 
FDI Expands skills base   .008**         
Increases competition for 
talent 
  .005**   .046**   
FDI expands lobbying 
potential  
 .02**       
FDI Dilutes govt. support     .077*  .076*   
Fu
n
d
in
g 
Sought external funding      0.064*   
Access to angel investment  0.048**        
Business expansion scheme       .083*  
Bank capital    0.083*    .010*  
Venture capital    0.036**(ne)      
Enterprise Ireland grants  0.053*       
Innovation vouchers  0.079* 
(ne) 
      
EI stabilisation funding   0.049**      
Retained earnings 0.068*        
EU Framework (FP7) funding       0.091*   
Funding requests rejected .016**     .058*   
Access to bank capital .080*        
Access to EI Grants .083*    .057*    
Impact of retained earnings    .045**      
In
n
o
va
ti
o
n
 T
yp
es
/S
o
u
rc
e
s/
Su
p
p
o
rt
s 
Importance of customers  0.005**        
HEIs (product/process)     0.004**    
New-to-firm prods/services 
available from competitors 
 .018**       
Dev. mainly in-company  .014**      .044** 
Innovated via advanced 
machinery, equip or software 
.093*        
Access to industrial design 
registration advice 
.079*        
Copyrighting trademarking 
advice 
 .074*  .043**     
Access to R&D resources  .050**       
Materials/energy innovation   .080*      
Import of consultants, 
commercial labs, private R&D 
.016**        
Import of networks source    .088*     
Govt./public research source     .004**     
InterTrade Ireland support        .020** 
P
ro
ce
ss
 New/significantly changed 
sales/ distribution  
   0.035**    046** 
Improved production 
capacity or service provision 
       0.027** 
Key: Significant at 95%** and 90%*probability: Positive+, negative (-) and no effect (ne). Software 
Engineering – diagonal up border  
Table 7-0: Overview of contingencies 
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Age cohort – Patterns of System Fit 
While young engineering firms recorded positive perceptions in respect of access to and 
effects of training and development, the survey exhibits predominantly weak fit for funding, 
innovation sources and supports for the dual-sector cohort. The adolescent cohort indicated 
mainly positive system fit with regard to access to copyrighting, trademarking and R&D 
resources in the case of the engineering and skills availability and FDI presence in the 
software sector. This may reflect a degree of age-related viability. The mature software 
cohort indicated poor fit in terms of FDI contention for talent, bank capital and venture 
capital availability, however as might be expected, EI stabilisation funds were positively 
correlated – having been largely designed to support mature companies. The mature 
engineering cohort indicated positive fit vis-à-vis the use of retained earnings and 
materials/energy innovation output. 
Strategic intent cohort – Patterns of System Fit 
Engineering firms intent on building longevity demonstrated positive fit in respect of in-
house innovation, support from InterTrade Ireland and new or significantly changed sales 
and distribution methods. The latter was positively correlated for software firms seeking to 
maximise profits whereas engineering firms in this cohort perceived predominantly poor fit.    
Significant regulating effects relating to funding, human capital and innovation types and 
sources are discussed in more detail below.  
7.1.1 Funding 
Deficient access to external funding is frequently cited as the most significant barrier to 
innovation. Investment is heavily influenced by financial sector developments, in particular, 
the limited availability of bank and risk finance. Research indicates that SME access to non-
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bank sources of finance is too low and that this is particularly detrimental to the 
development of Irish SMEs (OECD, 2013). Working capital and cash flow also present 
challenges, as small firms are often compelled to accept extended payment terms.  
The positive relationship between the reinvestment of profits and firm age indicates 
increased reliance on internal equity as firms mature. Retained earnings and financial slack 
are shown to play a significant role in funding firm growth. In a study of capital structure 
over the firm lifecycle, La Rocca, La Rocca and Cariola (2011) found that debt is key to 
funding early-stage businesses in a ‘bank-oriented country’ (p.107), while mature firms 
rebalance their capital structure by substituting debt for internal capital. This profile is 
replicated across both sectors in the current research. However, access to debt finance is 
constrained among young firms, reinforcing the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) 
argument; it is also consistent with Boswell’s (1973) reference to financial institutions’ ‘in-
built allergy’ (p.193) to infant firms, given their standard requirement for balance sheets and 
trading accounts for a three to five-year timeframe. An adolescent software firm director 
recounted a bank’s reluctance to provide overdraft facilities until the firm reached 
profitability – ‘… there’s no bank funding. They’ll give us an overdraft now when we are 
profitable, but they wouldn’t give it to us when we needed it’. [S2.1_Vs] 
Software funding  
Firms in the computer software and services sector are known to be doubly encumbered in 
raising finance, due to the intangibility of their assets in conjunction with their age profile. 
Information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection characterise research on high-
tech funding. Three observations are particularly noteworthy in relation to age. For mature 
firms, the EI Stabilisation Fund (designed to support viable, vulnerable businesses during the 
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downturn) had a significant positive effect (p=<.005), whereas venture capital was perceived 
to have no effect (p=<.036) on the cohort, perhaps indicating reduced appetite among 
equity investors to fund established companies.  
Relative to the needs of young software firms, restricted access to angel funds was 
significantly correlated (p=<.048). As might be anticipated, early-stage firms expressed 
similar constraint in respect of retained earnings (p=<.068). These findings reinforce the 
general understanding that resources assume greater importance in young firms. However, 
it is also apparent that liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) limits those same firms in 
predicting resource requirements, amplifying moral hazard. As the director of a young 
software firm observed, ‘We had €7m by drip feed. It has been scary at times. At the outset, 
we were too optimistic in our forecasting’ [S1.0_VS]. In the same vein, another young firm 
MD commented in relation to fundraising: ‘The feedback was that we were too early and 
needed to establish a customer base. In reality I’m very happy that we didn't get funding 
three years ago….. We would not have achieved the targets that we had set out we would be 
in a very different place now’ [S1.1_Az]. These associations, in combination with testimony 
from interviews, suggest potential for management development and improved financial 
acumen. 
With regard to the impact of strategic intent on software funding fit, access to bank capital 
(<.010), and to a lesser extent Business Expansion Scheme funding (<.083), were significant 
and positive for those companies seeking to exit. This implies a preference for financial 
autonomy on the part of such firms, while amplifying the need for debt funding options. 
In keeping with the experience of firms in the engineering sector, software firms aspiring to 
technology leadership were significantly correlated with applications for external funding 
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(<.064). Moreover, a modest positive correlation (<.091) with access to European 
Framework (FP7) funding among the technology-led software cohort was not reflected in 
the engineering sector. Pre-competitive research in engineering disciplines is not well 
established and researchers are known to be less motivated by the challenges of low-
technology firms. This aligns with the high-tech orientation of FP7 and the parallel focus of 
the research community. Access to retained earnings among those aspiring to technology 
leadership pointed to constraint (<.068), suggesting that in the absence of broader private 
sector funding, options for firms seeking scale remain narrow.  
Engineering funding  
The predominance of self-funding in the engineering sector contrasts with the capital 
structure of the software sector, which is often associated with external shareholders 
seeking early returns. Contrary to the position in the software sector, there was no evidence 
of public equity investment. European policy makers recognise the importance of promoting 
risk capital and liquid equity markets to help high-tech companies develop (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002), but this is absent for manufacturing which is more capital intensive. The 
field data suggest that while liquidity constraints inhibit innovation, the position is mitigated 
by retained earnings. In common with their European peers, Irish-owned SMEs cite myriad 
difficulties raising finance for capital investment both before and since the 2008 financial 
crisis. A recent government report setting out the potential for Irish manufacturing (Forfás, 
2013a) outlines the funding position and reflects significant dependence on external finance 
due to capital intensity:  
For manufacturing, … capital investment is not a luxury; it is inextricably linked with 
business development and growth. Manufacturing CEOs cite unavailability of 
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finance as a genuine constraint to the future development of the sector in Ireland 
(p.x).  
In most cases, engineering firms grow organically and do not seek external capital, beyond 
significant plant and equipment acquisition. This may have negative long-term 
consequences, as economic growth can be constrained by overreliance on internal funds. 
Analysis of the engineering funding dimension resulted in a number of significant age 
associations. The findings indicated particular constraint for young engineering firms. In 
common with many countries, lack of early-stage finance consistently emerges as a 
challenge with firms forced to rely on internal funds for innovation. Young engineering 
enterprises also demonstrated poorest fit, based on rejection of funding applications 
(p=<.016), somewhat limited access to EI grant aid (p=<.083) and absence of angel 
investment (p=<.000). The latter is consistent with slower rates of return in LMT sectors. As 
one financial sector informant commented, ‘time to money is too drawn out in traditional 
manufacturing’ (DP_1.0). In contrast, mature firms indicated significant correlation in terms 
of the positive impact of retained earnings on innovation capacity (p=<.045). This suggests 
an accumulation of earnings by owners whose firms are successful enough to survive to 
middle-age. It is also consistent with prior findings that equity and debt funding provided by 
principal owners increase as firms move into middle and old age (Berger and Udell, 1998).  
The MD of one mature firm commented in relation to external funding: ‘We’ve had no 
agency funding. We fund innovation from cash flow. It’s been that way since the start. It’s a 
strong business was a result’ [E3.3_Lmh]. While financial autonomy may appear positive, as 
referenced above, it signals a potential revenue trap, given that retained earnings are 
generally insufficient to finance significant technology development. Bootstrapping R&D 
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tends to confine initiatives to those that generate short-term returns – firms, by necessity, 
prioritise development over research and, as a potential consequence, follow the market 
rather than lead it.  
With respect to strategy, engineering firms in the technology leadership cohort who sought 
external funding were significantly correlated (p=<.036), as was rejection of those 
applications (p=<.058). This is likely to be symptomatic of high rates of capital intensity 
compounded by protracted returns, as referenced above. Contrary to the earlier finding of 
restricted access to EI funding for young firms, those engineering firms claiming aspiration 
to growth indicated significant correlation (p=<.057) in respect of ease of access to grant 
aid. This advocates qualification criteria which align agency goals with growth metrics.    
Theoretical contribution 
While a number of the research findings align with extant theory, others suggest the need 
for theory development. The potential inherent in theorising the impact of firm 
contingencies on funding, and the likely utility of a diagnostic approach which takes much 
greater account of firm age and strategy, could inform practice and policy. The research 
shows that young firms report consistent difficulty in accessing formal sources of finance – a 
situation replicated across a range of countries (e.g. Lawless et al., 2013; Westhead and 
Storey, 1997). Evidence underscores capital market imperfections which preclude small 
firms from raising sufficient funds to support R&D. From a system perspective, these 
components are considered at a macro-meso level, but little focus is afforded to the role of 
firm-level dynamics. 
Significantly, the challenge to economic growth posed by mature firms’ overreliance on 
retained earnings, coupled with the funding constraint experienced by young firms and 
267 | P a g e  
 
those aspiring to technology leadership, would benefit from more detailed analysis such 
that inhibiting factors could be calculated and addressed. Specifically, tests and remedies for 
the finance-related liability of smallness (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983), newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) and obsolescence or senescence (Sorenson and Stuart, 2000) could 
advance theory within the SSI domain. 
In light of negative findings in relation to external funding, grant aid and retained earnings 
signalled by firms aspiring to technology leadership, greater understanding of how 
technology-led strategy is crafted, funded and executed by SMEs is warranted.     
Managerial implications 
While the availability of external investment is seen to assuage liabilities of newness in start-
ups, the funding lacuna for young firms exerts persistent pressure on growth prospects and, 
when allied to the absence of seed funding, acts as a barrier to later rounds of investment. 
This links to the challenge for SMEs in that the problems encountered and the skills 
necessary to deal with them change as firms grow, and thus the ability to anticipate and 
manage issues is one of central importance to on-going development.  With respect to SME 
practitioners, it could be argued, in line with the findings of Cressy and Olofsson (1997), that 
improved capacity for management and strategy formulation will be central to the future 
availability and subsequent management of funding. Survival prospects significantly depend 
on managements’ ability to adapt strategy to changes in the environment (Geroski, 1995). 
Where such skills are lacking, management development should be afforded priority.  
Offering a somewhat uncharacteristic assessment of the funding landscape, the CEO of one 
adolescent software company suggested that the funding system is adequate; the only non-
engineer among all of the software executives interviewed portrayed a lean approach to 
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business start-up with significant emphasis on business model fit. ‘I’ve never got an investor 
and I never would ask an investor for money without having a business model working. The 
business model is the key’ [S2.3_ Gt]. Extending beyond the realm of funding, however 
central to return on investment, this offers some reinforcement of the merits of 
management development allied to a theme that emerged in this research relative to hybrid 
engineering commercial skills. The development of technologies that do not have a viable 
business model presents a significant risk to sustainable innovation outcomes.   
Policy implications 
In addition to the near universal recommendation of increased funding, the research points 
to three parallel routes to releasing bottlenecks: first, a coordinated approach to 
management development; second and relatedly, attraction of investors based on desirable 
investment opportunities and third, leveraging grant and investment aid through a 
transparent system of funding that ties grant approval to stages of commercialisation.  
One source of growing debate is that successful entrepreneurial activity attracts funding, 
and not vice versa (Kao, 2009; Kreft & Sobel, 2005). Extending the previous theme of 
prioritising management development, this implies that policy should focus on creating an 
environment which is attractive to high-potential entrepreneurs, rather than attracting 
venture funding per se. While government and VC funds are typically associated with 
financing innovation in the high-tech sector, ambitious software programmes introduced by 
the EU Commission and national governments have been shown to have a limited effect on 
the European software industry (Mowery, 1999). Results for the Irish software sector in 
respect of top-line revenue growth are similarly disappointing. With regard to the 
development of the funding system, the role of policy makers in diagnosing firm-level 
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perspectives spanning age, managerial autonomy and strategic aspiration appears merited. 
The alternative would be to suggest that agencies and policy makers should assume the 
resources and expertise of venture capitalists and investors; however, requisite funding and 
acumen may be in short supply.    
In the absence of significant policy initiatives, evidence from interviews indicates that firms 
in both sectors employ bootstrapping allied with the sale of professional services to 
counteract the lack of financial slack. Where retained earnings are insufficient to fund the 
development of leading technologies, public sector funding represents one short-term 
option to plug the gap. However, firms seeking such funding would benefit from a more 
transparent, if not directive, application and evaluation regime. The EU Horizon 2020 
programme contains many of the elements of the acclaimed SBR programme for US 
technology SMEs. The programme is structured in three phases: financing exploration of the 
technical feasibility of an idea or technology, proof of concept, pre-prototyping and the 
evaluation of the potential for commercialisation to support the move from the laboratory 
into the marketplace (Autio et al., 2014). Given that state agencies are charged with the 
administration of Horizon 2020, the lessons learned from the deficiencies of FP7 and the 
positive outcomes of the SBR programme might filter through to other channels. This 
behoves management acumen and development, parallel to that suggested at the firm 
level, on the part of state agencies. 
Financial and human capital are recognised as being pivotal to innovation. Following analysis 
of the funding contingencies, the next section addresses significant associations in respect 
of firm contingencies and skills.  
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7.1.2 Human Capital 
Knowledge is recognised as the most fundamental resource in the modern economy; 
moreover, it is clearly linked to skills and innovation. Penrose (1959) interpreted growth as 
an outcome of a firm’s entrepreneurial and managerial knowledge capacity.   
The systemic effect of education is already well established. This research suggests the need 
for more detailed diagnosis of the nature and variety of skills needed alongside more 
business-oriented third-level support for the technical and commercial research needs of 
SMEs. It is important to analyse the skills necessary for development, as well as the balance 
between pure and applied research. Much of the narrative in this domain has a scientific 
rather than a commercial emphasis, and it would be beneficial to develop a shared 
understanding among policy makers, state agencies and educational institutions as to how 
SME-based R&D, as distinct from micro firm and large-scale enterprise R&D, is constituted in 
relation to the types of skills needed to support its various facets.   
FDI and general management-level observations are particularly noteworthy in respect of 
human capital. Relative to the positive and negative impacts of FDI, the adolescent software 
cohort recognised a complementary role in respect of expanding the skills base and lobbying 
capacity. By contrast, mature software firms and those aspiring to technology leadership, in 
both the engineering and software sectors, identified contention for talent as a significant 
constraint. With regard to leadership roles, these were seen to exert a positive impact on 
performance in adolescent software firms, whereas young engineering firms perceived ease 
of recruitment as well as ease of access to management training and development.  
The effects of FDI, many of which were unanticipated prior to this research, are analysed 
separately below. 
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Software – human capital 
Human capital is critically important to the competitiveness of the software sector globally – 
most notably in respect of development personnel. It is also recognised that software skills 
are a vital dimension of systemic competitiveness across other sectors, including 
manufacturing systems, medical devices, healthcare, green tech and financial services. 
Beyond development skills, informants observed the need for hybrid technical and 
commercial aptitude.  
The historical shortage of skills has been identified as an impediment to the development of 
domestic software industries throughout Europe. More recently, the shortage of skills in 
Ireland, including the growing trend towards off-shore production, has been reported 
(Fitzgerald, Lenihan, Lopez-Gomez, & O'Sullivan, 2014). Scarcity of talent is likely to depress 
the potential for sustainable growth at affordable salary levels. Such is the dearth of supply, 
that 55 per cent of demand for technically qualified ICT employees in Ireland is currently 
met by foreign nationals (Forfás, 2012b). 
Alluding to the aggravating effects of FDI within the system, one respondent commented: 
‘Programmers at all levels [are] scarce, due in part to large multinationals absorbing the best 
talent.’ A mature firm CEO expressed a view in relation to competition for talent and 
implications for muted growth of the indigenous sector: ‘I think it’s one of the reasons why 
the indigenous industry is somewhat stunted, why we are economically crowded out by the 
multinationals’ [S3.2_Oc]. 
The adolescent software cohort identified the positive and significant impact of FDI 
presence on lobbying (p=<.02) as well as educational provision (<.008) alongside promotion 
of employment prospects more generally. Lobbying is formally spearheaded by ICT Ireland 
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and the Irish Software Association (ISA), which represent the interests of indigenous and 
foreign-owned companies under the umbrella of IBEC. Beyond promoting the needs of the 
sector – primarily in the human capital, taxation and funding arenas – ISA subsidises 
upskilling and management development programmes for employees and the wider labour 
force. 
The findings echo conclusions by O'Malley and O'Gorman (2001)  and O'Riain (2004) to the 
effect that foreign-owned technology subsidiaries generate beneficial effects by raising skill 
levels in the workforce; albeit prior research is absent micro data on indigenous firms. At 
the population level, it is noteworthy that, with limited exceptions, weak ties have been 
identified as a persistent factor undermining the growth potential of both sectors. The 
adolescent software cohort also identified a significant and positive correlation between 
leadership, general management and innovation outcomes (p=<.046). Managerial autonomy 
and adaptability is widely acknowledged in the literature while senior management is 
known to play a key role in solving the problems that allow young firms to progress to 
subsequent stages of development. 
Interviews reflect a dearth of qualified developers emerging from third-level institutions, a 
constraint exacerbated by the superior remuneration and development opportunities 
offered by the FDI sector. In keeping with the findings of Barry and Bradley (1997) and 
Lawless et al., (2012), skill levels are typically greater in subsidiaries, and wages are 
approximately 20 per cent higher than in the indigenous sector. In the words of the founder 
of a mature software company: ‘The money and the benefits in the larger companies are 
much better. Also, the job security is better; every economic crisis wipes out a bunch of 
indigenous companies because we don’t have access to funds’ [S3.2_Oc].  
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Foreign-owned companies appear to aggravate the liability of scarcity (Carroll and Hannan, 
1989; 2000) in respect of technical skills for mature software firms (p=<.005) as well as 
those aspiring to technical superiority (p=<.046) and, to a lesser extent, those seeking to 
maximise profits (p=<.077) due to perceived dilution of government support. The resulting 
tight niche packing (Carroll and Hannan, 1989) is intensified by ongoing sponsorship of entry 
to the sector both indigenously and through subsidiaries, but without a concomitant effort 
to address the skills gap albeit, initiatives are ongoing in relation to education provision and 
improved access to employment visas for qualified individuals.  
The weakest aspect of system fit relates to contention for software engineering and design 
skills – a situation that is not dissimilar to other economies, including Silicon Valley. 
However, the situation in Ireland is greatly aggravated by competition from overseas 
subsidiaries offering superior remuneration and career prospects.  
Engineering – human capital 
The engineering employee base is multifaceted, encompassing a broad range of unskilled, 
apprenticed and degree-qualified personnel. While sectors like manufacturing engineering 
are deemed LMT; this classification masks significant levels of new process and product 
adoption, and their impact on innovation. While the traditional engineering sector can be 
characterised as LMT, with R&D expenditure levels at one to three per cent of revenue 
(Smith, 2005), production processes are often highly knowledge intensive. As illustrated by 
the Director of a mature firm: ‘People talk about the promise of the knowledge-based 
economy. I think what we need is a knowledge-based manufacturing economy’ [E3.2_Pr]. 
The availability of skills and competencies varies significantly across technical, commercial 
and managerial roles. Young engineering firms recorded ease of recruitment (p=<.052) at 
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leadership and general management level. However, a number of participants contrasted 
the availability of degree-qualified applicants seeking supervisory roles against gaps in 
production engineering and technical programming skills. Indeed, the latter are reported as 
largely absent from the domestic labour pool. A recent Irish government report (Forfás, 
2013a) references the need for enhanced management capability and leadership skills to 
drive innovation and export growth in the new manufacturing era. The positive correlation 
in respect of leadership and management for young firms appears to downplay imbalanced 
system output with regard to the supply of production-oriented skills vis-à-vis graduate-
level candidates for manufacturing roles.  
A related theme that emerged repeatedly in interviews, but which was not found to be 
significant for a specific cohort, is the dearth of hybrid skills in the talent pool. While this 
analysis of age-skills dimensions presents a view of age contingent variables in the senior 
management and development fields, including a somewhat positive association with 
training provision (p=<.072) for managerial employees, the contingency perspective 
somewhat underplays the field data in respect of combined commercial-technical skills. This 
aspect of human capital acts as a constraint to establishing product-market fit and crafting 
business models as expressed in the viewpoint: ‘It’s hard to get a commercial person who 
has a technical-engineering background … They are much sought after and there aren’t 
many around’ [ESY_BC]. 
Notably, among those firms aspiring to technology leadership, competition for talent 
presented the sole significant correlation for the FDI dimension of the engineering SSI 
(<.058). The latter may signify problems with the supply of elite technical skills or the 
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possibility that human capital is diverted to foreign-owned subsidiaries for reasons observed 
in the indigenous software sector – superior remuneration and greater career prospects.  
Theoretical implications 
While any suggestion that innovation is monopolised by high-tech firms has been long 
discredited, debates on national research and technology policies are perceived to suffer 
from ‘high-tech myopia’ (Heidenrich, 2008, p.1), implying the superior potential of research-
intensive sectors. The findings, while reflecting the known differentials in policy focus, also 
suggest the need for more theory development in the area of human capital. Supply-side 
considerations include the perceived adequacy of leadership and general management 
talent among young firms, and contention for human capital with both indigenous and 
foreign-owned high-tech firms among those striving for technology leadership. While there 
has been much theory development in the area of FDI externalities, the advantages and 
disadvantages of FDI vis-à-vis specific sectors and firm-level contingencies within those 
sectors have not received attention to date.  
Managerial implications 
In light of the recognition among the adolescent software cohort of the complementary role 
played by FDI in expanding the skills base and buttressing lobbying capacity, practitioners in 
non-strategic sectors should seek to address deficits in this regard. The near absence of 
manufacturing engineering FDI representation amplifies the need for awareness building 
among indigenous firms. While the research uncovered a number of informal local and 
regional engineering sector associations, engagement with the national lobbying platform, 
IBEC’s Irish Engineering Enterprises Federation umbrella body, was minimal.  
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Policy implications 
The findings have several policy implications. The significance of technology skills for 
innovative output took precedence in interviews with adolescent and mature companies, 
where many report cultivating skills in-house, or being compelled to recruit abroad due to 
inadequate domestic provision. Unlike software engineering where skills are more 
standardised, expertise in engineering is less homogenous, which drives the tendency to 
mould employees in line with company practice. This cements a propensity for experience-
based learning, including strong tacit knowledge. The inclination to mould skills in-house 
may be a symptom of idiosyncratic management, and aligns with the preference for 
independence, which is further reinforced by self-funding. Albeit more tangential than the 
suggested effects of FDI on the software sector, liability of scarcity (Carroll and Hannan, 
1989; 2000) and tight niche packing (Carroll and Hannan, 1989) have an impact on the 
traditional engineering sector in respect of those seeking technology leadership positions.  
This concludes analysis of the findings and implications of the research in relation to the 
human capital dimensions of the SSIs. The next section analyses system dimensions related 
to innovative output.  
7.1.3 Innovation Types, Sources and Supports 
In line with theory, the field data characterise SME innovation as largely reactive and 
incremental. Based on solutions and adaptations required by customers or available from 
competitors, the majority consist of relatively small improvements, thus supporting the 
contention that most of the knowledge for innovation originates in near-market sources 
rather than technical research (Fagerberg, 2009; Lundvall et al., 2002; Roper, 1997).  
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Beyond products, the data present ample evidence of business model innovation in the 
form of companies developing new routes to market, innovating export distribution 
channels, developing products under licence and process innovation adding value through 
productivity improvement, design, development and manufacturing services.  
Software – innovation types, sources and supports 
There was one significant age-related correlation in respect of the innovation input variables 
for the software sector. While much research focusses on collaboration mechanisms that 
facilitate innovative output, specifically in the context of resource-constrained SMEs 
(Eisenhardt and Forbes, 1984; Lundvall et al., 2002), young cohort respondents reported 
direct customer input as having no effect (p=<.005) on innovation. This runs contrary to the 
general understanding that interaction with customers has stronger effects on the 
probability of product innovation (Jordan and O’Leary, 2011) and the near market emphasis 
cited above. The result may indicate that collaboration has a restrained influence on more 
radical product innovation, cementing the view that customer interactions focus mostly on 
incremental change (Un, Cuervo-Cazurra and Asakawa, 2010). Otherwise, technology-
oriented firms are seen to demonstrate less interest in market-based innovations if they do 
not involve state-of-the-art technologies (Zhou, Kin and Tse, 2005). While both scenarios 
represent innovation, it may be that young firms do not classify incremental improvement 
as innovation, or, alternatively, that early innovation initiatives among young firms are 
conceived internally and become subject to market interaction and customer validation 
later. Consistent with the finding on customer interaction, interview narratives suggest a life 
course effect in adolescent and mature companies’ attitudes to technology: many reported 
how early technology push gave way to more client-centred solutions, with holistic offerings 
overtaking or embodying standalone technology. This is illustrated by a young firm CEO who 
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described technology as important but subservient to his firm’s potential to create value, 
emphasising a growing appreciation for non-technology-based innovation and diffusion: 
‘You obviously have to have the technology in the first place, but technological innovation 
has a medium impact on our potential to grow…Execution is more important than 
technological superiority. If you asked me five years ago, I would have said [it was] top 
priority but … I don't think it's so much about the technology as about how you deliver the 
offering and the service that you support it with’ [S1.1_Az]. 
Among significant software strategy-related associations in respect of innovation types and 
sources were the link between profit-oriented firms and the impact of changes in sales and 
distribution methods, as well as the apparent ineffectiveness of higher education 
institutions as a source of innovation for that cohort. Improved production and service 
provision methods were significantly correlated among those firms seeking longevity.    
Firms aspiring to maximise sales growth indicated significant correlation with respect to 
innovation in sales and distribution methods (p=<.035) compared to alternative strategy 
types. Given the link between effective sales and company growth, this relationship might 
be anticipated; but interview data suggest that such innovation is not commonplace. An 
exploratory interview with a partner in a VC firm illustrates how weak go-to-market 
strategies can result in commercial failure despite the presence of market opportunity and 
novel solutions. The partner reflected: ‘… when I look across our successful and unsuccessful 
companies, there’s no difference in their technical capabilities, but there is a difference in 
their ability to sell and go out to the market and meet customers, convince them they should 
have their product, and that they should pay for it and not be with anyone else’ [VC D]. 
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Software firms seeking to maximise growth indicated that third level institutions were not 
important sources of product/process-related innovation, having no impact on innovative 
output (p=<.004). This resonates with extant findings that HEIs do not have a significant 
effect on business innovation (Jordan and O’Leary, 2008; McCann and Simonen, 2005; 
Roper, Du and Love, 2008). More pointedly, in the Irish high-tech sector, Jordan (2011) and 
Jordan and O’Leary (2011) found a negative relationship between the frequency of 
interaction with academic researchers and the probability of product and process 
innovation.  
Firms seeking longevity, in keeping with lifecycle theory on process innovation, reported 
that innovations in production or service capacity delivered significant positive impact 
(p=<.027). While process-oriented output was high among more mature companies, and 
thus consistent with the need to formalise methods and standards, significant elements of 
the value delivered to customers concerned process outputs. One company founder actively 
set out to build a technology-intensive business that would scale up without related 
increases in headcount and capital outlay. He described leveraging previous experience in a 
people-intensive business to achieve his objective: ‘I took my knowledge about running a 
service business and this, I suppose, is where the innovation came from. I was looking for a 
business that could be upgraded by adding a server instead of a person. Scalability was the 
most important thing for me, regardless of the idea. … It’s not a people-intensive business 
it’s a technology-intensive business’ [S2.3_Gtm] 
The theoretical, managerial and policy implications are summarised below, following 
analysis of findings for the traditional engineering sector.  
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Engineering – innovation types, sources and supports 
Adolescent engineering firms accounted for the majority of significant associations, 
including launch of new-to-firm products and launching services already available from 
competitors (p=<.018), a tendency to develop products primarily in-house (p=<.014) and 
ease of access to R&D resources (p=<.050). In relation to the in-house focus on new product 
introductions, a number of informants described a disruptive innovation stance, crafting 
solutions similar to ‘more sophisticated German counterparts’ (without reference to reverse 
engineering), by taking a low-cost, low-complexity approach to achieving market fit and 
competitiveness. 
Young engineering firms reported the relatively limited import of consultants, commercial 
labs and private R&D providers in supporting their innovation activities (p=<.016). This likely 
relates to their focus on near-market development, with direct response to customer needs 
reducing the necessity for research and potentially allowing them to bootstrap future 
innovation initiatives.  
Significant associations with regard to strategic intent were dominated by firms aspiring to 
business longevity in the areas of in-house innovation (p=<.044), changes in sales and 
distribution methods (p=<.046) and benefits attained from working with InterTrade Ireland 
(p=<.043), primarily through education partnerships. Profit-seeking firms reflected 
negatively in relation to government and public research support (p=<.004), with many 
suggesting that preference is afforded to foreign investment initiatives, due to their superior 
employment impact.  
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Theoretical implications 
Given the economic potential in technology start-ups, there is significant scope for empirical 
work in the context of business model innovation. The work of Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2010) and Maurya (2012) on business model visualisation, as well as the work of Blank 
(2005) and Ries (2011) on customer and lean development, has been widely diffused among 
start-up communities. This research suggests that the pattern of learning which emerges 
through a firm’s life course can be escalated through live case studies carried out in 
conjunction with HEIs. This is particularly important in light of resource constraints 
combined with mortality rates among start-ups. 
By extension, while a number of authors counsel against regarding servitisation as a remedy 
for sustaining manufacturing business in tough markets, they note significant potential for 
helping companies to exploit higher-value activities (Baines et al., 2009; Reinartz and Ulaga, 
2008). The parallel process of productisation in software firms, whereby many offerings are 
developed in response to customer-specific needs – essentially creating unrepeatable 
propositions which undermine potential to scale – would benefit from extended empirical 
analysis. Baines et al. (2009) cite the dearth of research available to help practitioners make 
the necessary transition.  
Implications for practitioners  
While SMEs aspiring to growth are assumed likely to establish partnerships (Hansen and 
Hamilton, 2011), the data presents mixed evidence of inter-firm collaboration for new 
product and service innovations. Overall, collaboration levels were consistent with Robson 
and Bennett’s (2000) assertion that supply chain collaboration constitutes the most 
significant route to partnering for SME innovation. However, the preference for 
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independent development of new offerings is in line with research findings that ‘Irish SMEs 
are inclined to innovate in-house’ (European Commission, 2012, p.9). The limited 
importance of customer engagement for innovation in young software firms supports this 
analysis and is allied to the restricted outside involvement in development of new products 
and services in adolescent engineering firms and in those seeking longevity. Historically, 
LMT firms have displayed a decline in propensity to collaborate, with levels of R&D-type 
partnering decreasing from about 20 per cent in the 1960s to 10 per cent in the 1980s and 5 
per cent in the 1990s (Hagedoorn, 2002).  
Customer collaboration facilitates faster proof of concept and mitigates the risk associated 
with frontier-type projects. This thinking represents a precursor to the lean start-up concept 
(Ries, 2011; Maurya, 2012) which places emphasis on building products iteratively, based on 
product-market hypothesis testing throughout the preliminary stages of the product 
lifecycle. With regard to collaborative R&D relationships, Love and Roper (2001) observe 
that networking may lead to risk-sharing, allowing firms to undertake developments that 
would be too costly or risky to undertake independently. One process innovation identified 
in interviews is sales lead sharing among companies within a regional engineering 
association: when orders are too large for one company to fulfil, contracts assigned to one 
entity are delivered in collaboration with other association members, thus creating 
cooperative-competitive relationships. A broader purview in respect of cooperation with 
industry networks, competitors, customers and suppliers merits managerial consideration.  
Implications for policy  
Continuing the previous theme, but with a different focus for policy makers, firms are 
known to maximise R&D returns by directing product research towards customers (Grimpe 
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and Sofka, 2009). However, the data show that much of firms’ R&D efforts were focussed on 
near-market opportunities (development), and that agency funding criteria were largely 
aligned with customer and market feedback. While this has overwhelmingly positive 
consequences for market validation, it may foreshadow ambitions for more radical 
innovation. In addition, while the production of game-changing technology is a challenge for 
SMEs in the context of the many constraints discussed in this thesis, there may be merit in 
facilitating companies to take bigger risks – with limited exceptions; this appears to be the 
preserve of institutional researchers in conjunction with multinationals. As illustrated by a 
business development director of a mature engineering firm:  ‘I see a lot of research going 
on in third level for MNCs. NUI Maynooth is like a research vessel for Intel and, similarly, UCG 
ties in with Boston Scientific – rightly so, they are massive employers with huge revenue 
streams for the country’ [E3.2_Pre].  
To continue the theme of game-changing technologies, higher education institutions are 
considered a bulwark of Systems of Innovation, yet the findings suggest a lack of fitness for 
purpose for growth-oriented SMEs in the software sector. While not significant, for other 
cohorts, the problem appears to be pervasive. Just as research at the technology frontier is 
more likely to serve the needs of Ireland’s FDI population, applied research on behalf of 
SMEs both in terms of product-market fit and route to market across the technical and 
commercial domains could be given priority at institutional level. This suggests striking a 
better balance between institutional emphasis on the absorption, adaption and diffusion of 
technologies alongside technology development. Ideally managed by enterprise agencies in 
conjunction with HEIs, this area is amenable to a pilot approach, the design of which would 
include management and evaluation criteria. In the context of institutional objectives, this 
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plank of the system could yield results which would embed relationships for the wider 
benefit of students, firms and educators. 
While not significant for a specific cohort, third-level business incubators were seen as a 
potential source of competition for human capital, diverting talent into start-ups rather than 
supporting established firms to scale up. Lundvall et al., (2009) point to the challenge of high 
volumes of start-ups in contrast with a short supply of entrepreneurship initiative within 
existing firms. One mature firm CEO observed that ‘… incubation gives you a safe haven and 
… all the talent is getting diverted into micro companies that will never go anywhere’ 
[S2.3_GT].  
Given the unanticipated effects of FDI on innovation system fit, the following provides a 
brief analysis of the impacts that emerged from the research.  
7.1.4 Foreign Direct Investment 
Context 
The role played by FDI vis-à-vis system-fit for indigenous firms emerged in exploratory 
interviews. While extant research acknowledges the positive and negative effects of FDI on 
the economy of host nations, the perceived level of impact was as potent as it was 
unanticipated. Specific FDI variables were created for the survey as existing measures 
(Community Innovation Survey) did not adequately capture direct effects on system fit. 
While there is some impact on manufacturing engineering firms, specifically in respect of 
human capital and more generally in terms of perceived dilution of government support, 
pros and cons are predictably greater for the software SSI, given the concentration of high-
tech subsidiaries.   
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Despite synergies between the indigenous and foreign-owned sectors, such as joint lobbying 
of the education system, Irish-owned firms appear to suffer from a liability of smallness 
(Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983) in respect of lower wage rates, reduced job security 
and fewer opportunities for progression. While share options are seen to offer a positive 
alternative for employees of indigenous software firms, exit potential is largely tied to trade 
sales given the limited number of IPOs, exacerbated by the number of de-listings since the 
early 2000s. Associated theories on the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and niche 
packing (Carroll and Hannan, 1989) combined with the evidence from this research, provide 
strong indications that FDI exerts a preponderantly negative impact on system resources 
and, as a consequence, on the innovative capacity of indigenous firms.  
Policy implications 
The dual structure of the Irish economy, induced by a long-term commitment to FDI-led 
industrialisation, has resulted in two distinct economic sectors. Beyond the weak 
interactions between the foreign and indigenous sectors, and contrary to prior findings of 
the positive influence of FDI on the competitive advantage of indigenous firms (O’Malley 
and O’Gorman, 2001), the research for this thesis uncovered unexpected levels of 
contention between the two. While the role played by FDI in the Irish economy is 
overwhelmingly positive, the beneficial effects are inadvertently diluted by what appear to 
be poorly managed consequences. Larger, more established firms have access to a greater 
array of resources and they enjoy advantages over smaller counterparts, including being 
better positioned to compete for qualified labour with inevitable consequences for growth. 
This presents particular liabilities of smallness and newness in the Irish software SSI. The 
effect of inward investment is likely to diminish the human capital available to indigenous 
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firms, thus creating the potential for ‘the rich getting richer while the poor get poorer’ 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1986, p.445)  
While SSI elements can reinforce each other in promoting processes of learning and 
innovation, as observed by Lundvall (1992, p.2) ‘virtuous and vicious cycles’ are also a by-
product of the system. If, as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest, the number of 
organisations in a population is a function of environmental carrying capacity, the data 
reveal contrary effects with regard to the supply of talent, and to a lesser extent, 
government focus within the system. As noted above, the talent constraints exert greatest 
impact on mature software firms, but also have impact on those striving to deliver 
technologically advanced propositions across both the software and engineering sectors.  
This research suggests that employing separate policies and agencies to design and govern 
FDI and indigenous firms leads to parallel consideration (with minimal evidence of cross-
over), rather than an integrated ecosystem approach. Independent of advocating 
consideration of firm-level contingencies, the design and execution of policy rooted in the 
SSI framework would engender tighter scrutiny of mutual effects – ultimately delivering a 
more robust and potentially self-reinforcing system with direct and indirect spill overs.  
While indigenous software firms recognise the potential benefits of sub-supply and the 
increased lobbying power offered by their FDI counterparts, continued promotion of the 
software sector against the backdrop of an insufficient talent pool appears to result in firms 
adapting firstly, through overseas recruitment and secondly, through offshoring of design 
and engineering effort. An alternative consequence in the context of superior prospects and 
financial sureties offered by multinationals is that the adequacy of resources within the 
software SSI and those aspiring to technology leadership in the engineering sector, forces 
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indigenous firms to persist on the margins of the resource base (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). 
While policy makers and state agencies indicate awareness of tight niche packing (Carroll & 
Hannan, 1989), public debate on the problem is limited and to some extent dissuaded – 
constituting something of an elephant in the room.   
Liability of scarcity 
An important aspect of environmental adoption is the potential effect of density at the time 
of firm foundation, leading to higher mortality rates across the life course of the population. 
Additionally, founding conditions are said to have a disproportionate effect on young firms 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Stinchcombe, 1965), as conditions at birth and early 
infancy shape development in significant ways (Kimberly, 1980). In light of the likelihood of 
diminishing returns as resources become depleted, Aldrich (1999) warns of the potential for 
‘niche-crowding’ (p.269) as competition for resources intensifies in high-density 
environments. The density-delay hypothesis originating in mathematical population models 
suggests an imprint effect of firm density at founding. In their starting point argument, 
Carroll and Hannan (2000 pp.241-242) coin the term ‘liability of scarcity’ and outline the 
adverse effects of density at the time of firm foundation, including intense competition 
creating resource scarcity and tight niche packing resulting in new entrants competing for 
thinly spread resources, leading to higher than average mortality rates. This extends the 
debate about the practice of governments ‘picking winners’ where existing resource 
constraints appear to be compounded by attracting new entrants into targeted, yet 
resource-poor, sectors. 
With respect to early-stage firms, some organisational ecologists believe that businesses, 
once born, have little if any flexibility to change and will succeed or fail according to 
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environment-based selection (Engel and Teece, 2012), where variations in early stage 
resources have significant long-run impact on mortality.  
Niche-crowding may exemplify the situation in emerging high-technology domains, with 
significant competition for skills across indigenous and foreign-owned sectors further 
compounded by contention for seed funding and equity funding. On the contrary, low-tech 
manufacturing sectors may, as a consequence of low population density, suffer from 
insufficient numbers opting for non-high tech careers, exacerbated by cross-sectoral 
competition for managerial talent and, to a lesser extent, investment capital. System 
analysis in this context should take into account the size of a population relative to generic 
and industry-specific resources.  
This concludes the analysis of significant associations and implications of the research. To 
follow is a review of research limitations and prospects for future research.  
7.2 Limitations of this research  
While a range of exciting and valuable contributions have been drawn from the data, in 
common with most research, this analysis has a number of limitations which need to be 
considered in interpreting the results. Some elements represent interesting topics for future 
research.  
In relation to the extent to which findings are transferable to a broader sample, the research 
context was confined to two sectors in a single national territory which may limit its external 
validity. While it is anticipated that many of the variables could be adapted to other sectoral 
systems, the data originate uniquely from Irish SMEs, leaving open to question the 
generalisability of the findings to other economies. The latter is partially illustrated by 
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contrasting results from the software and engineering sectors. Employing the same 
framework, comparative analyses in different institutional contexts could add to the 
generalisability of the findings.  
A second limitation arises from the nature of the study and the ability to draw inferences for 
longitudinal relationships from cross-sectional data. This includes survivor bias. Differing 
macro-economic conditions add to the difficulty of drawing long-term implications from 
cross-sectional research and one-off surveys of innovation-related activity. Building on 
systems thinking, innovation is recognised as a cumulative phenomenon which leverages 
existing knowledge and strategies, including prior inventions and innovations; therefore the 
results are best interpreted as suggesting associations among the selected variables at one 
point in time.  
On a related issue, the adoption of a questionnaire as a research instrument, while 
supported by in-depth interviews, falls short of a sophisticated temporal study. As observed 
by Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron (2001) , the preferable way to ‘reveal multiple levels 
of context in the interaction field is to have a time series sufficiently long to show how firm, 
sector and economic levels of context interact’(p.699). It is hoped that the shortcomings of 
the questionnaire are at least partially offset by the insights provided through the interview 
process.  
7.3 Future Research  
The research findings provide several new insights; however, they also indicate the potential 
for further research on the mobilisation of firm-level contingencies in the design, 
management and evaluation of system fit.  
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Beyond a cross-sectional study, there is scope to explore the regulating effect of age and 
strategic intent longitudinally and within other territories. Such studies would benefit from 
analysis of the software and manufacturing engineering sectors to provide added insights 
through comparative sector analysis.  
The findings in this chapter contribute to the apparent gap in the literature for a more 
systematised understanding of the impact of firm dynamics on system fit. However, there is 
significant opportunity to extend the contribution by supplementing the model with 
alternative contingencies such as firm ownership structure, measures of value-add, export 
orientation and business models. This might necessitate the integration of theoretical 
frameworks from other disciplines, capturing further complexities of SSI fit.  
Finally, while this research concentrated on correlating individual contingencies with system 
dimensions, contingencies are known to occur together, potentially with conflicting 
implications. Cross-correlation of firm-level contingencies would likely offer further insights 
into the complex and multi-dimensional nature of system-fit. This could produce additional 
fine-grained data, supplementing the findings of this study and adding to the theoretical 
understanding of system fit.   
7.4 Key contributions 
The empirical evidence provided in this research represents important contributions to the 
SSI literature in respect of theory and policy. The following section focuses on six central 
contributions, three in the realm of theory and three in the policy domain.  
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Theoretical Contributions 
While current SI theory embraces the notion that the policies and institutions which enable 
growth are context specific, the theory offers limited recognition of specificity at the firm 
level. As Pettigrew et al. (2001) contend, it is crucial to use context analytically and not just 
as a stimulus environment. The micro perspective adopted in this research extends theory 
on a number of levels: 
Firstly, the findings support a supplemental approach to the study of SSI suggesting that 
combined analysis of respective micro and institutional-level variables could yield richer 
theory than standard macro and meso-level perspectives. This research represents the first 
empirical analysis of contingency-based system fit, theorising the relationship between firm-
level variables and innovation system dimensions. The findings suggest that research 
combining the analysis of respective micro and institutional variables can yield richer theory 
than the standard macro and meso-level perspectives adopted heretofore. 
The second theoretical contribution is the novel integration of literature on SSI, age and 
strategic intent. The three literatures have developed independently of each other, yet each 
is focused on how firms adapt to internal and external dynamics. The theories on systems of 
innovation, age and strategic intent have not previously been linked in this way. 
The third theoretical contribution is the principal age and strategic contingency perspective. 
The empirical research uncovered systematic relations between SSI-fit and observable firm-
level variables. Judgements about SI have tended to be based on a macro or whole-system 
view whereas this research suggests that the same system may work very differently for 
companies with distinct age and strategy profiles within the same sector, suggesting that a 
more contingent view is needed. Notably, the integration of firm contingencies within the 
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framework has provided more insight than the comparative case study approach employed 
in the extant literature.  
Policy Contributions 
Despite the institutional perspective that macro and micro environments are inextricably 
interwoven (Zucker, 1977), policy design, as currently practiced, relies largely on territorial 
and sectoral frameworks with limited consideration of micro-level characteristics. Firm 
contingencies offer scope for policy adaptation through the use of rich company data to 
chart system fit. Insights derived into the reciprocity of firm age, strategic aspiration and fit 
create the potential to refine current policy by examining not only those dimensions which 
support or impede innovation, but to further distinguish the effects of different 
contingencies on distinct sectors. Notably, this study intersects with the emergent National 
Systems of Entrepreneurship concept, which aims to capture ‘the moderating effect of 
institutional conditions on individual processes’ (Acs et al., 2014, p.490). This has 
implications for pragmatism in the design of policy and for benchmarking innovation 
systems with respect to firm contingencies. Policy makers and their agencies have a 
substantial role to play in crafting institutional designs that take advantage of fit. This 
suggests a diagnostic, rather than a blueprinting approach to system design, incorporating 
theory and firm-level data to produce models. As observed by Fagerberg, Mowery, & 
Verspagen (2009) research findings are often too general to be instructive for policy makers. 
The results of this research do not justify a generalised diagnostic approach; however, they 
do suggest merit in assessing selected variables within key sectors. The micro perspective 
adopted in this thesis has the potential to inform policy on a number of levels: 
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Firstly, the model demonstrates the mutually impactful roles of firm-level contingency and 
system dimensions in innovation system design. The contingency view offers a possible 
alternative to the normative approach which typically proposes universal policy solutions to 
meet complex and sometimes contradictory sectoral and organisational challenges. Policy 
designers may thus be encouraged to assess dual-fit.   
A second contribution relates to the comparative analyses of innovation and enterprise in 
distinct SSI. By establishing the extent to which firm contingency affects system fit across 
two contrasting sectors, this research examines emergent and traditional firms in parallel, 
making a contribution to ‘cross-level’ policy design. Consistent with prior research (e.g. 
Rumelt, 1991) industry-wide factors may matter less than firm dynamics, underscoring the 
importance of policy makers drawing on agency. 
The final policy contribution focuses on the influence of contingency-based system fit on 
micro-level performance. Insight into fit based on firm contingencies represents a 
potentially valuable contribution to our knowledge of how innovative potential can be 
enhanced. This is in harmony with the thinking of Rodrik (2009) that development 
economists should adopt the role of ‘diagnosticians’ (p.5) helping decision makers to choose 
the right model and remedies for their specific realities, offering some reinforcement of the 
suggestion that policy-makers should adopt a more diagnostic approach to innovation 
system design and management.  
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7.5 Closing remarks 
Through the lens of firm contingency, this research sought to examine whether the current 
conception of SSI policy adequately reflects firm dynamics. It analysed what is known about 
innovation, based on two contingencies i.e. firm age and strategic aspiration, in the context 
of framing conditions within two SSIs. More specifically, it aimed to uncover whether 
particular age and strategy cohorts are more or less conducive to fit with selected system 
dimensions. The research challenges the conceptualisation of SSI by demonstrating that 
system properties respond differently based on distinct contingencies within sectors.  
The research elaborates on several issues that are core to innovative capacity and it brings 
to the fore several concerns in need of managerial, policy and scholarly analysis. Insight into 
system fit based on firm contingencies represents a valuable contribution to our knowledge 
of how innovative potential can be enhanced through an improved understanding of policy 
design and evaluation. The evidence in the thesis points to the significance of a micro-level 
perspective.  
 
Drawing on a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, this research began by analysing the 
overarching systems of innovation, firm age and strategic aspiration literature. Within the 
framework developed, sectoral system dimensions were correlated with firm-level 
characteristics. Significant associations based on the output of dual sector surveys were 
supported by qualitative data from interviews to qualify and elaborate the framework, thus 
re-interpreting the SSI through the lens of significant contingencies.  
A primary objective was to move beyond the macro/meso-level focus on SI by focusing on 
the heterogeneity of firms and the question of how SSI fit is affected by the resulting 
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diversity in micro-level processes. Through the medium of strategy and age-driven variables, 
organisational development engenders contingent conditions, creating inherent potential 
for synergies and conflicts with the system. While recognising that firm-specific factors are 
central to explaining the innovative capacity and output of companies across the software 
and manufacturing engineering sectors, we established that age and strategic contingencies 
have a significant and heterogeneous effect on system fit. This calls into question the degree 
to which systems should be designed with reference to firms’ sectoral, technological or 
territorial profile – suggesting that micro-level contingencies are similarly influential to 
innovative capacity. The insights offer potential to explain and address gaps in system 
configuration by fostering a more contextualised understanding of the SI domain. 
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Appendix 1: Overview of research sites - Phase 1 
Firm  Areas of activity  Informant  
Engineering 
SME 
Instant UpRight is a global provider of access solutions, 
manufacturing and supplying their  instant alloy tower system and 
custom-engineered scaffolding access solutions for the Aviation, 
Power Generation and Industrial markets 
Managing Director, 
John Nevin  
 Trenchlink designs and manufactures a system of interlocking, 
ductile iron road plates which are to cover utility trenches 
maximising safety with minimum disruption for road users.   
Managing Director, 
David Byrne 
Software 
SME 
FlexTime develops and supplies web oriented solutions for Flexible 
Working, Time & Attendance and Staff Scheduling 
Managing Director, 
Ciaran Rowsome 
Soft-ex develops web-based Telecom Data Intelligence and 
enterprise communications management tools for mobile and 
fixed operators and corporate enterprises. 
Managing Director, 
Ian Sparling 
IBEC The Irish Engineering Enterprises Federation (IEEF) promotes and 
supports the competitiveness and prosperity of the engineering 
sector in Ireland through the representation of the sector's 
interests to national government and EU institutions, the provision 
of business and market information to companies, and 
development of specific programmes on key business issues. 
Director, Marion 
Byron 
 
The Irish Software Association (ISA) provides a voice for the 
technology sector to enable companies to build their ability to 
scale, increase funding levels in sector and push the sector’s 
requirements in the political sphere in a coherent way. 
Director of the ISA, 
Paul Sweetman 
Enterprise 
Ireland  
Responsible for strategy & policy in relation to the development of 
the indigenous internationally traded firms, Enterprise Ireland 
provides direct supports to Irish companies at all stages of 
development to foster job creation and export growth. Their 
programmes offer a range of assistance in the broad categories of: 
Company Growth, Capability Building, High Potential Start Ups, 
Seed and VC Programmes, and Research collaboration and 
commercialisation. 
Manager, 
Engineering Markets 
Division, Neil 
O'Sullivan 
Manager, 
Internationally 
Traded Services & 
Software Division, 
Jim Cuddy 
Venture 
Capital  
Delta Partner is a VC firm investing primarily in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom. The firm was established in 1994 and had €250m 
under management at the time of interview. 
General 
Partner,  Maurice 
Roche 
Kernel Capital has a portfolio of investee companies across, 
technology, life science and general industry. The company was 
established in 2002 and had €173m under management at the 
time of interview.  
Founder and 
Managing Partner, 
Niall Olden 
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Appendix 2: Overview of research sites - Phase 2 
Firm  Areas of activity  Age Employees 
/Revenue 
(2009) 
Informant  
S1.1 Technology supporting automated business processes 
Wireless internet services providers 
6 10/700k CEO 
S1.2 Wireless technology to detect physical proximity 
between people, businesses and devices. 
8 11/750k CEO 
S1.3 Middleware supplier to the travel industry 7 116/9M Chief Technology 
Officer 
S2.1 Automated customer contact solutions 11 22/3M Sales Director 
S2.2 Systems integration solutions for laboratory and 
manufacturing systems 
11 22/2.5M Managing Director 
and Co-Founder 
S2.3 Mobile marketing media services 11 11/900k Founder Director 
S3.1 e-invoicing services for accounts payable, accounts 
receivable and billing 
14 13/1.2M CEO 
S3.2 Software for retail and lab optical industry 14 86/10M CEO 
S3.3 E-learning solutions  22 65/5.6M CEO 
E1.1 Multidirectional forklifts 11 200/45M Managing Director 
E1.2 Sub-supply of steel fabrications and end products to 
the agricultural, industrial, sports and marine sectors 
15 70/6.5M Managing Director 
E1.3 Engineering systems for gas generation 17 11/1.4M Managing Director 
E2.1 Precision engineering sub-supply to medical, 
electronic, aerospace and automotive customers  
31 67/6.9M Managing Director 
and Head of 
Operations 
E2.2 Manufacture of excavator attachments and hitching 
technology 
31 110/13.5 Managing Director 
E2.3 Clean-tech machine fabrication  34 50/6.2M Managing Director 
E3.1 Metal fabrication including custom-built components 
and design and manufacture  of galvanized silos 
40 72/7.5M Sales & Market 
Director 
E3.2 Sub-supply of precision machined components and 
fully tested electro-mechanical assemblies 
42 75/11M VP Business  
Development  
E3.3 Mechanical and structural engineering including 
conveyor and marine systems 
40 38/5.1M General Manager 
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Appendix 3: Phase 2 Interview Schedule  
Introduction 
The objective of the interview is to gain insight into chief executive level perceptions of the 
engineering and software Sectoral Innovation Systems respectively. Questions are general in 
nature and the interview should take no more than an hour to complete.  
Questions 
Demographics:  
 
Date of incorporation:  
 
Turnover 2006/2007/2008 
 
Employees 2006/2007/2008 
 
1. Please describe your company’s founding history  
2. How would you describe the core activity of the business – has this changed since its 
foundation? 
3. What have been the key drivers of innovation over the past three years?  
4. How would you describe your firm’s strategy for growth – strategic intent? 
5. How would you categorise your business in terms of low-medium-high technology? 
6. How would you categorise the rate of growth in your sector low-medium-high? 
7. To what extent to you cost innovation activity? If so, what metrics do you use? 
8. How, if at all, does your company protect Intellectual Property? 
9. Considering your firm’s most recent innovation project, how long did it take to bring 
the project to market? 
10. Thinking about the Quality and Skills of the workforce 2006-2008 
a. How adequate was the supply of Technology and Business graduates 
b. How important have Technology and Business graduates been to the growth 
and development of the business? 
11. Thinking about advancing capability via training and development 2006-2008  
a. How adequate is the range of Technology and Business programmes on offer 
b. How important have such programmes been to the development of your 
business? 
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12. Thinking about the availability of funding for innovation 2006-2008 
a. How adequate was the supply of funding (Bank/Equity/Retained 
earnings/Agency) 
b. How important has such funding been to the development of your business? 
13. Thinking about innovation partnerships 2006-2008 
a. To what extent has your company engaged with external partners  
b. How important have such partnerships been to the development of your 
business? 
14. Thinking about technology-based Innovation (Goods/Services/Processes) 2006-2008 
a. To what extent have you engaged in innovation? 
b. To what extent were those innovations developed in-house or with external 
partners? 
c. How important have the innovations been to the development of your 
business? 
15. Thinking about non-technology-based Innovation (e.g. Business 
model/Procedures/Routes to Market) 2006-2008 
a. To what extent have you engaged in that type of innovation? 
b. To what extent were those innovations developed in-house or with partners? 
c. How important have such innovations been to the development of your 
business? 
16. In terms of resources, what do you believe are the most important determinants of 
innovation in the sector?  
 
Many thanks for taking the time to participate in this study. We realise that your 
time and experience are valuable and your contributions are much appreciated.  
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire Review Panel 
Commercial Review Panel 
Mr. David Byrne, Managing Director, MD, Trenchlink 
Mr. Raomal Perera, Entrepreneur and co-founder Network365/Valista and ISOCOR 
Mr. Simon Rees, Sales and Marketing Director, Idiro Technologies 
Mr. John Wall, Managing Director, GxP Systems  
Mr. David Walsh, General Manager, KelTech Engineering 
Academic Review Panel 
Dr. Anthony Buckley, Lecturer, School of Marketing, Dublin Institute of Technology 
(DIT) 
Dr. Joseph Coughlan, Head of School, Accounting and Finance, DIT 
Dr. Daire Hooper, Lecturer, School of Management, DIT  
Mr. Paul O’Reilly, Head of School, Management Studies, DIT  
Professor Stephen Roper, Professor of Enterprise and Director of the Enterprise 
Research Centre, Warwick Business School 
Professor Pamela Sharkey Scott, Maynooth University.  
 
Extract from feedback on original Questionnaire 
General comments: Generally, font size too small.  
Some questions congested.  
Refinement of cover letter  
Refinement of follow-up letter.   
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaires 
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